CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress


South Africa: Current Issues and U.S.
Relations
Lauren Ploch
Analyst in African Affairs
January 4, 2011
Congressional Research Service
7-5700
www.crs.gov
RL31697
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
Summary
Over fifteen years after the South African majority gained its independence from white minority
rule under apartheid, a system of racial segregation, the Republic of South Africa is firmly
established as a regional power. With Africa’s largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP), a diverse
economy, and a government that has played an active role in promoting regional peace and
stability, South Africa is poised to have a substantial impact on the economic and political future
of Africa. The country is also playing an increasingly prominent role in the G20 and other
international fora. South Africa is twice the size of Texas and has a population of almost 50
million. Its political system is regarded as stable, but South Africa faces serious long-term
challenges arising from poverty, unemployment, and AIDS.
The United States government considers South Africa to be one of its strategic partners on the
continent, and the two countries commenced a new Strategic Dialogue in 2010, with the
encouragement of the U.S. Congress. Bilateral relations are cordial; however, the U.S. and South
African administrations have expressed differences with respect to the situations in Zimbabwe
and Iran, among other foreign policy issues. South Africa begins a two-year term as a non-
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in 2011; U.S. officials articulated
frustration with the South African government on positions it took during its last term on the
Council in 2007-2008.
The African National Congress (ANC), which led the struggle against apartheid, has dominated
the political scene since the end of apartheid and continues to enjoy widespread support among
the population. The party has suffered internal divisions, though, some of which contributed to
the resignation of President Thabo Mbeki in 2008 and the formation of a breakaway party, the
Congress of the People (COPE). The ANC fell short of retaining its two-thirds majority in the
parliament during the most recent elections, held in April 2009. Jacob Zuma, elected as head of
the ANC in late 2007, weathered a series of corruption charges and was chosen by the ANC-
dominated parliament after the 2009 elections to serve as the country’s newest President.
South Africa has the largest HIV/AIDS population in the world, with almost 6 million people
reportedly HIV positive. The Mbeki Administration’s policy on HIV/AIDS was controversial, but
the Zuma Administration has made significant commitments to addressing the disease. The
country has weathered a series of corruption scandals, and continues to struggle with high crime
and unemployment rates. Mounting social tensions related to the competition for jobs, resources,
and social services led to an eruption of xenophobic violence against immigrants in 2008; some
resentment against foreign workers in the country lingers. South Africa, with its wealth of mineral
resources and diverse manufacturing sector, has benefitted from steady economic growth in
recent years, but the country weathered a recession in 2009 and economists predict weaker
growth prospects for the near future. Job creation remains a major challenge for the government.
In 2010, South Africa successfully hosted the largest event ever held on the African continent, the
FIFA World Cup, an international football (soccer) competition. The government and the private
sector undertook a wide variety of construction and infrastructure projects in preparation for the
event, which was attended by over three million people and drew over 300,000 tourists. South
Africa defied many expectations during the event—six new stadiums were finished on time,
crime was low, and South Africans introduced the world to a long (and loud) plastic horn known
as the vuvuzela. Americans bought more tickets to the event than any other nationality. The games
were a point of pride, not only to South Africans, but to many across Africa.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service

South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
Contents
Background ................................................................................................................................1
Political Situation........................................................................................................................2
The Democratic Alliance.......................................................................................................3
Strains in the ANC Alliance...................................................................................................4
The Succession Debate and Mbeki’s Resignation ..................................................................5
A New Party Emerges: The Congress of the People ...............................................................6
The April 2009 Elections.......................................................................................................6
The Zuma Administration .....................................................................................................7
The Arms Deal and Other Corruption Scandals .....................................................................7
Press Freedoms .....................................................................................................................9
HIV/AIDS .......................................................................................................................... 10
Land Reform....................................................................................................................... 12
Crime.................................................................................................................................. 13
The Economy............................................................................................................................ 14
Economic Policies Under Thabo Mbeki............................................................................... 14
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)................................................................................ 15
Foreign Investment ............................................................................................................. 15
Changes Under Zuma or Business as Usual? ....................................................................... 16
The Global Economic Crisis and The New Growth Path...................................................... 16
The 2010 World Cup........................................................................................................... 17
Electricity Shortages and “Green” Energy Proposals ........................................................... 18
U.S. Relations ........................................................................................................................... 18
Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism....................................................................................... 20
Diplomatic Differences ....................................................................................................... 21
The United Nations ....................................................................................................... 21
Zimbabwe .................................................................................................................... 22
Trade .................................................................................................................................. 24
Prospects for the Future............................................................................................................. 24

Figures
Figure 1. Map of South Africa’s Provinces ................................................................................ 25

