UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT
_____________________________________________


At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
9th day of August, two thousand nineteen.

________________________________________
Julie Brown, Miami Herald Media Company,

Intervenors - Appellants.
v.

Ghislaine Maxwell,

Defendant - Appellee,
v.

Virginia L. Giuffre,

Plaintiff - Appellee.
_______________________________________




ORDER
Docket No: 18-2868

Appellee, Ghislaine Maxwell, filed a petition for panel rehearing, or, in the alternative, for
rehearing en banc. The panel that determined the appeal has considered the request for panel
rehearing, and the active members of the Court have considered the request for rehearing en banc.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.






FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk


Case 18-2868, Document 271, 08/09/2019, 2628203, Page1 of 1
Selected docket entries for case 18−2868
Generated: 08/09/2019 10:13:24
Filed
Document Description
Page
Docket Text
08/09/2019 272 Order FILED
2 ORDER, dated 08/09/2019, directing the Clerk to issue the
mandate forthwith, by JAC, RSP, CFD, FILED.[2628208]
[18−2868]
08/09/2019 273
JUDGMENT MANDATE, ISSUED.[2628218] [18−2868]
273 Judgment Mandate ISSUED
4
273 Supporting Document
5
273 Supporting Document
30
08/09/2019 275 UNSEALED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RECORD,
DOCKETED
31 UNSEALED SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD,
appendix 1 of 13 , pursuant to the Court's decision dated
July 3, 2019, DOCKETED. [2628223] [18−2868]
08/09/2019 276 UNSEALED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RECORD,
DOCKETED
49 UNSEALED SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD,
appendix 2 of 13 , pursuant to the Court's decision dated
July 3, 2019, DOCKETED. [2628224] [18−2868]
08/09/2019 277 UNSEALED SUMMARY
JUDGMENT RECORD,
DOCKETED
126 UNSEALED SUMMARY JUDGMENT RECORD,
appendix 3 of 13 , pursuant to the Court's decision dated
July 3, 2019, DOCKETED. [2628225] [18−2868]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT



At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
9th day of August, two thousand nineteen.

Before:
José A. Cabranes,
Rosemary S. Pooler,


Christopher F. Droney,



Circuit Judges.
________________________________

Julie Brown, Miami Herald Media Company,

Intervenors - Appellants,
v.

Ghislaine Maxwell,

Defendant - Appellee,
v.

Virginia L. Giuffre,

Plaintiff - Appellee.


ORDER

18-2868

________________________________

Alan M. Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich,
DBA Cernovich Media,

Intervenors - Appellants,
v.

Virginia L. Giuffre,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.

Ghislaine Maxwell,

Defendant-Appellee.



16-3945(L)
17-1625(Con)
17-1722(Con)
________________________________

Case 18-2868, Document 272, 08/09/2019, 2628208, Page1 of 2


IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.









For the Court:








Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,





Clerk of Court
































Case 18-2868, Document 272, 08/09/2019, 2628208, Page2 of 2


UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT


At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
3rd day of July, two thousand and nineteen.

Before:
José A. Cabranes,


Rosemary S. Pooler,


Christopher F. Droney,



Circuit Judges.
________________________________

Julie Brown, Miami Herald Media Company,

Intervenors - Appellants.
v.

Ghislaine Maxwell,

Defendant - Appellee,
v.

Virginia L. Giuffre,

Plaintiff - Appellee.


JUDGMENT
Docket Nos. 18-2868
________________________________


The appeal in the above captioned case from a judgment of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York was argued on the district court’s record and the
parties’ briefs. Upon consideration thereof,


IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the orders of the District
Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018 are VACATED. The
Court further ORDERS the unsealing of the summary judgment record as described in its
opinion. The case is REMANDED to the District Court for a particularized review of the
remaining materials.










For the Court:








Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,





Clerk of Court








MANDATE
MANDATE ISSUED ON 08/09/2019
Case 18-2868, Document 273-1, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page1 of 1
18‐2868; 16‐3945‐cv(L) 
 
Brown v. Maxwell; Dershowitz v. Giuffre


In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
 
 
 
 
AUGUST TERM 2018 
 
No. 18‐2868‐cv 
 
JULIE BROWN, MIAMI HERALD COMPANY, 
Intervenors‐Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 
Defendant‐Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE, 
Plaintiff‐Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 16‐3945‐cv(L) 
No. 17‐1625 (CON) 
No. 17‐1722(CON) 
 
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, MICHAEL CERNOVICH, DBA CERNOVICH 
MEDIA, 
Intervenors‐Appellants, 
Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page1 of 25

2 
 
V.  
 
VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE, 
Plaintiff‐Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
GHISLAINE MAXWELL, 
Defendant‐Appellee.* 
 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York 
 
 
 
 
ARGUED: MARCH 6, 2019 
DECIDED: JULY 3, 2019 
 
 
 
 
Before: CABRANES, POOLER, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges. 
 
 
 
Intervenors‐Appellants Alan Dershowitz, Michael Cernovich, 
and the Miami Herald Company (with reporter Julie Brown) appeal 
from certain orders of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective 
motions to unseal filings  in a defamation suit. We conclude that the 

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the captions as set out above. 
Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page2 of 25

3 
District Court  failed  to  conduct  the  requisite  particularized  review 
when ordering the sealing of the materials at issue. At the same time, 
we recognize the potential damage to privacy and reputation that may 
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We 
therefore  clarify  the  legal  tools  that  district  courts  should  use  in 
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE 
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, 
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment 
record as described  further herein,  and REMAND  the  cause  to  the 
District  Court  for  particularized  review  of  the  remaining  sealed 
materials.  
Judge Pooler concurs in this opinion except insofar as it orders 
the immediate unsealing of the summary judgment record without a 
remand. 
 
 
 
SANFORD L. BOHRER (Christine N. Walz, 
Madelaine J. Harrington, New York, NY, on 
the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, FL, 
for Intervenors‐Appellants Julie Brown and 
Miami Herald. 
TY GEE (Adam Mueller, on the brief), 
Haddon, Morgan and Foreman, P.C., 
Denver, CO, for Defendant‐Appellee Ghislaine 
Maxwell. 
 
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4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PAUL G. CASSELL (Sigrid S. McCawley, Boies 
Schiller Flexner LLP, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, on 
the brief), S.J Quinney College of Law, 
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, for 
Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia L. Giuffre. 
ANDREW G. CELLI JR. (David A. Lebowitz, on 
the brief), Emery, Celli, Brinckerhoff & 
Abady LLP, New York, NY, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Alan M. Dershowitz. 
MARC RANDAZZA (Jay Marshall Wolman, 
Las Vegas, NV, on the brief), Randazza Legal 
Group, PLLC, Hartford, CT, for Intervenor‐
Appellant Michael Cernovich. 
 
 
 
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge: 
Intervenors‐Appellants  Alan  M.  Dershowitz  (“Dershowitz”), 
Michael Cernovich  (“Cernovich”), and  the Miami Herald Company 
(with reporter Julie Brown,  jointly the “Herald”) appeal from certain 
orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York (Robert W. Sweet, Judge) denying their respective motions 
to unseal  filings  in a defamation suit. We conclude  that  the District 
Court  failed  to  conduct  the  requisite  particularized  review  when 
ordering  the sealing of  the materials at  issue. At  the same  time, we 
Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page4 of 25