Contacts
Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................25

South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
1
Background
The people of South Africa are highly diverse. Black Africans make up more than three-quarters
of the population, but come from several different ethnic backgrounds. Most whites are Afrikaans
speakers of Dutch, German, and French Huguenot ancestry, but there is a substantial English-
speaking white minority. The remainder of the population are Asian, largely of Indian descent,
and people of mixed race.
South Africa’s economy, the largest on the
continent, is diverse as well. South Africa
produces wine, wool, maize and other
agricultural products for export, although only
about 12% of the country’s land is suitable for
agriculture. Moreover, South Africa is the
world’s leading producer of gold, platinum,
and chromium. Major industrial sectors
include automobile assembly, chemicals,
textiles, foodstuffs, and iron and steel
production. South African cell phone
companies and other firms are active
throughout Africa, and SABMiller, formerly
South African Breweries, operates on a global
scale. The country’s stock exchange is among
the 20 largest in the world, and South Africa is
one of the few countries on the continent to
rank as an upper middle income country.
Despite its many economic strengths,
however, the country ranks as one of the most
unequal societies in the world in terms of
income distribution. The majority of black
South Africans live in poverty, and South
Africa’s cities are surrounded by vast informal
housing settlements known as “townships.”
Shortages of water, electricity, and other social services in the townships have contributed to
growing tensions, as evidenced by a rise in township protests in recent years.
South Africa is an influential actor in the international relations of Africa. South Africa served
from 2007 through 2008 as one of the 10 non-permanent members of the United Nations (U.N.)
Security Council; it has been elected to serve another two-year term beginning in January 2011.
The country remains a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council. Its voting record on both
bodies has been considered by some to be controversial. South Africa was a founding member of
the African Union (AU), successor to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and then-
President Thabo Mbeki served as the AU’s first chairperson. President Mbeki also took a lead role
in the creation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an African-designed
plan for improved governance within Africa and increased western aid, trade, and investment that
was adopted by the AU as a blueprint for the continent’s economic development. South Africa has
repeatedly put itself forward as a venue for major international conferences, such as the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development, the 2001 World Conference on Racism. In 2010,
South Africa was the first African nation to host the soccer World Cup, and in December 2011,
South Africa in Brief
Population: 49 million
African, 79%; whites, 9.6%; mixed race, 9%; Asian, 2.5%
Religion: 80% Christian, 2% Muslim, 4% Other, 15%
None
Language most often spoken at home:
Zulu, 24%; Xhosa, 18%; Afrikaans, 13%; Sepedi 9.4%,
English 8.2%, Setswana 8.2%, Sesotho 7.9%, Xitsonga
4.4%
Population Growth Rate: -0.051%
Life Expectancy: 49.2 years
Prevalence of HIV/AIDS: 18.1%
Literacy: 86.4%
Gross Domestic Product (GDP): $287.2 billion (2009)
GDP per capita: $5,820 (2009); $7,100 (2010 estimate)
Unemployment: 24%
Comparative Area: twice the size of Texas
Capitals: Pretoria (administrative); Cape Town
(legislative); Bloemfontein (judicial)
Sources: CIA World Factbook, IMF data.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
2
the country will host the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change. South Africa is the
only African member of the G20, the premier forum for international economic cooperation.
Weak regimes and instability elsewhere in the region have historically had a negative impact on
South Africa, and the country continues to face a large influx of illegal immigrants. By some
estimates, more than three million Zimbabweans currently reside illegally in South Africa. Some
South Africans blame these immigrants for the country’s high crime and unemployment rates, and
in May 2008 tensions erupted in the townships, sparking a wave of xenophobic attacks that
displaced over 25,000 and left over 60 dead. Isolated attacks have occurred since then, and the
potential for further violence cannot be ruled out.
In order to promote greater stability, South African officials have played prominent mediator roles
in African conflicts, and South African troops actively support peacekeeping missions throughout
the continent. In 2002, they helped to persuade the parties to the prolonged conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to sign a peace agreement following negotiations in
South Africa. President Thabo Mbeki was less successful in mediating the conflict in Cote
d’Ivoire, a country which continues to face political turmoil. Former President Nelson Mandela
played a leading role in brokering a peace agreement in Burundi, and South Africa contributed
hundreds of troops to the peacekeeping mission there. Over 1,200 South African troops are
currently participating as peacekeepers in the U.N. Stabilization Mission in the DRC
(MONUSCO), and over 900 South African soldiers and police serve under the U.N.-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In a move believed by many to protest the Sudanese
government’s policies in Darfur, the Mbeki government was instrumental in preventing Sudan
from attaining the chairmanship of the African Union in 2006. It has, however, protested the
imposition of tougher U.N. sanctions against Sudan and an International Criminal Court (ICC)
indictment of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir as counterproductive.1 Former President Mbeki
continues to play an active mediation role in Sudan. The country has supported democratic
advances on the continent, providing millions of ballots in 2006 for elections in the DRC. In
2007, the heads of state of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) nominated
then-President Mbeki as mediator between the Zimbabwean government and the opposition in an
effort to resolve its political and economic crises. Mbeki’s role was controversial. President Jacob
Zuma and a team of his own mediators took over in late 2009.
Political Situation
The Republic of South Africa held its first universal suffrage elections in April 1994. The African
National Congress (ANC), which led the struggle against white minority rule and the apartheid
system of state-enforced racial segregation, won control of the National Assembly. The Assembly
chose as President Nelson Mandela, the ANC leader who had been released from prison in 1990,
after serving 27 years. His release followed years of secret contacts between the ANC and key
white business and political figures. These contacts had led both sides to conclude that a
settlement could be negotiated that would protect the interests of all South Africans. The
negotiations themselves encountered many difficulties, including several outbreaks of violence
that threatened to destroy the peace process. Finally, however, in November 1993, all-party
negotiations resulted in a final agreement on a new constitution and free elections, held in 1994.
South Africa’s second universal suffrage elections were held in June 1999, and the ANC retained

1 CRS Report RL34665, International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, by Alexis Arieff et al.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
3
control of the National Assembly. Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, who had served in key ANC
posts overseas during the anti-apartheid struggle, was chosen by the Assembly to succeed
Mandela. Mbeki retained his position as President following the April 2004 parliamentary
elections, in which the ANC won almost 70% of the votes.
South Africa’s politics continue to be dominated by the ANC, which has enjoyed support among
many black South Africans because of its role in spearheading the long struggle against white
minority rule. Until December 2007, when he lost the party presidency to a rival, Thabo Mbeki
served as president both of the party and the country.2 He was expected to remain President of
South Africa until the 2009 elections but resigned from the position in September 2008. He was
replaced by an interim president, former Deputy ANC leader Kgalema Motlanthe. Following
Mbeki’s resignation, several prominent members of the party led a breakaway faction, now
known as the Congress of the People (COPE).
Prior to the 2009 elections, the ANC held a 72% majority of the seats in the 400-member National
Assembly, where the country’s legislative power principally resides, far ahead of its nearest rival,
the Democratic Alliance (DA), which had 12% of the seats. The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP),
headed by Mangosuthu Buthelezi, had about 6% of Assembly seats. Buthelezi, who has been
active in South African politics for decades, holds a Zulu chieftainship, and the party is largely
Zulu in membership. The IFP has experienced a steady decline in parliamentary seats since the
1994 election, while the ANC and the DA have gained electoral support. Other parties represented
in parliament include the New National Party (NNP), the United Democratic Movement (UDM),
the Independent Democrats (ID), and the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP). In addition
to the National Assembly, there is a higher legislative body, the National Council of Provinces
(NCOP), with limited powers. Its members are chosen by the governments of the nine provinces.
The Democratic Alliance
The second-largest party in the National Assembly, the Democratic Alliance (DA), was created in
2000 through a merger of the Democratic Party (DP) and the New National Party (NNP) to
challenge ANC dominance of the political system. The merger surprised many analysts, since the
NNP was directly descended from the National Party, which had created apartheid and
established the white minority regime that ruled South Africa for more than 40 years. In contrast,
the DP, though also largely white in its membership, advocated a classical liberal platform and
was heir to the Progressive Party, which had strongly opposed apartheid and campaigned on
human rights issues. However, by allying, the two parties were able to ensure their control of the
legislature of Western Cape Province and of many local governments in the province, including
the government of Cape Town, in the 2000 local elections.3
Former DP leader Tony Leon, an articulate critic of the ANC with respect to the slow pace of
privatization, transparency, and other issues, became DA leader, with NNP head Marthinus van
Schalkwyk as his deputy. The alliance soon fragmented in a way that has further enhanced the
power of the ANC in South African politics. In October 2001, van Schalkwyk announced that the
NNP would leave the DA and enter into a cooperative agreement with the ANC. The NNP leader

2 Under the South African constitution, the President is elected by the National Assembly.
3 Tom Lodge, “The Future of South Africa’s Party System,” Journal of Democracy, Vol 17, No. 3, July 2006, p. 154.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
4
explained that the move would promote national unity and progress, while critics suggested that
he was primarily interested in securing government appointments for NNP leaders.4
The city of Cape Town remains a major urban opposition bastion, and the DA won control of the
surrounding Western Cape Province from the ANC in the 2009 elections. Former Cape Town
mayor Helen Zille, who won the seat in a close race in 2006, replaced Tony Leon as head of the
DA party when he stepped down in 2007. She became Premier of the Western Cape following the
2009 elections. In 2010, another opposition party, the Independent Democrats, announced that it
would merge with the DA.
Strains in the ANC Alliance
The ANC has long worked in an interlocking tripartite alliance with the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). Leaders of
COSATU and the SACP sit on the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC, which is
the party’s principal decision-making body. However, there has been considerable disagreement
among the ANC and its allies over the government’s economic reform programs. The
government’s first major economic strategy, known as Growth, Employment, and Redistribution
(GEAR), sought to spur economic growth by attracting foreign investment, strengthening the
private sector, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. COSATU and the SACP have argued that
this approach has failed to benefit South Africa’s poor. They favor the creation of programs that
would use state resources to create jobs and a moratorium on privatization. In 2005, the general
secretary of COSATU announced in a union meeting,
We want the ANC to be maintained as an organization primarily of the workers and the poor.
We will never hand over this weapon, built up with our blood, sweat, and tears, to the other
side on a silver platter. We will never let the ANC be privatized by the rich. It is a working
class formation and a left-wing liberation movement—it must remain ours.5
Former President Mbeki, on the other hand, argued that the ANC was a “broad church” capable of
representing socialists and nationalists and bridging class divisions.
COSATU was highly critical of Mbeki’s stance on the AIDS epidemic and his approach toward
the Zimbabwe situation (see below). In 2006, COSATU launched a general strike to protest the
loss of 100,000 jobs over the prior three years, primarily from the textile and mining industries. In
June 2007, the country’s trade unions launched what was reported to have been the biggest strike
since the end of apartheid, costing the economy over $400 million.6 The unions, who were
demanding a 12% pay raise for public servants, accepted the government’s offer of a 7.5% raise
after four weeks of protest. Strikes in mid-2008 brought the country’s mining industry to a
standstill as workers protested rising food, fuel, and electricity costs. These strikes were
considered significant acts of defiance against the policies of the Mbeki government. Speculation
regarding a splintering of the ANC grew as the rift between COSATU, its populist allies, and
Mbeki supporters within the ANC widened.

4 Mbeki Gives Van Schalkwyk Space with New Positions,” Business Day, November 5, 2002.
5 “Mbeki, Nzimande Clash Over Splits in Alliance,” Business Day, October 9, 2006.
6 “S Africa Unions Call Off Strike,” BBC, June 28, 2007.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
5
The Succession Debate and Mbeki’s Resignation
As President Mbeki neared the end of his second term as president of the ANC, there was
considerable speculation on whom the party might choose for the position at the ANC’s national
congress in December 2007. Mbeki had suggested that he would not run for a third term. His
successor would be widely expected to succeed him as President of the country following the
national elections in 2009. Although the ANC’s party constitution allows for a competitive
leadership race, no party presidential candidacy had ever been contested. Mbeki’s dismissal of
Jacob Zuma as the country’s Deputy President in 2005 (see below) exposed divisions in the party
(Zuma remained deputy president of the party). He had been widely considered to be the likely
successor to Mbeki prior to these scandals. Zuma, a populist who has elicited strong support from
both youth and labor groups, as well as from his Zulu ethnic base, has been linked with a number
of controversies, including a 2006 rape allegation for which he was acquitted, and a high-profile
corruption case (see “The Arms Deal and Other Corruption Scandals” below). Zuma made his
intention to vie for the party leadership post clear, and he was vocally supported by leaders from
COSATU and SACP, who claim he has been a victim of political conspiracy. After months of
speculation, Mbeki, rather than put his support behind a chosen successor, chose to run for a third
term as ANC president. Zuma won a decisive victory over Mbeki in a secret ballot vote at the
party congress, suggesting that Mbeki had alienated many party members.
Although he prevailed in the rape and initial corruption trials, Zuma continued to face legal
challenges. In November 2007, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned a lower court decision
that had made documents seized from Zuma and his lawyer inadmissable in future proceedings.
Zuma was expected to go on trial again in August 2008 for racketeering, money laundering,
fraud, and corruption, but the date of his trial was postponed. In September, a High Court judge
ruled that the case should be thrown out on procedural grounds and suggested in his findings that
Mbeki and members of his administration had interfered in the case.
On September 20, 2008, after nine years in office, Thabo Mbeki announced that he had accepted
a request by the ANC’s National Executive Council to resign as President of South Africa in the
wake of the High Court decision. One-third of Mbeki’s cabinet resigned with their leader. Among
them was Finance Minister Trevor Manuel who, along with Reserve Bank Governor Tito
Mboweni, had been widely credited with guiding the country’s economic progress since the end
of white rule. The inflation rate rose to its highest level since the end of apartheid amid
speculation of Manuel’s resignation; he was later reappointed. Other resignations followed.7 The
parliament elected ANC Deputy Leader Kgalema Motlanthe as interim President. Motlanthe, a
former mine union leader who was imprisoned on Robben Island with Mandela, had recently
been appointed by the party as a Member of Parliament, which made him eligible to assume the
presidency.8 Zuma, who did not hold a parliamentary seat, was ineligible to assume the office.
The judge issuing the High Court verdict on which the request for Mbeki’s resignation was based
made no findings on Zuma’s guilt or innocence. Prosecutors filed an appeal, and in January 2009,