5 
recognize  the potential damage  to privacy and  reputation  that may 
accompany public disclosure of hard‐fought, sensitive litigation. We 
therefore  clarify  the  legal  tools  that  district  courts  should  use  in 
safeguarding the integrity of their dockets. Accordingly, we VACATE 
the District Court’s orders entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, 
and August 27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary judgment 
record as described  further herein,  and REMAND  the  cause  to  the 
District  Court  for  particularized  review  of  the  remaining  sealed 
materials. 
I.
BACKGROUND 
A. Jeffrey Epstein’s Conviction and the CVRA Suit 
The origins of this case lie in a decade‐old criminal proceeding 
against financier Jeffrey Epstein (“Epstein”). On June 30, 2008, Epstein 
pleaded guilty to Florida state charges of soliciting, and procuring a 
person  under  the  age  of  eighteen  for,  prostitution.  The  charges 
stemmed from sexual activity with privately hired “masseuses,” some 
of whom were under eighteen, Florida’s age of consent. Pursuant to 
an agreement with state and federal prosecutors, Epstein pleaded to 
the  state  charges. He  received  limited  jail‐time,  registered  as  a  sex 
offender, and agreed  to pay compensation  to his victims.  In  return, 
prosecutors declined to bring federal charges.  
Shortly  after  Epstein  entered  his  plea,  two  of  his  victims, 
proceeding as “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane Doe 2,”  filed suit against  the 
Government  in  the  Southern  District  of  Florida  under  the  Crime 
Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”). The victims sought to nullify the plea 
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6 
agreement,  alleging  that  the  Government  failed  to  fulfill  its  legal 
obligations to inform and consult with them in the process leading up 
to Epstein’s plea deal.1  
On December 30, 2014, two additional unnamed victims—one 
of whom has now self‐identified as Plaintiff‐Appellee Virginia Giuffre 
(“Giuffre”)—petitioned  to  join  in  the CVRA  case. These petitioners 
included  in  their  filings  not  only  descriptions  of  sexual  abuse  by 
Epstein,  but  also  new  allegations  of  sexual  abuse  by  several  other 
prominent  individuals,  “including  numerous  prominent  American 
politicians, powerful business executives,  foreign presidents, a well‐
known  Prime  Minister,  and  other  world  leaders,”  as  well  as 
Dershowitz (a long‐time member of the Harvard Law School faculty 
who had worked on Epstein’s legal defense) and Defendant‐Appellee 
Ghislaine Maxwell (“Maxwell”).2   
Dershowitz  moved  to  intervene,  seeking  to  “strike  the 
outrageous  and  impertinent  allegations  made  against  him  and  to 
request a show cause order to the attorneys that have made them.”3 
Exercising  its  authority  to  “strike  from  a  pleading  an  insufficient 

1  On  February  21,  2019,  the  Florida  District  Court  ruled  that  federal 
prosecutors had violated the CVRA by failing to adequately notify the two victims‐
plaintiffs of the plea deal. The District Court has not yet determined the appropriate 
remedy. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1204–17 (S.D. Fla. 2019). 
2 Doe 1 v. United States, No. 08‐CV‐80736‐KAM, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Apr. 7, 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 

Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page6 of 25

7 
defense  or  any  redundant,  immaterial,  impertinent,  or  scandalous 
matter . . . on its own,”4 the Florida District Court (Kenneth A. Marra, 
Judge) sua sponte struck all  allegations against additional parties from 
the  pleadings,  including  those  against  Dershowitz,  and  therefore 
denied Dershowitz’s motion as moot.5  
The stricken allegations, however, quickly found their way into 
the  press,  and  several  media  outlets  published  articles  repeating 
Giuffre’s  accusations.  In  response  to  the  allegations,  on  January  3, 
2015,  Maxwell’s  publicist  issued  a  press  statement  declaring  that 
Giuffre’s allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue” and that 
her “claims are obvious lies.”6  
B. Giuffre Sues Maxwell 
On  September  21,  2015,  Giuffre  filed  the  underlying  action 
against Maxwell in the Southern District of New York. Giuffre alleged 
that  Maxwell  had  defamed  her  through  this  and  other  public 
statements. Extensive and hard‐fought discovery followed. Due to the 
volume of sealing requests filed during discovery, on August 9, 2016, 
the  District  Court  entered  a  Sealing  Order  that  effectively  ceded 
control of  the sealing process  to  the parties  themselves. The Sealing 
Order disposed of the requirement that the parties file individual letter 
briefs to request sealing and prospectively granted all of the parties’ 

4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). 
5 Doe 1, 2015 WL 11254692, at *2–3. 
6 See Giuffre v. Maxwell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 428, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
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8 
future sealing  requests.  In  total, 167 documents—nearly one‐fifth of 
the docket—were  filed under seal. These sealed documents  include, 
inter  alia, motions  to  compel  discovery, motions  for  sanctions  and 
adverse inferences, motions in limine, and similar material.  
On  January  6,  2017,  Maxwell  filed  a  motion  for  summary 
judgment.  The  parties  submitted  their  memoranda  of  law  and 
supporting exhibits contesting this motion under seal. On March 22, 
2017,  the District Court denied  the motion  in a heavily redacted 76‐
page  opinion.  Once  again,  the  entire  summary  judgment  record, 
including  the  unredacted  version  of  the  District  Court  opinion 
denying summary judgment, remained under seal. On May 24, 2017, 
Maxwell and Giuffre executed a settlement agreement, and  the case 
was closed the next day. 
C. Motions to Intervene and Unseal 
Over  the  course  of  the  litigation  before  Judge  Sweet,  three 
outside parties attempted to unseal some or all of the sealed material. 
On August 11, 2016, Dershowitz moved to intervene, seeking to unseal 
three documents  that, he argues, demonstrate  that Giuffre  invented 
the  accusations  against  him.  On  January  19,  2017,  Cernovich,  an 
independent  blogger  and 
self‐described  “popular  political 
journalist,”7  moved  to  intervene,  seeking  to  unseal  the  summary 
judgment record, and Dershowitz joined his motion. On April 6, 2018, 
after the case had settled, the Herald moved to  intervene and unseal 

7 Br. Appellant (Cernovich) 4. 
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9 
the entire docket. The District Court granted each of these motions to 
intervene, but denied the related requests to unseal in orders entered 
November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 27, 2018, respectively.  
The  Appellants  timely  appealed  from  each  of  the  orders 
denying their respective motions to unseal. Although each Appellant 
seeks  the  release of  a different  set of documents,  all argue  that  the 
District  Court  failed  to  analyze  the  documents  individually  or 
properly apply the presumption of public access to court documents. 
We therefore ordered that the appeals be heard  in tandem and held 
argument on March 6, 2019.  
On March 11, 2019, we issued an order to show cause why we 
“should  not  unseal  the  summary  judgment motion,  including  any 
materials filed in connection with this motion, and the District Court’s 
summary 
judgment  decision.”8  The  parties  timely  filed  their 
responses. 
II. DISCUSSION 
There  are  two  categories  of  sealed material  at  issue  in  these 
appeals: (1) the summary judgment record, which includes the parties’ 
summary  judgment briefs, their statements of undisputed facts, and 
incorporated exhibits; and (2) court filings made in the course of the 
discovery  process  and  with  respect  to  motions  in  limine.  In  this 
Opinion,  we  explain  that  our  law  requires  the  unsealing  of  the 

8 Giuffre v. Maxwell, No. 18‐2868‐cv, Docket No. 138. 
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10 
summary  judgment  materials  and  individualized  review  of  the 
remaining sealed materials.  
While  the  law  governing  public  access  to  these materials  is 
largely  settled, we have not yet adequately addressed  the potential 
harms that often accompany such access. These harms are apparent. 
Over  forty  years  ago,  the  Supreme  Court  observed  that,  without 
vigilance,  courts’  files  might  “become  a  vehicle  for  improper 
purposes.”9    Our  legal  process  is  already  susceptible  to  abuse. 
Unscrupulous  litigants  can  weaponize  the  discovery  process  to 
humiliate and embarrass their adversaries. Shielded by the “litigation 
privilege,”10 bad actors can defame opponents  in court pleadings or 
depositions without  fear of  lawsuit and  liability. Unfortunately,  the 
presumption of public access to court documents has the potential to 
exacerbate  these harms  to privacy  and  reputation by  ensuring  that 
damaging material irrevocably enters the public record. 
We therefore take the opportunity to describe the tools available 
to district courts in protecting the integrity of the judicial process, and 
emphasize the courts’ responsibility to exercise these powerful tools. 
We also caution the public to critically assess allegations contained in 
judicial pleadings. 

9 Nixon v. Warner Commcʹns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
10 See notes 46–47 and accompanying text, post.   