7 Among the resignations was that of the including the premier of Gauteng province, who said that he would not be able
to “publicly explain or defend the national executive committee’s decision on comrade Thabo Mbeki.” “Manuel Plays
Down Chance of ANC Split,” Mail and Guardian, September 30, 2008.
8 In South Africa, parties make appointments to fill vacant parliamentary seats, rather than holding by-elections.
Motlanthe was appointed as a member of parliament in May 2008 and was appointed to Mbeki’s cabinet in July 2008
as a Minister without Portfolio.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
6
the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the High Court ruling. Zuma filed an appeal with the
Constitutional Court to have the charges, which he claimed were politically motivated, dropped.
In March 2009, evidence of collusion between prosecutors, Mbeki, and several senior ANC
officials emerged, and, after extensive internal debate, the head of the National Prosecuting
Authority (NPA) dropped all charges against Zuma on April 5. Some analysts suggest that the
evidence does not affect the merits of the case, and questions have been raised on how that
evidence, recorded phone conversations, was obtained. The DA party strongly criticized the NPA
for “grossly inadequate reasons” for its dismissal of Zuma’s case.9 If Zuma’s trial had proceeded
and if he were to have been found guilty prior to the elections, he would have been ineligible to
become President of South Africa.10
A New Party Emerges: The Congress of the People
In the wake of Mbeki’s resignation, several high-profile ANC figures joined former Defense
Minister Mosiuoa Lekota to formally launch a new, centrist political party, the Congress of the
People (COPE) in December 2008. The new party fared well in its first electoral contest, winning
one-third of the 27 seats in Western Cape municipal by-elections in December 2008.11 The party
maintained momentum in the press in early 2009 with a series of high-profile defections from the
ANC, including former South African Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka and
businessman Saki Macozoma. COPE selected Reverend Mvume Dandala as its presidential
candidate. Dandala, who formerly served as Presiding Bishop of the Methodist Church of
Southern Africa and as head of the All Africa Council of Churches, is well known for his role in
campaigning against apartheid, but was criticized by the ANC for his relative lack of political
experience. In the party’s early months, some analysts suggested that COPE’s prospects in the
election would be tied to Jacob Zuma’s legal challenges. Although the charges against him were
dropped, COPE and other opposition parties publicly maintained that the ANC manipulated the
justice system to clear their candidate for the elections.
The April 2009 Elections
South Africans went to the polls on April 22, 2009, for parliamentary and provincial elections.
Approximately 18,000 South Africans living abroad reportedly registered to vote after a court
ruling the month prior confirmed their right to participate in the elections. In their campaigns, the
opposition parties took similar stances on a number of issues. Unlike the ANC, which supports
the current electoral system, the opposition advocated for the direct election of the President,
provincial premiers, and mayors. The parties also challenged the ANC’s decision to disband the
country’s former elite anti-corruption unit, the Scorpions. Media reports suggested that public
disapproval over several recent ANC decisions, such as the government’s refusal to issue a visa to
the Dalai Lama, could affect voter support for the party.12

9 “DA Slams Dismissal of Probe into ‘Mbekigate’ Tapes,” Mail and Guardian, March 31, 2009.
10 South Africa’s constitution required elections to be held within 90 days of the expiration of the National Assembly’s
five year term, on April 13, 2009. The new Assembly chooses the president after they are seated.
11 A ruling by the Electoral Commission barred ANC party candidates from standing in 12 of the 27 constituencies.
12 The Dalai Lama had been invited to attend a peace conference in March 2009 along with several other Nobel
laureates. Some reports suggest pressure from China influenced the decision, although government spokesman claims
the visa was denied because the Tibetan’s visit would have distracted from the World Cup, which was the focus of the
conference. Fellow laureate Desmond Tutu was publicly critical, as were opposition leaders and then-Health Minister
(continued...)
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
7
Voter turnout, estimated at 77%, was high for the April elections. The ANC maintained its
dominance but fell short of retaining its two-thirds majority in the parliament. The ANC now
holds 264 seats in the 400-seat assembly, while the main opposition party, the DA, holds 67 seats
and gained control of one of the country’s nine provinces. COPE received 7.4% of the 2009 vote,
picking up 30 seats in the 400-seat parliament, while the Inkatha Freedom Party received
acquired only 18 seats. Jacob Zuma was subsequently chosen by the new parliament to serve as
South Africa’s newest President. Motlanthe now serves as Deputy President.
The Zuma Administration
Zuma was inaugurated as South Africa’s newest President on May 9, 2009. He named his cabinet
the following day. Long-serving Finance Minister Trevor Manuel was replaced by the well-
respected former head of South Africa’s Revenue Service, Pravin Gordhan. Manuel was named to
head a new national planning commission to formulate government strategy. The appointments
allayed market concerns that Zuma would shift the country’s economic policy to the left.
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton welcomed the Zuma government’s pledge to continue
“a strong economic program.”13 Health Minister Barbara Hogan was moved to the Ministry of
Public Enterprises and replaced at the Health Ministry by a physician and former provincial
official, Aaron Motsoaledi. Businessman and senior ANC member Tokyo Sexwale, who was once
considered a possible successor to Mbeki, was named Minister of Human Settlements.
Zuma’s victory has not entirely allayed the tensions within the ANC, which may be exacerbated
by the country’s recent recession and growing budget deficit. COSATU remains highly critical of
the macroeconomic policies supported by the party’s “right,” policies that Zuma’s finance
minister has maintained. In November 2009, COSATU announced a “war” against anti-left
elements within the ANC.14 Strains between SACP and the ANC Youth League, led by the
controversial and outspoken Julius Malema, have increased during the Zuma Administration.
Malema, who has been a vocal proponent of nationalizing the country’s mines, was disciplined by
the party in 2010 and ordered to apologize for insulting Zuma, who still serves as president of the
ANC. Some observers contend that this infighting may prove distracting for Zuma in advancing
his policy goals. In October 2010, the President ordered his first major cabinet reshuffle,
reportedly in an effort improve service delivery, sacking seven ministers, including the outspoken
Barbara Hogan, and moving two to other posts. Municipal polls are scheduled for 2011.
The Arms Deal and Other Corruption Scandals
A $5.5 billion arms purchase from several European countries announced by South Africa in 1999
has posed political problems for senior members of the ANC, including Jacob Zuma, for over a

(...continued)
Barbara Hogan, who told reporters that the decision implied that the government was “dismissive of human rights.”
Nelson Mandela’s grandson, an organizer of the event, suggested that the decision “tainted” South Africa’s democratic
efforts. The event was postponed, and President Zuma’s new Foreign Minister later reportedly announced that the Dalai
Lama would be welcome to visit South Africa at any time. “Govt: Hogan’s Dalai Lama Comments ‘Unfortunate,’”
Mail and Guardian, March 25, 2009; “S. Africans Angered by Decision to Deny Visa to Dalai Lama,” Washington
Post, March 24, 2009.
13 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Interview with Manelisi Dubase of the South African Broadcasting
Corporation, May 19, 2009.
14 “South Africa’s COSATU Says to Take On the ANC Right,” Reuters, November 30, 2009.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
8
decade. Questions remain over the country’s need for aircraft, submarines, and surface vessels
which were to be acquired under the deal with five European firms. More pressing, though, have
been allegations of corruption associated with the purchase. Tony Yengeni, the ANC’s former
chief whip in the National Assembly, was arrested in 2001 on charges of corruption, forgery, and
perjury in connection with a large discount he received for the purchase of a luxury car, allegedly
in return for assuring that the deal went ahead. He pled guilty to fraud in exchange for acquittal
on corruption charges. President Mbeki later fired then-Deputy President Jacob Zuma, after a
judge declared Zuma had a “generally corrupt” relationship with his former financial advisor,
Schabir Shaik, who was convicted of fraud and corruption in connection with the arms deal.
Zuma was indicted but acquitted in 2006, after prosecutors failed to build a case against him.
Shaik lost an appeal of his conviction, with the judges ruling that evidence overwhelmingly
supported the charge that payments totaling about $165,000 made by Shaik to Zuma were bribes.
15 Shaik was released on medical parole in March 2009. The Hawks, a new special police
investigative unit (see below), closed the last two investigations related to the arms deal probe,
including one involving British defense firm BAE Systems, in October 2010, arguing that there
was little prospect of convictions. Critics maintain that several questions related to the deal
remain unresolved, and some are concerned that promised “offsets”—that is, investments by the
arms suppliers in South African industry—have not materialized.16
Another corruption scandal that has drawn attention is the “Travelgate” scam, in which 31 current
and former members of parliament, most from the ruling ANC party, have appeared in court since
2005 on charges of corruption. Accused of abuse of official travel privileges, the MPs reportedly
stole some $3 million in government funds. According to Transparency International, the
prosecutions have shown that “the anti-corruption bodies and judiciary have a fair degree of
independence and are able to carry out their functions without hindrance, even when high ranking
members of the ANC were involved.”17 Some of the MPs who pled guilty have left parliament,
but some still serve in office. “Travelgate” was followed by another reported scandal popularly
referred to as “Oilgate,” an allegedly corrupt oil deal between a state-owned oil company and a
black economic empowerment company (see below), in which public funds were reportedly
illegally diverted into an ANC party campaign fund.
Several corruption scandals have centered on the country’s justice organs themselves. South
Africa’s former chief prosecutor, Vusi Pikoli, was suspended in 2007 on charges of prosecutorial
excess by then-President Mbeki. Many suggest that the subsequent arrest of national police
commissioner Jackie Selebi amid allegations that he might have ties to organized crime was
directly linked to Pikoli’s suspension.18 Pikoli had been preparing warrants for Selebi’s arrest
when he was suspended. Selebi, a senior ANC member, was considered to be a Mbeki supporter
within the party, and some South Africans accused Mbeki of trying to prevent Selebi’s arrest.
Pikoli was later cleared of wrongdoing, but was not reappointed to his post. Selebi was replaced
as police commissioner, and in July 2010, he was convicted on charges of bribery and sentenced
to 15 years in prison.

15 Shaik was released on medical parole in March 2009.
16 “The Arms Deal—The Shadows Lengthen,” Business Day, September 20, 2006; “SA Laureates Demand Arms
Inquiry,” BBC, December 4, 2008.
17 Berlin-based Transparency International (TI) describes itself as a non-governmental organization devoted to
combating corruption. TI, Global Corruption Report 2006.
18 See, for example, “Lets All Arrest One Another,” The Economist, January 17, 2008, and “Party Power Struggle
Enthralls South Africa,” New York Times, October 12, 2007.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
9
The Pikoli and Selebi cases may indicate political tensions within the country’s law enforcement
agencies. As chief prosecutor, Pikoli oversaw the Scorpions (the Directorate of Special
Operations), South Africa’s former premier financial crimes investigative unit. Several leading
ANC officials led efforts to have the Scorpions, who prosecuted several high-profile corruption
cases, including that of Zuma, disbanded. Zuma and his allies criticized the Scorpions’
prosecution of him as politically motivated and suggested in 2008 that the Scorpions’ duties
should be subsumed by the national police. Others, including DA and COPE leaders, argued that
the unit’s “special status” under the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) was needed to tackle
corruption at the highest levels. Allegations of collusion between Mbeki allies and former heads
of both the Scorpions and the NPA in the Zuma case further compounded the debate.19 Despite
strong opposition from the opposition and civil society, the unit was officially moved by
parliament under the authority of the police service in late 2008. The unit, now known as the
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations (DCPI), or “the Hawks,” leads investigations against
organized and economic crimes.
President Zuma’s initial judicial appointments have been well received, including that of a new
chief justice, but his appointment in December 2009 of Menzi Simelane as director of the NPA,
the post formerly held by Pikoli, has drawn criticism. Critics suggest that Simelane, former
director general of the Justice Ministry, is partisan and may have interfered with the independence
of the NPA when he was with the ministry. The DA lost a case challenging Simelane’s
appointment, but the bar council continues to investigate complaints filed against him. In January
2010, Simelane changed the NPA’s media policy, prohibiting prosecutors from speaking to the
media without prior authorization.
Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan has estimated that corruption is costing South Africa an
estimated $3.6 billion a year, approximately 1% of the country’s GDP, and some analysts suggest
that figure could be much higher.20 The government announced a series of new initiatives to
counter public sector corruption, including the creation of a new anti-corruption authority that
would investigate tender fraud.
Press Freedoms
Several media and advocacy groups have raised concerns that the South African government
might be attempting to restrict press freedoms. In 2005, one of the country’s leading newspapers,
the Mail & Guardian, was banned by the courts from publishing a report on the “Oilgate”
scandal. According to media reports, the court ruling found that publishing the report would
damage the oil company’s right to privacy and was potentially defamatory.21 The gag order was
reportedly the first placed on an independent paper since apartheid, and was denounced as “an
extraordinarily dangerous precedent” to press freedom by the Media Institute for Southern Africa,
a press watchdog group. Concerns were also raised regarding the editorial independence of the
public South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the country’s largest broadcaster.22