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11 
A. Standard of Review 
When  reviewing  a district  court’s decision  to  seal  a  filing  or 
maintain such a seal, “we examine the court’s factual findings for clear 
error, its legal determinations de novo, and its ultimate decision to seal 
or unseal for abuse of discretion.”11  
B. The Summary Judgment Materials 
With respect to the first category of materials, it is well‐settled 
that  “documents  submitted  to  a  court  for  its  consideration  in  a 
summary 
judgment  motion  are—as  a  matter  of  law—judicial 
documents  to which a strong presumption of access attaches, under 
both  the  common  law and  the First Amendment.”12  In  light of  this 
strong  First  Amendment  presumption,  “continued  sealing  of  the 
documents may be justified only with specific, on‐the‐record findings 
that  sealing  is  necessary  to  preserve  higher  values  and  only  if  the 
sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim.”13 

11 Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139 
(2d Cir. 2016). 
12 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 121 (2d Cir. 2006). We 
observe that our holding in Lugosch relies on the general principle that parties may 
“be assumed  to have supported  their papers with admissible evidence and non‐
frivolous arguments.” Id. at 122. Insofar as a district court has, through striking a 
filing,  specifically  found  that  assumption  inapplicable,  the  categorical  rule  in 
Lugosch may not apply. See notes 42–43 and accompanying text, post. 
13  Id.  at  124.  Examples  of  such  countervailing  values  may  include, 
depending  on  the  circumstances,  preserving  “the  right  of  an  accused  to 
fundamental fairness in the jury selection process,” Press‐Enter. Co. v. Superior Court 

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12 
In this case, the District Court erred in several respects.14 First, it 
failed to give proper weight to the presumption of access that attaches 
to documents  filed  in connection with summary  judgment motions. 
The District Court  reasoned  that  the  summary  judgment materials 
were “entitled to a lesser presumption of access” because “summary 
judgment  was  denied  by  the  Court.”15  In  assigning  a  “lesser 
presumption” to such materials, the District Court relied on a single 
sentence of dicta  from our decision  in United States v. Amodeo.16 We 
have  since  clarified,  however,  that  this  sentence  was  based  on  a 
“quotation from a partial concurrence and partial dissent in the D.C. 
Circuit . . . [and] is thus not the considered decision of either this court 
or  the  D.C.  Circuit.”17  In  fact,  we  have  expressly  rejected  the 
proposition that “different types of documents might receive different 

of California, Riverside Cty., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984); the protection of attorney‐client 
privilege, Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 125; “the danger of  impairing  law enforcement or 
judicial efficiency,” SEC. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2001); and “the 
privacy interest of those who resist disclosure,” id. 
14 Our discussion here focuses specifically on the District Court’s denial of 
the Herald’s motion to unseal the entire record. Because this decision grants relief 
to all Appellants, we need not discuss any separate, additional error in the District 
Court’s denial of the earlier motions to unseal. 
15 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 444.  
16 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo II”) (“One judge [in the District 
of Columbia Circuit]  has  pointed  out,  for  example,  that where  a  district  court 
denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing a final determination 
of substantive legal rights, the public interest in access is not as pressing.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)). 
17 Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121. 

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weights of presumption based on the extent to which they were relied 
upon in resolving [a] motion [for summary judgment].”18 
Second,  in  contravention of our precedent,  the District Court 
failed to review the documents individually and produce “specific, on‐
the‐record  findings  that  sealing  is  necessary  to  preserve  higher 
values.”19  Instead,  the  District  Court made  generalized  statements 
about the record as a whole.20 This too was legal error. 
Finally,  upon  reviewing  the  summary  judgment materials  in 
connection with  this appeal, we  find  that  there  is no countervailing 
privacy  interest sufficient to  justify their continued sealing. Remand 
with respect to these documents is thus unnecessary. Accordingly, and 
to avoid any  further delay,21 we order  that  the  summary  judgment 
documents  (with minimal redactions) be unsealed upon  issuance of 
our mandate.22  

18 Id. at 123. 
19 Id. at 124. 
20 See,  e.g., Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 445  (summarily concluding  that all 
“[t]he Summary Judgment Judicial Documents openly refer  to and discuss  these 
allegations [of sexual assault and sexual trafficking] in comprehensive detail, and 
that those allegations “establish[] a strong privacy interest here”). 
21  Cf.  Lugosch,  435  F.3d  at  127  (ordering  that  “the mandate  shall  issue 
forthwith” to expedite the unsealing process). 
22 Upon  issuance  of  our mandate,  a minimally  redacted  version  of  the 
summary judgment record will be made accessible on the Court of Appeals docket. 
We  have  implemented  minimal  redactions  to  protect  personally  identifying 
information such as personal phone numbers, contact lists, birth dates, and social 

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C. The Remaining Sealed Materials 
The law governing disclosure of the remaining sealed material 
in  this  case  is only  slightly more  complex. The Supreme Court has 
recognized a qualified right “to inspect and copy judicial records and 
documents.”23 In defining “judicial records and documents,” we have 
emphasized  that  “the mere  filing of  a paper or document with  the 
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to 
the right of public access.”24 Instead, “the item filed must be relevant 
to the performance of the  judicial function and useful in the  judicial 
process in order for it to be designated a judicial document.”25  
As our precedent makes clear, a court “perform[s] the  judicial 
function” not only when  it rules on motions currently before  it, but 
also when properly exercising its inherent “supervisory powers.”26 A 

security numbers. We have also redacted  the names of alleged minor victims of 
sexual abuse from deposition testimony and police reports, as well as deposition 
responses  concerning  intimate  matters  where  the  questions  were  likely  only 
permitted—and the responses only compelled—because of a strong expectation of 
continued confidentiality. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2. While we appreciate  the views 
expressed in Judge Pooler’s separate opinion, the panel majority believes that the 
efforts  invested  by  three  former  district  judges  in  reviewing  these  materials 
adequately address those concerns.  
23 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597–98. 
24 United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Amodeo I”). 
25 Id.  
26 Cf. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125, 135 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(explaining  that,  in  considering whether  the  report  of  a monitor  charged with 
assessing  compliance  with  a  deferred  prosecution  agreement  is  a  judicial 

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document is thus “relevant to the performance of the judicial function” 
if it would reasonably have the tendency to influence a district court’s 
ruling on a motion or in the exercise of its supervisory powers, without 
regard  to  which  way  the  court  ultimately  rules  or  whether  the 
document  ultimately  in  fact  influences  the  court’s  decision.27 
Accordingly,  if  in applying  these standards, a court determines  that 
documents  filed by a party are not relevant  to  the performance of a 
judicial function, no presumption of public access attaches.28  
Once  an  item  is  deemed  relevant  to  the  exercise  of  judicial 
power, “the weight  to be given  the presumption of access must be 
governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article 
III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those 

document,  “[i]f  the  district  court’s  conception  of  its  supervisory  power  in  this 
context were correct, the Monitor’s Report would quite obviously be relevant to the 
performance of  the  judicial  function and useful  in  the  judicial process”  (internal 
quotation  marks  omitted)).  Whether  a  specific  judicial  decision  constitutes  a 
“performance of the judicial function” is a question of law. Accordingly, we review 
such determinations de novo. Id. at 134.  
27 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145–46 (concluding that documents were relevant to 
the performance of a  judicial  function because  they would have “informed”  the 
district court’s decision whether to discharge or retain a Receiver); see also FTC. v. 
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Federal Rule of 
Evidence  401’s  “having  any  tendency”  definition  of  relevance  in  determining 
whether documents were “judicial documents”). 
28 As we explain below,  there are several  (often preferable)  tools beyond 
sealing that district courts can use to protect their dockets from becoming a vehicle 
for irrelevant—and potentially defamatory—accusations. See Section D, post. 

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monitoring the federal courts.”29 Thus, while evidence introduced at 
trial  or  in  connection  with  summary  judgment  enjoys  a  strong 
presumption of public access, documents that “play only a negligible 
role in the performance of Article III duties” are accorded only a low 
presumption that “amounts to little more than a prediction of public 
access  absent  a  countervailing  reason.”30 Documents  that  are never 
filed  with  the  court,  but  simply  “passed  between  the  parties  in 
discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption’s reach.”31 
The  remaining  sealed materials  at  issue  here  include  filings 
related  to,  inter  alia,  motions  to  compel  testimony,  to  quash  trial 
subpoenae,  and  to  exclude  certain  deposition  testimony.  All  such 
motions, at least on their face, call upon the court to exercise its Article 
III powers. Moreover, erroneous judicial decision‐making with respect 
to such evidentiary and discovery matters can cause substantial harm. 
Such materials are therefore of value “to those monitoring the federal 
courts.”32  Thus,  all  documents  submitted  in  connection  with,  and 
relevant to, such judicial decision‐making are subject to at least some 
presumption of public access.33 

29 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. 
30 Id. at 1050. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1049.   
33 In previous decisions, we have identified an important exception to this 
general rule:  the presumption of public access does not apply  to material  that  is 
submitted  to  the  court  solely  so  that  the  court may  decide whether  that  same 