19 Some have questioned whether the allegations, reportedly based on recorded telephone conversations, affect the
merits of the case against Zuma, and the method by which Zuma allies obtained the evidence has also been called into
question.
20 The Economist Intelligence Unit, “South Africa,” Country Report, December 2010.
21 The Media Institute of Southern Africa, “Media Freedom Has ‘Suffered Major Blow,’” May 28, 2005.
22 See, e.g., The Department of State, “South Africa,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 2010.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
10
In 2010, advocacy groups focused on two ANC proposals, one to create a Media Appeals
Tribunal that could impose legal penalties related to complaints against the press, and another, the
Protection of Information bill, which would impose stiff penalties for journalists reporting on
classified information and which could be used to punish whistleblowers. The Committee to
Protect Journalists has called the legislation “reminiscent of apartheid-era regulations,” and even
some veteran ANC members have criticized the proposals.23 Parliament is currently reviewing the
legislation and has indicated a willingness to modify sections deemed not to be in compliance
with human rights standards. Rights groups also protested the arrest of a local journalist in August
on charges of forgery, allegedly related to stories he was investigating on a provincial ANC leader
and on the police. Prosecutors later withdrew the charges against him.
HIV/AIDS
South Africa is believed to have the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic in the world, with almost six
million people estimated to be living with the disease. According to the Joint United Nations
Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), an estimated 18.1% of South African adults, aged 15-49,
were HIV positive in 2007, the most recent year for which figures are available.24 UNAIDS also
reports that as many as 280,000 children under the age of 15 were HIV positive that year. AIDS is
the leading cause of premature death in South Africa, and the number of AIDS-related deaths
there in 2007, some 350,000, was more than double that reported for Nigeria, which has the
second-highest global mortality figure at 170,000 deaths but almost three times South Africa’s
population. Approximately 1.4 million children currently living in the country have been
orphaned by the disease. As these figures show, the situation is grave.
Thabo Mbeki’s stance on HIV/AIDS was a major political issue in South Africa during his tenure.
Critics maintain that the former President’s ambiguous statements about the disease and lack of
leadership on the issue diverted attention and funding from the pandemic at a critical time. In
2000, President Mbeki wrote to then-President Clinton and other heads of state defending
dissident scientists who maintain that AIDS is not caused by the HIV virus. In 2001, he rejected
appeals that the National Assembly declare the AIDS pandemic a national emergency. In 2002,
President Mbeki drew criticism from the media and others for reportedly insisting that
tuberculosis rather than AIDS was the leading cause of death in South Africa, even though the
country’s Medical Research Council had reported that AIDS was the leading cause, accounting
for 40% of mortality among adults aged 15-49.25 The reasons for Mbeki’s stance on AIDS have
been difficult to discern. Some speculate that he feared that AIDS could undermine his vision of
South Africa as a leader in an African renaissance sparked by NEPAD and the African Union and
thus tended to minimize the importance of the epidemic.
The Mbeki government gradually modified its stance on HIV/AIDS under mounting domestic
and international pressure. In 2002, the government announced that it would triple the national
AIDS budget, end official opposition to the provision of antiretrovirals for rape victims, and
launch a program for universal access to drugs to prevent mother-to-child transmission (MTCT)
of HIV. That year, a South African court ordered the government to begin providing the

23 Committee to Protect Journalists, Letter to President Zuma, August 16, 2010, available at http://www.cpj.org; “Pallo
Jordan Opposes Media Tribunal,” Mail & Guardian, November 23, 2010.
24 UNAIDS, 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, August 2008.
25 “South Africa President Mbeki Criticizes U.N. AIDS Fund Grant,” Associated Press, July 25, 2002, and “Research
Affirms Disease Is Nation’s Leading Cause of Death,” The Washington Post, October 19, 2001.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
11
antiretroviral (ARV) drug Nevirapine nationwide to reduce MTCT. The South African Treatment
Action Campaign (TAC) had launched the suit in 2001, maintaining that MTCT prevention trials
were inadequate and that 20,000 babies could be saved yearly by a nationwide program.26 At its
2002 party conference the ANC announced that it was putting AIDS at the top of its agenda.27
The Department of Health in 2003 declared that the government would provide free antiretroviral
drugs, but after what observers considered a very slow implementation of the policy, TAC
threatened another lawsuit. Under pressure, the government began providing treatment at five
hospitals in 2004 and has gradually expanded access to the program. Reports suggest that access
to treatment for those with advanced HIV has since increased significantly, from only 4% of those
in need receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) in 2004 to 21% in 2006 and over 30% in 2008.28
Despite this commitment by the government to providing ART, many critics still did not consider
the Mbeki administration to be serious about the epidemic. In August 2006, then-Health Minister
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang drew international criticism for a controversial display of traditional
remedies such as garlic, lemons, and beetroot, which she reportedly claimed provided an
alternative defense to AIDS, at the International AIDS Conference in Toronto. Stephen Lewis, the
U.N. Special Envoy to Africa on AIDS, proclaimed South Africa’s AIDS policies as “wrong,
immoral, and indefensible” and “worthy of a lunatic fringe” during the conference, and 81
international scientists delivered a petition to Mbeki urging the health minister’s dismissal.29
Many observers consider the Toronto Conference to have prompted a key shift in the
government’s position. Weeks after the conference, Mbeki appointed his Deputy President,
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, as head of a new national AIDS commission charged with halving the
country’s infection rate by 2011. She emphasized that the government did believe that HIV causes
AIDS and acknowledged “shortcomings” in the government’s response to the epidemic. The
government also reached out to the AIDS advocacy community, which responded with cautious
optimism. TAC, the most vocal critic of the Mbeki Administration’s efforts, was cited in late 2006
saying that there was now “a growing enthusiasm, across the board, around the possibility of
what we can do as a country in a united fashion” to combat the disease.30 However, TAC again
questioned Mbeki’s commitment to fighting the epidemic after the August 2007 firing of
Tshabalala-Msimang’s deputy, who was outspoken about problems with the nation’s health
services and critical of the Health Minister’s controversial views on AIDS.
Although experts believe the country’s prevalence rates have begun to stabilize, the South African
government still faces many challenges in its response to HIV/AIDS.31 The emergence of
extensively drug resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB), high rates of HIV/TB co-infection, and
significant HIV prevalence rates among health care workers place major strains on the health care
system. AIDS activists responded positively to then-President Motlanthe’s appointment of a new
health minister, Barbara Hogan. She was replaced by President Zuma with Aaron Motsoaledi,

26 “AIDS Activists Sue South Africa,” Associated Press, August 21, 2001.
27 President Mbeki was criticized by some for not giving AIDS greater prominence in his address to the conference.
28 UNAIDS, 2008 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, August 2008 and Celebrating Life: The U.S. President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 2009 Annual Report to Congress.
29 The letter, titled “Expression of Concern by HIV Scientists,” can be found at http://www.aidstruth.org/letter-to-
mbeki.php. See also “Under Fire, South Africa Shakes Up Its Strategy Against AIDS,” The New York Times,
September 3, 2006, and “In South Africa, a Dramatic Shift on AIDS; Treatment, Prevention Get New Emphasis as
Deputy President Takes Key Role,” The Washington Post, October 27, 2006.
30 “Under Fire, South Africa Shakes Up Its Strategy Against AIDS,” The New York Times, September 3, 2006.
31 UNAIDS, “Country Factsheets,” available at http://cfs.unaids.org.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
12
who in late 2009 appeared to publicly link the doubling of South Africa’s death rate in the last
decade, largely due to AIDS, to the Mbeki Administration’s policies on the epidemic.32 President
Zuma, in a speech on December 1, 2009, World AIDS Day, announced a nationwide campaign to
encourage all South Africans to be tested for HIV and pledged to provide treatment for all infants
under one year who test positive for HIV by April 2010. He also pledged that ART would be
more readily available to pregnant women and those with both TB and HIV, and that a larger
number of health clinics would be prepared to provide counseling, testing, and, where possible,
treatment. Activists praised the President, who has made some controversial personal choices in
the past, for his speech and his proposed policies, commending the government’s “new-found
commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS in an open, serious, and evidence-based manner.”33
Land Reform
In order to address historic injustices, the South African government began a land reform program
in the late 1990s to restore land rights to those in the black majority forcibly dispossessed of their
land under racially discriminatory apartheid legislation. The government set a number of targets,
including the settlement of all land claims34 by the end of 2008 and the more ambitious transfer of
30% of agricultural lands owned by whites in 1994 to African owners by 2014. While the
government’s “willing buyer, willing seller” land reform policies have reportedly met with little
resistance from white landowners, and the Land Affairs Department reports that almost all land
claims have been settled, critics charge that the transfers are going too slowly. According to media
reports, the government announced in mid-2006 that negotiations with white farmers over the
price of land marked for restitution would be limited to six months, after which expropriation
could take place if no settlement was reached.35 Two months later, two white-owned farms
claimed by black South Africans were marked for expropriation, a process through which the
government would seize the land and pay the owners a price set by independent assessors.36
In a 2005 speech on the perceived slow pace of land transfers, then-Deputy President Mlambo-
Ngcuka said that South Africa might learn from Zimbabwe’s land reform process, igniting
considerable controversy. President Mbeki dismissed critics of the speech, saying that her words
were misinterpreted and that Zimbabwe’s policies were only one among many the government
had studied. The media reported a similarly controversial discussion document circulated by the
Land Affairs Department suggesting replacing the “willing buyer, willing seller” approach with a
“Zimbabwean model,” or forced-sale principle (Zimbabwe’s policy that preceded land invasions
there). The discussion paper was said to propose the expropriation of commercial agricultural
land to meet the government’s target of 30% redistribution. Government officials stressed that the
document was for internal discussion only and did not reflect official policy.37

32 “Minister Reveals ‘Shocking’ Figures on AIDS-Related Deaths,” Mail and Guardian, November 10, 2009.
33 Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), “TAC Commends President Zuma for his Strong Leadership on HIV/AIDS and
Welcomes the Death of AIDS Denialism,” December 3, 2009. For more information on President Zuma’s approach to
the epidemic, see Celia Dugger, “In South Africa, An Unlikely Leader on AIDS,” New York Times, May 14, 2010.
34 Black citizens filed over 79,700 land claims between 1999 and 2006, according to a report by Michael Wines, “South
Africa to Seize Two White-Owned Farms,” New York Times, October 10, 2006.
35 “ANC Gives Ultimatum to White Farmers,” The Daily Telegraph, August 14, 2006.
36 “South Africa to Seize Two White-Owned Farms, New York Times, October 10, 2006.
37 Under this proposed model, farmers who want to sell their land must offer the government the right of first refusal. If
they refused a government offer, they could not sell the land on the open market. “‘Zimbabwe’ Land Option Mooted by
Officials,” Business Day, October 16, 2006.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
13
The South African government has made several attempts to speed up the transfer of commercial
agricultural lands. Official figures in 2009 suggest that the government had met only 6% of its
30% target for state-funded transfers. The Mbeki Administration proposed legislation in 2008 that
would accelerate the process by adding a constitutional provision for expropriation of a property
“for a public purpose.” Critics, including the Democratic Alliance, argued that the proposed law,
which would restrict property owners’ rights to judicial appeal and force sales at below market
prices, was unconstitutional and would undermine confidence in property rights and deter
investment.38 They also suggest that while the rate of state-funded transfers has been slow,
substantial transfers have been made privately through the property market. The legislation was
shelved, but the Zuma Administration is expected to resubmit it in 2011. The Zuma
Administration has maintained its commitment to a controversial “use it or lose it” initiative
introduced in 2008 that allows farms that have been transferred to black beneficiaries to be taken
by the government if they are deemed unproductive.
In late 2009, officials from the Department of Land Affairs announced that South Africa would
not meet its deadline to redistribute one-third of farmland by 2014, and would extend the deadline
to 2025, due to a shortage of funds needed to buy the remaining land. COSATU has referred to
the redistribution issue as a “social time-bomb.”39 In a 2004 survey of South Africans of all races,
72% of black respondents agreed with the statement: “All the land whites own, they stole from
blacks.”40 According to an independent South African think tank,
The most universal and immediate land need in South Africa is for ‘a place to stay’ rather
than ‘a place to farm’.... Even among employed agricultural workers, land demand is modest.
Among people living on the land without alternative sources of income, however, aspirations
for land or more land can reach high levels, and become very intense. Although this is a
minority group, it is large in numerical terms, and hence constitutes a significant policy
challenge.41
Crime
Violent crime remains a serious problem in South Africa, although the country’s murder rate has
dropped significantly in the past 15 years.42 House and business robberies and car hijackings are
prevalent, and the country has the world’s highest prevalence of rape outside countries
experiencing sustained armed conflict. Some analysts attribute the high rate of crime to the
country’s high level of wealth disparity, but also to shortcomings within the police force and in
the lack of a comprehensive government approach to the problem. President Zuma has stressed
his commitment to fighting crime, and has pledged to reduce serious and violent crimes by 7% to
10% annually.43