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Although a court’s authority to oversee discovery and control 
the  evidence  introduced  at  trial  surely  constitutes  an  exercise  of 
judicial power, we note  that  this authority  is ancillary  to  the court’s 
core  role  in  adjudicating  a  case.  Accordingly,  the  presumption  of 
public  access  in  filings  submitted  in  connection  with  discovery 
disputes or motions  in  limine  is generally  somewhat  lower  than  the 
presumption applied to material introduced at trial, or in connection 
with dispositive motions such as motions  for dismissal or summary 
judgment.34  Thus,  while  a  court  must  still  articulate  specific  and 
substantial reasons for sealing such material, the reasons usually need 
not  be  as  compelling  as  those  required  to  seal  summary  judgment 
filings.  
Here, the precise basis for the District Court’s decision to deny 
the motion to unseal these remaining materials is unclear. In the three 
paragraphs devoted  to  the  issue,  the District Court emphasized  the 
potential for embarrassment “given the highly sensitive nature of the 
underlying allegations,” and concluded that “the documents sealed in 
the course of discovery were neither relied upon by [the District] Court 
in  the  rendering  of  an  adjudication,  nor  necessary  to  or  helpful  in 
resolving a motion.”35 It is therefore unclear whether the District Court 
held  that  these materials were not  judicial documents  (and  thus are 

material must be disclosed  in  the discovery process or  shielded by a Protective 
Order. See TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 233.  
34 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049–50. 
35 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d. at 442  (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). 
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not subject to a presumption of public access), or found that privacy 
interests outweighed a limited right of public access. 
On either interpretation, however, the District Court’s holding 
was error. Insofar as the District Court held that these materials are not 
judicial documents because it did not rely on them in adjudicating a 
motion, this was legal error. As explained above, the proper inquiry is 
whether the documents are relevant to the performance of the judicial 
function,  not  whether  they  were  relied  upon.36  Indeed,  decision‐
makers  often  find  that  a  great  deal  of  relevant material  does  not 
ultimately sway their decision. And insofar as the District Court held 
that privacy  interests outweigh  the presumption of public access  in 
each of the thousands of pages at issue, that decision—which appears 
to  have  been made without  particularized  review—amounts  to  an 
abuse of discretion.37 
In  light  of  the  District  Court’s  failure  to  conduct  an 
individualized review of the sealed materials, it is necessary to do so 
now. We  believe  the District Court  is  best  situated  to  conduct  this 
review. The District Court can directly communicate with the parties, 
and  can  therefore more  swiftly  and  thoroughly  consider particular 
objections to unsealing specific materials. Relatedly, the District Court 
can obtain the parties’ assistance in effecting any necessary redactions, 
and in notifying any outside parties whose privacy interests might be 

36 See text accompanying notes 12–18 and 26–28, ante. 
37 See In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 943 n.21 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that “abuse of discretion” is a nonpejorative, legal “term of art”). 
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implicated by the unsealing. Accordingly, we remand the cause to the 
District Court to conduct such a particularized review and unseal all 
documents for which the presumption of public access outweighs any 
countervailing privacy interests. 
D. Protecting the Integrity of Judicial Proceedings 
While we disagree with  the District Court’s disposition of  the 
motions to unseal, we share its concern that court files might be used 
to  “promote  scandal  arising  out  of  unproven  potentially  libelous 
statements.”38  We  therefore  describe  certain  methods  courts  can 
employ  to protect  the  judicial process  from being  coopted  for  such 
purposes. 
The  Supreme  Court  has  explained  that  “[e]very  court  has 
supervisory power over its own records and files” to ensure they “are 
not used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal” or “serve 
as  reservoirs  of  libelous  statements  for  press  consumption.”39  This 
supervisory  function  is not only within a district court’s power, but 
also among its responsibilities.  
In practice, district courts may employ several methods to fulfill 
this  function.  They  may,  for  instance,  issue  protective  orders 
forbidding  dissemination  of  certain material  “to  protect  a  party  or 
person  from  annoyance,  embarrassment,  oppression,  or  undue 

38 Giuffre, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 447. 
39 Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks). 

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burden” and require that filings containing such material be submitted 
under seal.40 If parties then seek to file such materials, the court may 
deny them leave to do so.41 District courts may also seek to counteract 
the effect of defamatory statements by explaining on the record that 
the  statements  appear  to  lack  credibility. Moreover,  under  Federal 
Rule  of  Civil  Procedure  12(f),  the  district  court  may  strike  such 
material  from  the  filings  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  “redundant, 
immaterial,  impertinent,  or  scandalous.”42 Because  such  rejected  or 
stricken material  is not “relevant  to  the performance of  the  judicial 
function” it would not be considered a “judicial document” and would 
enjoy  no  presumption  of  public  access.43  Finally,  in  appropriate 

40 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d at 229–30. 
41 See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions, February 1, 
2019 
Edition, 
Rule 
6.1, 
http://nysd.uscourts.gov/ecf/ECF%20Rules%20020119%20Final.pdf. 
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Courts may strike material from the pleadings either 
“on  its  own”  or  “on motion made  by  a  party.”  Id. Although motions  to  strike 
material solely “on the ground that the matter is impertinent and immaterial” are 
disfavored, when material is also “scandalous,” no such presumption applies. Cf. 
Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Talbot 
v.  Robert  Matthews  Distrib.  Co.,  961  F.2d  654,  664 
(7th  Cir.  1992) 
(“Allegations may be stricken as scandalous if the matter bears no possible relation 
to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice.”); Wine Markets Intʹl, 
Inc. v. Bass, 177 F.R.D. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (“Motions to strike are not generally 
favored,  except  in  relation  to  scandalous matters.”); Alvarado‐Morales  v. Digital 
Equip. Corp., 843 F.2d 613, 617–18 (1st Cir. 1988) (categorizing as scandalous “matter 
which impugned the character of defendants”). 
43 Amodeo I, 44 F.3d at 145. 

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circumstances, district courts may impose sanctions on attorneys and 
parties under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).44 
E. A Cautionary Note 
We conclude with a note of caution to the public regarding the 
reliability of court filings such as those unsealed today. 
Materials submitted by parties to a court should be understood 
for what they are. They do not reflect the court’s own findings. Rather, 
they are prepared by parties seeking to advance their own interests in 
an  adversarial  process.  Although  affidavits  and  depositions  are 
offered “under penalty of perjury,”  it  is  in  fact exceedingly  rare  for 
anyone to be prosecuted for perjury in a civil proceeding.45 Similarly, 

44 In relevant part, Rule 11 provides: 
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an 
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that . . . it is not being presented 
for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly  increase  the cost of  litigation  .  .  .  .  [T]he court may  impose an 
appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the 
rule  or  is  responsible  for  the  violation  .  .  .  .  The  sanction may  include 
nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed 
on  motion  and  warranted  for  effective  deterrence,  an  order  directing 
payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable attorney’s fees and 
other expenses directly resulting from the violation. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049 (describing sanctions available 
to the court). 
45 Sonia Sotomayor & Nicole A. Gordon, Returning Majesty  to  the Law and 
Politics: A Modern Approach, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 35, 47 n.52 (1996) (ʺPerjury cases 
are not often pursued . . . .”). 

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pleadings,  complaints,  and  briefs—while  supposedly  based  on 
underlying evidentiary material—can be misleading. Such documents 
sometimes  draw  dubious  inferences  from  already  questionable 
material or present ambiguous material as definitive. 
Moreover,  court  filings  are,  in  some  respects,  particularly 
susceptible to fraud. For while the threat of defamation actions may 
deter malicious falsehoods in standard publications, this threat is non‐
existent with respect to certain court filings. This is so because, under 
New York law (which governs the underlying defamation claim here), 
“absolute  immunity  from  liability  for defamation  exists  for  oral  or 
written statements made . . . in connection with a proceeding before a 
court.”46 Thus, although the act of filing a document with a court might 
be  thought  to  lend  that  document  additional  credibility,  in  fact, 
allegations appearing in such documents might be less credible than 
those published elsewhere.47  

46 Front, Inc. v. Khalil, 24 N.Y.3d 713, 718 (2015); see also Kelly v. Albarino, 485 
F.3d 664, 666 (2d Cir. 2007) (adopting the reasoning of the District Court explaining 
that this privilege is “the broadest of possible privileges”); Restatement (Second) of 
Torts  §  587  (1977)  (“A  party  to  a  private  litigation  or  a  private  prosecutor  or 
defendant in a criminal prosecution is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory 
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed  judicial 
proceeding, or in the institution of or during the course and as a part of, a judicial 
proceeding  in  which  he  participates,  if  the  matter  has  some  relation  to  the 
proceeding.”). But see note 47, post. 
47 While common law courts have generally interpreted the litigation privilege 
broadly,  they  nevertheless  maintain  an  important  (if  rarely  implemented) 
limitation on its scope: to qualify for the privilege, a statement must be “material 
and pertinent to the questions involved.” Front, 24 N.Y.3d at 718 (quoting Youmans 

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We have long noted that the press plays a vital role in ensuring 
the public right of access and in enhancing “the quality and safeguards 
the integrity of the factfinding process.”48 When faithfully observing 
its best traditions, the print and electronic media “contributes to public 
understanding  of  the  rule  of  law”  and  “validates  [its]  claim  of 
functioning as surrogates for the public.”49 
At  the  same  time,  the  media  does  the  public  a  profound 
disservice when it reports on parties’ allegations uncritically. We have 
previously  observed  that  courts  cannot  possibly  “discredit  every 
statement or document turned up in the course of litigation,” and we 
have criticized “the use by the media of the somewhat misleading term 
‘court  records’  in  referring  to  such  items.”50 Even ordinarily  critical 

v.  Smith,  153  N.Y.  214,  219–20  (1897)).  It  follows,  then,  that  immaterial  and 
impertinent statements are (at least nominally) actionable, particularly when they 
are “so needlessly defamatory as to warrant the  inference of express malice.” Id. 
(same). It seems to us that when a district court strikes statements from the record 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) on the ground that the matter is “impertinent” and 
“immaterial,”  it makes  the  very  same determination  that permits  a defamation 
action under the common law. We think the judicial system would be well served 
were our common law courts to revitalize this crucial qualification to the litigation 
privilege. 
48 Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,  Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court  for Norfolk Cty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 
(1982)). 
49 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572–73 (1980) (plurality 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
50 Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1049. 
Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page23 of 25

24 
readers may  take  the  reference  to  “court  papers”  as  some  sort  of 
marker of reliability.  This would be a mistake. 
We  therefore urge  the media  to exercise  restraint  in  covering 
potentially defamatory allegations, and we caution the public to read 
such accounts with discernment. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize, we hold as follows: 
(1) Materials  submitted  in  connection  with  a  motion  for 
summary  judgment are subject  to a strong presumption of 
public access. 
(2)  The  summary  judgment  record  at  issue will  be  unsealed 
upon  issuance  of  our  mandate,  subject  to  minimal 
redactions.51 
(3) Materials  submitted  in  connection  with,  and  relevant  to, 
discovery  motions,  motions  in  limine,  and  other  non‐
dispositive  motions  are  subject  to  a  lesser—but  still 
substantial— presumption of public access. 
(4) The District Court is directed to review the remaining sealed 
materials  individually  and  unseal  those  materials  as 
appropriate. 

51 See note 22, ante. 
Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page24 of 25

25 
(5) District  courts  should  exercise  the  full  range  of  their 
substantial  powers  to  ensure  their  files  do  not  become 
vehicles for defamation. 
For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  VACATE  the  orders  of  the 
District Court entered on November 2, 2016, May 3, 2017, and August 
27, 2018, ORDER the unsealing of the summary  judgment record as 
described herein, and REMAND  the cause  to  the District Court  for 
particularized review of the remaining materials.  
In undertaking this task, the District Court may be well‐served 
by ordering the parties to submit to the Court unredacted, electronic 
copies of the remaining sealed materials, as well as specific, proposed 
redactions. The District Court may also order  the parties  to  identify 
and notify additional parties whose privacy interests would likely be 
implicated by disclosure of these materials. 
In  the  interests of  judicial economy, any  future appeal  in  this 
matter shall be referred to this panel. 
Case 18-2868, Document 273-2, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page25 of 25


POOLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 
 
I join the Court’s opinion in every respect but one: the decision to unseal 
the summary judgment record ourselves. I agree that all or most of the material 
must be unsealed. Nevertheless, in my view, the district court is better suited to 
the task. As the Court’s opinion recognizes in connection with the remaining 
sealed materials, the district court is better positioned to communicate with the 
parties and any nonparties whose privacy interests might be affected by 
unsealing. On that score, it is worth clarifying here the breadth of the Court’s 
unsealing order: it unseals nearly 2000 pages of material. The task of identifying 
and making specific redactions in such a substantial volume is perilous; the 
consequences of even a seemingly minor error may be grave and are irrevocable. 
Moreover, although I share the majority’s concern about avoiding delay, I would 
alleviate that concern through other means—perhaps with an order directing the 
district court to act expeditiously and by making clear what types of limited 
redactions are and are not appropriate. In sum, I would unseal the district court’s 
summary judgment decision only and leave the remainder of the materials for 
the district court to review, redact, and unseal on remand.  
Case 18-2868, Document 273-3, 08/09/2019, 2628218, Page1 of 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------X

VIRGINIA L. GIUFFRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
GHISLAINE MAXWELL,
Defendant.





15-cv-07433-RWS

--------------------------------------------------X




DEFENDANT’S STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED
FACTS PURSUANT TO LOCAL CIVIL RULE 56.1





.............................................
..
Laura A. Menninger
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca
HADDON, MORGAN, AND FOREMAN, P.C.
150 East 10
th
Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
303.831.7364
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page1 of 18
1

Pursuant to Rule 56.1 of the Local Civil Rules of this Court, defendant Ghislaine
Maxwell submits this statement of the material facts as to which she contends there is no genuine
issues to be tried. Ms. Maxwell expressly preserves all of her objections to the admissibility of
the evidence cited herein and in the accompanying memoranda of law and does not waive any
objections by making this submission.
numbered.
1. Ms. Maxwell’s response to publications of plaintiff’s false allegations: the
March 2011 statement. In early 2011 plaintiff in two British tabloid interviews made numerous
false and defamatory allegations against Ms. Maxwell. In the articles, plaintiff made no direct
allegations that Ms. Maxwell was involved in any improper conduct with Jeffrey Epstein, who
had pleaded guilty in 2007 to procuring a minor for prostitution. Nonetheless, plaintiff suggested
that Ms. Maxwell worked with Epstein and may have known about the crime for which he was
convicted.
2. In the articles, plaintiff alleged she had sex with Prince Andrew, “a well-known
businessman,” a “world-renowned scientist,” a “respected liberal politician,” and a “foreign head
of state.”
3. In response to the allegations Ms. Maxwell’s British attorney, working with
Mr. Gow, issued a statement on March 9, 2011, denying “the various allegations about
[Ms. Maxwell] that have appeared recently in the media. These allegations are all entirely false.”
4. The statement read in full:
Statement on Behalf of Ghislaine Maxwell
By Devonshires Solicitors, PRNE
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
London, March 10, 2011 - Ghislaine Maxwell denies the various allegations about
her that have appeared recently in the media. These allegations are all entirely
false.
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2

It is unacceptable that letters sent by Ms Maxwell’s legal representatives to
certain newspapers pointing out the truth and asking for the allegations to be
withdrawn have simply been ignored.
In the circumstances, Ms Maxwell is now proceeding to take legal action against
those newspapers.
“I understand newspapers need stories to sell copies. It is well known that certain
newspapers live by the adage, “why let the truth get in the way of a good story.”
However, the allegations made against me are abhorrent and entirely untrue and
I ask that they stop,” said Ghislaine Maxwell.
“A number of newspapers have shown a complete lack of accuracy in their
reporting of this story and a failure to carry out the most elementary investigation
or any real due diligence. I am now taking action to clear my name,” she said.
Media contact:
Ross Gow
Acuity Reputation
Tel: +44-203-008-7790
Mob: +44-7778-755-251
Email: ross@acuityreputation.com
Media contact: Ross Gow, Acuity Reputation, Tel: +44-203-
008-7790, Mob: +44-7778-755-251, Email: ross at acuityreputation.com
5. Plaintiff’s gratuitous and “lurid” accusations in an unrelated action. In 2008 two
alleged victims of Epstein brought an action under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act against the
United States government purporting to challenge Epstein’s plea agreement. They alleged the
government violated their CVRA rights by entering into the agreement.
6. Seven years later, on December 30, 2014, Ms. Giuffre moved to join the CVRA
action, claiming she, too, had her CVRA rights violated by the government. On January 1, 2015,
Ms. Giuffre filed a “corrected” joinder motion.
7. The issue presented in her joinder motion was narrow: whether she should be
permitted to join the CVRA action as a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21,
specifically, whether she was a “known victim[] of Mr. Epstein and the Government owed them
CVRA duties.” Yet, “the bulk of the [motion] consists of copious factual details that [plaintiff]
and [her co-movant] ‘would prove . . . if allowed to join.’” Ms. Giuffre gratuitously included
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page3 of 18
3

provocative and “lurid details” of her alleged sexual activities as an alleged victim of sexual
trafficking.
8. At the time they filed the motion, Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers knew that the media
had been following the Epstein criminal case and the CVRA action. While they deliberately filed
the motion without disclosing Ms. Giuffre’s name, claiming the need for privacy and secrecy,
they made no attempt to file the motion under seal. Quite the contrary, they filed the motion
publicly.
9. As the district court noted in ruling on the joinder motion, Ms. Giuffre “name[d]
several individuals, and she offers details about the type of sex acts performed and where they
took place.” The court ruled that “these lurid details are unnecessary”: “The factual details
regarding whom and where the Jane Does engaged in sexual activities are immaterial and
impertinent . . ., especially considering that these details involve non-parties who are not related
to the respondent Government.” Accordingly, “[t]hese unnecessary details shall be stricken.” Id.
The court then struck all Ms. Giuffre’s factual allegations relating to her alleged sexual activities
and her allegations of misconduct by non-parties. The court said the striking of the “lurid details”
was a sanction for Ms. Giuffre’s improper inclusion of them in the motion.
10. The district court found not only that the “lurid details” were unnecessary but also
that the entire joinder motion was “entirely unnecessary.” Ms. Giuffre and her lawyers knew the
motion with all its “lurid details” was unnecessary because the motion itself recognized that she
would be able to participate as a fact witness to achieve the same result she sought as a party.
The court denied plaintiff’s joinder motion.
11. One of the non-parties Ms. Giuffre “named” repeatedly in the joinder motion was
Ms. Maxwell. According to the “lurid details” of Ms. Giuffre included in the motion,
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page4 of 18
4

Ms. Maxwell personally was involved in a “sexual abuse and sex trafficking scheme” created by
Epstein:
 Ms. Maxwell “approached” plaintiff in 1999 when plaintiff was “fifteen years
old” to recruit her into the scheme.
 Ms. Maxwell was “one of the main women” Epstein used to “procure under-
aged girls for sexual activities.”
 Ms. Maxwell was a “primary co-conspirator” with Epstein in his scheme.
 She “persuaded” plaintiff to go to Epstein’s mansion “in a fashion very similar
to the manner in which Epstein and his other co-conspirators coerced dozens of
other children.”
 At the mansion, when plaintiff began giving Epstein a massage, he and
Ms. Maxwell “turned it into a sexual encounter.”
 Epstein “with the assistance of” Ms. Maxwell “converted [plaintiff] into . . . a
‘sex slave.’” Id. Plaintiff was a “sex slave” from “about 1999 through 2002.”
 Ms. Maxwell also was a “co-conspirator in Epstein’s sexual abuse.”
 Ms. Maxwell “appreciated the immunity” she acquired under Epstein’s plea
agreement, because the immunity protected her from prosecution “for the crimes
she committed in Florida.”
 Ms. Maxwell “participat[ed] in the sexual abuse of [plaintiff] and others.”
 Ms. Maxwell “took numerous sexually explicit pictures of underage girls
involved in sexual activities, including [plaintiff].” Id. She shared the photos
with Epstein.
 As part of her “role in Epstein’s sexual abuse ring,” Ms. Maxwell “connect[ed]”
Epstein with “powerful individuals” so that Epstein could traffick plaintiff to
these persons.
 Plaintiff was “forced to have sexual relations” with Prince Andrew in
“[Ms. Maxwell’s] apartment” in London. Ms. Maxwell “facilitated” plaintiff’s
sex with Prince Andrew “by acting as a ‘madame’ for Epstein.”
 Ms. Maxwell “assist[ed] in internationally trafficking” plaintiff and “numerous
other young girls for sexual purposes.”
 Plaintiff was “forced” to watch Epstein, Ms. Maxwell and others “engage in
illegal sexual acts with dozens of underage girls.”
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page5 of 18
5

12. In the joinder motion, plaintiff also alleged she was “forced” to have sex with
Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, “model scout” Jean Luc Brunel, and “many other
powerful men, including numerous prominent American politicians, powerful business
executives, foreign presidents, a well-known Prime Minister, and other world leaders.”
13. Plaintiff said after serving for four years as a “sex slave,” she “managed to escape to
a foreign country and hide out from Epstein and his co-conspirators for years.”
14. Plaintiff suggested the government was part of Epstein’s “conspiracy” when it
“secretly” negotiated a non-prosecution agreement with Eptstein precluding federal prosecution
of Epstein and his “co-conspirators.” The government’s secrecy, plaintiff alleged, was motivated
by its fear that plaintiff would raise “powerful objections” to the agreement that would have
“shed tremendous public light on Epstein and other powerful individuals.
15. Notably, the other “Jane Doe” who joined plaintiff’s motion who alleged she was
sexually abused “many occasions” by Epstein was unable to corroborate any of plaintiff’s
allegations.
16. Also notably, in her multiple and lengthy consensual interviews with Ms. Churcher
three years earlier, plaintiff told Ms. Churcher of virtually none of the details she described in the
joinder motion.
17. Ms. Maxwell’s response to plaintiff’s “lurid” accusations: the January 2015
statement. As plaintiff and her lawyers expected, before District Judge Marra in the CVRA
action could strike the “lurid details” of plaintiff’s allegations in the joinder motion, members of
the media obtained copies of the motion.
18. At Mr. Barden’s direction, on January 3, 2015, Mr. Gow sent to numerous
representatives of British media organizations an email containing “a quotable statement on
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page6 of 18
6

behalf of Ms Maxwell.” The email was sent to more than 6 and probably less than 30 media
representatives. It was not sent to non-media representatives.
19. Among the media representatives were Martin Robinson of the Daily Mail; P.
Peachey of The Independent; Nick Sommerlad of The Mirror; David Brown of The Times; and
Nick Always and Jo-Anne Pugh of the BBC; and David Mercer of the Press Association. These
representatives were selected based on their request—after the joinder motion was filed—for a
response from Ms. Maxwell to plaintiff’s allegations in the motion.
20. The email to the media members read:
To Whom It May Concern,
Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms Maxwell.
No further communication will be provided by her on this matter.
Thanks for your understanding.
Best
Ross
Ross Gow
ACUITY Reputation
Jane Doe 3 is Virginia Roberts—so not a new individual. The allegations made by
Victoria Roberts against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue. The original allegations
are not new and have been fully responded to and shown to be untrue.
Each time the story is re told [sic] it changes with new salacious details about
public figures and world leaders and now it is alleged by Ms Roberts [sic] that
Alan Derschowitz [sic] is involved in having sexual relations with her, which he
denies.
Ms Roberts claims are obvious lies and should be treated as such and not
publicised as news, as they are defamatory.
Ghislaine Maxwell’s original response to the lies and defamatory claims remains
the same. Maxwell strongly denies allegations of an unsavoury nature, which
have appeared in the British press and elsewhere and reserves her right to seek
redress at the repetition of such old defamatory claims.
21. Mr. Barden, who prepared the January 2015 statement, did not intend it as a
traditional press release solely to disseminate information to the media. So he intentionally did
not pass it through a public relations firm, such as Mr. Gow’s firm, Acuity Reputation.
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page7 of 18
7

22. The January 2015 statement served two purposes. First, Mr. Barden intended that it
mitigate the harm to Ms. Maxwell’s reputation from the press’s republication of plaintiff’s false
allegations. He believed these ends could be accomplished by suggesting to the media that,
among other things, they should subject plaintiff’s allegations to inquiry and scrutiny. For
example, he noted in the statement that plaintiff’s allegations changed dramatically over time,
suggesting that they are “obvious lies” and therefore should not be “publicised as news.”
23. Second, Mr. Barden intended the January 2015 statement to be “a shot across the
bow” of the media, which he believed had been unduly eager to publish plaintiff’s allegations
without conducting any inquiry of their own. Accordingly, in the statement he repeatedly noted
that plaintiff’s allegations were “defamatory.” In this sense, the statement was intended as a
cease and desist letter to the media-recipients, letting the media-recipients understand the
seriousness with which Ms. Maxwell considered the publication of plaintiff’s obviously false
allegations and the legal indefensibility of their own conduct.
24. Consistent with those two purposes, Mr. Gow’s emails prefaced the statement with
the following language: “Please find attached a quotable statement on behalf of Ms Maxwell”
(emphasis supplied). The statement was intended to be a single, one-time-only, comprehensive
response—quoted in full—to plaintiff’s December 30, 2014, allegations that would give the
media Ms. Maxwell’s response. The purpose of the prefatory statement was to inform the media-
recipients of this intent.
25. Plaintiff’s activities to bring light to the rights of victims of sexual abuse.
Plaintiff has engaged in numerous activities to bring attention to herself, to the prosecution and
punishment of wealthy individuals such as Epstein, and to her claimed interest of bringing light
to the rights of victims of sexual abuse.
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page8 of 18
8

26. Plaintiff created an organization, Victims Refuse Silence, Inc., a Florida corporation,
directly related to her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse.
27. The “goal” of Victims Refuse Silence “was, and continues to be, to help survivors
surmount the shame, silence, and intimidation typically experienced by victims of sexual abuse.”
Toward this end, plaintiff has “dedicated her professional life to helping victims of sex
trafficking.”
28. Plaintiff repeatedly has sought out media organizations to discuss her alleged
experience as a victim of sexual abuse.
29. On December 30, 2014, plaintiff publicly filed an “entirely unnecessary” joinder
motion laden with “unnecessary,” “lurid details” about being “sexually abused” as a “minor
victim[]” by wealthy and famous men and being “trafficked” all around the world as a “sex
slave.”
30. The plaintiff’s alleged purpose in filing the joinder motion was to “vindicate” her
rights under the CVRA, expose the government’s “secretly negotiated” “non-prosecution
agreement” with Epstein, “shed tremendous public light” on Epstein and “other powerful
individuals” that would undermine the agreement, and support the CVRA plaintiffs’ request for
documents that would show how Epstein “used his powerful political and social connections to
secure a favorable plea deal” and the government’s “motive” to aid Epstein and his “co-
conspirators.”
31. Plaintiff has written the manuscript of a book she has been trying to publish detailing
her alleged experience as a victim of sexual abuse and of sex trafficking in Epstein’s alleged “sex
scheme.”
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page9 of 18
9

32. Republication alleged by plaintiff. Plaintiff was required by Interrogatory No. 6 to
identify any false statements attributed to Ms. Maxwell that were “‘published globally, including
within the Southern District of New York,’” as plaintiff alleged in Paragraph 9 of Count I of her
complaint. In response, plaintiff identified the January 2015 statement and nine instances in
which various news media published portions of the January 2015 statement in news articles or
broadcast stories.
33. In none of the nine instances was there any publication of the entire January 2015
statement.
34. Ms. Maxwell and her agents exercised no control or authority over any media
organization, including the media identified in plaintiff’s response to Interrogatory No. 6, in
connection with the media’s publication of portions of the January 2015 statement.
35. Plaintiff’s defamation action against Ms. Maxwell. Eight years after Epstein’s
guilty plea, plaintiff brought this action, repeating many of the allegations she made in her
CVRA joinder motion.
36. The complaint alleged that the January 2015 statement “contained the following
deliberate falsehoods”:
(a) That Giuffre’s sworn allegations “against Ghislaine Maxwell are untrue.”
(b) That the allegations have been “shown to be untrue.”
(c) That Giuffre’s “claims are obvious lies.”
37. Plaintiff lived independently from her parents with her fiancé long before
meeting Epstein or Ms. Maxwell. After leaving the Growing Together drug rehabilitation
facility in 1999, plaintiff moved in with the family of a fellow patient. There she met, and
became engaged to, her friend’s brother, James Michael Austrich. She and Austrich thereafter
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10

rented an apartment in the Ft. Lauderdale area with another friend and both worked at various
jobs in that area. Later, they stayed briefly with plaintiff’s parents in the Palm Beach/
Loxahatchee, Florida area before Austrich rented an apartment for the couple on Bent Oak Drive
in Royal Palm Beach. Although plaintiff agreed to marry Austrich, she never had any intention
of doing so.
38. Plaintiff re-enrolled in high school from June 21, 2000 until March 7, 2002.
After finishing the 9
th
grade school year at Forest Hills High School on June 9, 1999, plaintiff re-
enrolled at Wellington Adult High School on June 21, 2000, again on August 16, 2000 and on
August 14, 2001. On September 20, 2001, Plaintiff then enrolled at Royal Palm Beach High
School. A few weeks later, on October 12, 2001, she matriculated at Survivors Charter School.
Id. Survivor’s Charter School was an alternative school designed to assist students who had been
unsuccessful at more traditional schools. Plaintiff remained enrolled at Survivor’s Charter School
until March 7, 2002. She was present 56 days and absent 13 days during her time there. Id.
Plaintiff never received her high school diploma or GED. Plaintiff and Figueroa went “back to
school” together at Survivor’s Charter School. The school day there lasted from morning until
early afternoon.
39. During the year 2000, plaintiff worked at numerous jobs. In 2000, while living
with her fiancé, plaintiff held five different jobs: at Aviculture Breeding and Research Center,
Southeast Employee Management Company, The Club at Mar-a-Lago, Oasis Outsourcing, and
Neiman Marcus. Her taxable earnings that year totaled nearly $9,000. Plaintiff cannot now recall
either the Southeast Employee Management Company or the Oasis Outsourcing jobs.
40. Plaintiff’s employment at the Mar-a-Lago spa began in fall 2000. Plaintiff’s
father, Sky Roberts, was hired as a maintenance worker at the The Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm
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11

Beach, Florida, beginning on April 11, 2000. Mr. Roberts worked there year-round for
approximately 3 years. After working there for a period of time, Mr. Roberts became acquainted
with the head of the spa area and recommended plaintiff for a job there. Mar-a-Lago closes every
Mother’s Day and reopens on November 1. Most of employees Mar-a-Lago, including all
employees of the spa area such as “spa attendants,” are “seasonal” and work only when the club
is open, i.e., between November 1 and Mother’s Day. Plaintiff was hired as a “seasonal” spa
attendant to work at the Mar-a-Lago Club in the fall of 2000 after she had turned 17.
41. Plaintiff represented herself as a masseuse for Jeffrey Epstein. While working at
the Mar-a-Lago spa and reading a library book about massage, plaintiff met Ms. Maxwell.
Plaintiff thereafter told her father that she got a job working for Jeffrey Epstein as a masseuse.
Plaintiff’s father took her to Epstein’s house on one occasion around that time, and Epstein came
outside and introduced himself to Mr. Roberts. Plaintiff commenced employment as a traveling
masseuse for Mr. Epstein. Plaintiff was excited about her job as a masseuse, about traveling
with him and about meeting famous people. Plaintiff represented that she was employed as a
masseuse beginning in January 2001. Plaintiff never mentioned Ms. Maxwell to her then-fiancé,
Austrich. Plaintiff’s father never met Ms. Maxwell.
42. Plaintiff resumed her relationship with convicted felon Anthony Figueroa. In
spring 2001, while living with Austich, plaintiff lied to and cheated on him with her high school
boyfriend, Anthony Figueroa. Plaintiff and Austrich thereafter broke up, and Figueroa moved
into the Bent Oak apartment with plaintiff. When Austrich returned to the Bent Oak apartment to
check on his pets and retrieve his belongings, Figueroa in Plaintiff’s presence punched Austrich
in the face. Figueroa and plaintiff fled the scene before police arrived. Figueroa was then a
convicted felon and a drug abuser on probation for possession of a controlled substance.
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12

43. Plaintiff freely and voluntarily contacted the police to come to her aid in 2001
and 2002 but never reported to them that she was Epstein’s “sex slave.” In August 2001 at
age 17, while living in the same apartment, plaintiff and Figueroa hosted a party with a number
of guests. During the party, according to plaintiff, someone entered plaintiff’s room and stole
$500 from her shirt pocket. Plaintiff contacted the police. She met and spoke with police officers
regarding the incident and filed a report. She did not disclose to the officer that she was a “sex
slave.” A second time, in June 2002, plaintiff contacted the police to report that her former
landlord had left her belongings by the roadside and had lit her mattress on fire. Again, plaintiff
met and spoke with the law enforcement officers but did not complain that she was the victim of
any sexual trafficking or abuse or that she was then being held as a “sex slave.”
44. From August 2001 until September 2002, Epstein and Maxwell were almost
entirely absent from Florida on documented travel unaccompanied by Plaintiff. Flight logs
maintained by Epstein’s private pilot Dave Rodgers evidence the substantial number of trips
away from Florida that Epstein and Maxwell took, unaccompanied by Plaintiff, between August
2001 and September 2002. Rodgers maintained a log of all flights on which Epstein and
Maxwell traveled with him. Epstein additionally traveled with another pilot who did not keep
such logs and he also occasionally traveled via commercial flights. For substantially all of
thirteen months of the twenty-two months (from November 2000 until September 2002) that
Plaintiff lived in Palm Beach and knew Epstein, Epstein was traveling outside of Florida
unaccompanied by Plaintiff. During this same period of time, Plaintiff was employed at various
jobs, enrolled in school, and living with her boyfriend.
45. Plaintiff and Figueroa shared a vehicle during 2001 and 2002. Plaintiff and
Figueroa shared a ’93 white Pontiac in 2001 and 2002. Plaintiff freely traveled around the Palm
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13

Beach area in that vehicle. In August 2002, Plaintiff acquired a Dodge Dakota pickup truck from
her father. Figueroa used that vehicle in a series of crimes before and after Plaintiff left for
Thailand.
46. Plaintiff held a number of jobs in 2001 and 2002. During 2001 and 2002, plaintiff
was gainfully employed at several jobs. She worked as a waitress at Mannino’s Restaurant, at
TGIFriday’s restaurant (aka CCI of Royal Palm Inc.), and at Roadhouse Grill. She also was
employed at Courtyard Animal Hospital (aka Marc Pinkwasser DVM).
47. In September 2002, Plaintiff traveled to Thailand to receive massage training
and while there, met her future husband and eloped with him. Plaintiff traveled to Thailand
in September 2002 to receive formal training as a masseuse. Figueroa drove her to the airport.
While there, she initially contacted Figueroa frequently, incurring a phone bill of $4,000. She
met Robert Giuffre while in Thailand and decided to marry him. She thereafter ceased all contact
with Figueroa from October 2002 until two days before Mr. Figueroa’s deposition in this matter
in May 2016.
48. Detective Recarey’s investigation of Epstein failed to uncover any evidence that
Ms. Maxwell was involved in sexual abuse of minors, sexual trafficking or production or
possession of child pornography. Joseph Recarey served as the lead detective from the Palm
Beach Police Department charged with investigating Jeffrey Epstein. That investigation
commenced in 2005. Recarey worked only on the Epstein case for an entire year. He reviewed
previous officers’ reports and interviews, conducted numerous interviews of witnesses and
alleged victims himself, reviewed surveillance footage of the Epstein home, participated in and
had knowledge of the search warrant executed on the Epstein home, and testified regarding the
case before the Florida state grand jury against Epstein. Detective Recarey’s investigation
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page14 of 18
14

revealed that not one of the alleged Epstein victims ever mentioned Ms. Maxwell’s name and she
was never considered a suspect by the government. None of Epstein’s alleged victims said they
had seen Ms. Maxwell at Epstein’s house, nor said they had been “recruited by her,” nor paid
any money by her, nor told what to wear or how to act by her. Indeed, none of Epstein’s alleged
victims ever reported to the government they had met or spoken to Ms. Maxwell. Maxwell was
not seen coming or going from the house during the law enforcement surveillance of Epstein’s
home. The arrest warrant did not mention Ms. Maxwell and her name was never mentioned
before the grand jury. No property belonging to Maxwell, including “sex toys” or “child
pornography,” was seized from Epstein’s home during execution of the search warrant. Detective
Recarey, when asked to describe “everything that you believe you know about Ghislaine
Maxwell’s sexual trafficking conduct,” replied, “I don’t.” He confirmed he has no knowledge
about Ms. Maxwell sexually trafficking anybody. Detective Recarey also has no knowledge of
Plaintiff’s conduct that is subject of this lawsuit.
49. No nude photograph of Plaintiff was displayed in Epstein’s home. Epstein’s
housekeeper, Juan Alessi, “never saw any photographs of Virginia Roberts in Mr. Epstein’s
house.” Detective Recarey entered Epstein’s home in 2002 to install security cameras to catch a
thief and did not observe any “child pornography” within the home, including on Epstein’s desk
in his office.
50. Plaintiff intentionally destroyed her “journal” and “dream journal” regarding
her “memories” of this case in 2013 while represented by counsel. Plaintiff drafted a
“journal” describing individuals to whom she claims she was sexually trafficked as well as her
memories and thoughts about her experiences with Epstein. In 2013, she and her husband created
a bonfire in her backyard in Florida and burned the journal together with other documents in her
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page15 of 18
15

possession. Id. Plaintiff also kept a “dream journal” regarding her thoughts and memories that
she possessed in January 2016. To date, Plaintiff cannot locate the “dream journal.”
51. Plaintiff publicly peddled her story beginning in 2011. Plaintiff granted journalist
Sharon Churcher extensive interviews that resulted in seven (7) widely distributed articles from
March 2011 through January 2015. Churcher regularly communicated with plaintiff and her
“attorneys or other agents” from “early 2011” to “the present day.” Plaintiff received
approximately $160,000 for her stories and pictures that were published by many news
organizations.
52. Plaintiff drafted a 144-page purportedly autobiographical book manuscript in
2011 which she actively sought to publish. In 2011, contemporaneous with her Churcher
interviews, plaintiff drafted a book manuscript which purported to document plaintiff’s
experiences as a teenager in Florida, including her interactions with Epstein and Maxwell.
Plaintiff communicated with literary agents, ghost writers and potential independent publishers
in an effort to get her book published. She generated marketing materials and circulated those
along with book chapters to numerous individuals associated with publishing and the media.
53. Plaintiff’s publicly filed “lurid” CVRA pleadings initiated a media frenzy and
generated highly publicized litigation between her lawyers and Alan Dershowitz. On
December 30, 2014, plaintiff, through counsel, publicly filed a joinder motion that contained her
“lurid allegations” about Ms. Maxwell and many others, including Alan Dershowitz, Prince
Andrew, Jean-Luc Brunel. The joinder motion was followed by a “corrected” motion and two
further declarations in January and February 2015, which repeated many of plaintiff’s claims.
These CVRA pleadings generated a media maelstrom and spawned highly publicized litigation
between plaintiff’s lawyers, Edwards and Cassell, and Alan Dershowitz. After plaintiff publicly
Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page16 of 18
16

alleged Mr. Dershowitz of sexual misconduct, Mr. Dershowitz vigorously defended himself in
the media. He called plaintiff a liar and accused her lawyers of unethical conduct. In response,
attorneys Edwards and Cassell sued Dershowitz who counterclaimed. This litigation, in turn,
caused additional media attention by national and international media organizations.
54. Plaintiff formed non-profit Victims Refuse Silence to attract publicity and
speak out on a public controversy. In 2014, plaintiff, with the assistance of the same counsel,
formed a non-profit organization, Victims Refuse Silence. According to plaintiff, the purpose of
the organization is to promote plaintiff’s professed cause against sex slavery. The stated goal of
her organization is to help survivors surmount the shame, silence, and intimidation typically
experienced by victims of sexual abuse. Plaintiff attempts to promote Victims Refuse Silence at
every opportunity. For example, plaintiff participated in an interview in New York with ABC to
promote the charity and to get her mission out to the public.
Dated: January 6, 2017

Respectfully submitted,


/s/ Laura A. Menninger
Laura A. Menninger (LM-1374)
Jeffrey S. Pagliuca (pro hac vice)
HADDON, MORGAN AND FOREMAN, P.C.
150 East 10
th
Avenue
Denver, CO 80203
Phone: 303.831.7364
Fax:
303.832.2628
lmenninger@hmflaw.com

Attorneys for Ghislaine Maxwell



Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page17 of 18
17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on January 6, 2017, I electronically served this Defendant’s Statement of Material
Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1 via ECF on the following:

Sigrid S. McCawley
Meredith Schultz
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER, LLP
401 East Las Olas Boulevard, Ste. 1200
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
smccawley@bsfllp.com
mschultz@bsfllp.com
Paul G. Cassell
383 S. University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
cassellp@law.utah.edu

Bradley J. Edwards
FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS,
FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L.
425 North Andrews Ave., Ste. 2
Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301
brad@pathtojustice.com
J. Stanley Pottinger
49 Twin Lakes Rd.
South Salem, NY 10590
StanPottinger@aol.com


/s/ Nicole Simmons

Nicole Simmons

Case 18-2868, Document 275, 08/09/2019, 2628223, Page18 of 18


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