38 “Expropriation Must Be a Land Resort,” Business Day, May 30, 2008.
39 “SA ‘to Miss Land Reform Deadline,’” BBC, November 4, 2009.
40 Survey cited in “Land Issue Illustrates Social Rift,” Business Day, 5 May 2004.
41 The Centre for Development and Enterprise, Land Reform in South Africa: a 21st Century Perspective, Johannesburg:
June 2005, p. 30.
42 Johan Burger and Chandre Gould, “Violent Crime in South Africa: What the Latest Crime Statistics Tell Us,”
Institute for Security Studies, September 22, 2010.
43 State of the Nation Address by President Jacob Zuma at a Joint Sitting of Parliament in Cape Town, June 3, 2009.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
14
The South African government continues to battle perceptions that the country is not safe for
tourists because of its high crime rate. Several surveys suggest that some potential tourists were
deterred from visiting South Africa for the World Cup out of fear of becoming victim to a
criminal act.44 The government deployed over 40,000 new police officers for the World Cup, new
positions that the force has retained. South Africa also set aside more than 50 special courtrooms
to handle crimes committed during the games. Reports suggest that the country’s crime rate
dropped during the event, which was held in June and July, and that the special courtrooms
consequently did not see the number of caseloads originally anticipated.45 Fears of a terrorist
incident, possibly one similar to that conducted in Mumbai in 2008, during the games also went
unfounded. The South African Police coordinated closely with INTERPOL and other
international partners, in preparation for the games, and received special training through the
State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program.
The Economy
In 2009, South Africa weathered its first recession in 17 years. The rate of growth in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 3% per year in the first decade after apartheid and rose to an
average of 5% from 2004 to 2007. The growth rate fell to 3.7% in 2008 and -1.8% in 2009, due in
part to the global economic downturn; it rose to an estimated 2.8% in 2010. The growth rate is
expected to rise to 3.7% in 2011.46 Much higher rates will be needed if South Africa is to
substantially increase employment among the black majority and reduce the sharp inequalities in
income distribution among the races. Unemployment estimates range from 25% to 40%, far
above the government’s target of 15%. The vast, poverty-stricken townships surrounding South
Africa’s cities remain a potential source of political instability. In recent years periodic riots have
erupted in several poor municipalities to protest local government corruption and inadequate
service delivery. Although turnout and support for the ANC remained high nationally in the
country’s last nationwide municipal elections, voters boycotted the polls in a number of
townships in which the ANC had formerly enjoyed strong support, and several hundred former
ANC supporters stood as independent candidates. Conditions in the townships have improved
marginally with the expanded availability of electricity and the provision of clean water taps.
However, the widening gap between the rich and poor is likely to pose a continuing challenge.
Economic Policies Under Thabo Mbeki
South Africa won praise from international economists for its reform-oriented macro-economic
policy in the late 1990s, which, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, “demonstrated
its commitment to open markets, privatization, and a favorable investment climate, moving away
from the former government’s strategy of import substitution and industrial development that
protected local industries with high tariff barriers.”47 The policy, known as the Growth,
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, delivered mixed results—it engendered
macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline, and trade liberalization. However, unemployment

44 See for example, “Crime ‘Deters’ SA 2010 Tourists,” BBC, July 23, 2007; and “South Africans Fear Crime Could
Mar World Cup,” CNN, January 29, 2009.
45 Gloria Edwards, “Increase in Crime After World Cup,” News24, September 13, 2010.
46 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Country Report: South Africa, December 2010.
47 U.S. Department of Commerce, South Africa Country Commercial Guide, Fiscal Year 2003, July 2002.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
15
continued to rise, and income distribution remained highly skewed, largely along racial lines.
Nevertheless, the income of the average black household almost doubled in the first decade after
the end of apartheid. In late 2007, the government announced that the average national income
had risen 22% since 1999.48
In 2005, the government unveiled a new economic plan, the Accelerated and Shared Growth
Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA). It was designed to raise the economic growth rate to 4.5%
from 2004-2009 and to at least 6% from 2010-1014 through targeted interventions, including
public investment in infrastructure, and to cut unemployment rates in half by 2014. These targets,
optimistic prior to the economic downturn, are likely now unattainable in the near term.
Some economists attribute South Africa’s economic difficulties, in part, to the slow pace of
privatization. Despite its commitment to privatization, the Mbeki government remained heavily
involved in transportation, communications, energy production, and the defense sector, and after
the 2004 elections expressed a desire to restructure most remaining state-owned enterprises rather
than expand privatization. Further privatization delays were due in part to government concerns
that privatization would boost unemployment temporarily, fueling criticism from COSATU and
the SACP. According to COSATU and SACP, the job cutbacks that often follow privatization are
contributing to the country’s unemployment and growing income gap.
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)
The government has sought to promote “black empowerment” by assuring that a significant
portion of the shares in privatized companies would be acquired by black South Africans rather
than by wealthy whites or foreign investors. Its Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) program,
initiated in 1994, was designed to address racial inequalities in the business sector. In 1994,
blacks owned less than 5% of the country’s private enterprises. As of 2008, there were over 15
black-owned and 29 black-empowered companies listed on the South African stock exchange.
The rise in black ownership has been echoed by a significant increase in the black middle class.
Nevertheless, the lack of skilled labor may be hampering the program, as may complicated or
unclear regulations. In 2007, the government instituted the BEE Codes of Good Practice, which
make both listed and unlisted companies subject to empowerment requirements and targets, but
offer concessions to small businesses and foreign investors.49 A new economic growth strategy
introduced by the government in November 2010 (see below) proposes a “major re-think” and
“substantial revision” of the BEE codes to increase jobs, skills development, and investment.
Foreign Investment
In the first decade of post-apartheid rule, analysts expressed concern over the government’s
ability to attract foreign investment at the levels needed to spur growth. Sound macroeconomic
policies, including reduced tariffs and export subsidies, the loosening of exchange controls,
improved enforcement of intellectual property laws, and legislation designed to improve

48 The average household income for blacks increased by 71% from 1996 to 2004, according to the South African
Institute for Race Relations’ South Africa Survey 2004/2005. See also “South Africa: Gap Between Haves and Have-
Nots Yawns Wider,” IRIN, November 7, 2007.
49 Multinational corporations can maintain 100% ownership provided they meet other BEE criteria, including
employment and procurement targets.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
16
competition have been cited by observers as responsible for the country’s economic growth. A
World Bank study finds that South Africa is one of the top 35 easiest countries in which to do
business.50 Investors are, however, reportedly worried by labor relations, high crime rates, and
corruption. Transparency International ranks South Africa 54 out of 178 in its 2010 Corruption
Perceptions Index, indicating that it is perceived as less corrupt than other Sub-Saharan African
countries (only four African countries ranked less corrupt than South Africa), but more corrupt
than many competitors for investment in other parts of the world.51 Its ranking has fallen from 43
in 2007. Political risks arising from potential instability in Zimbabwe are regarded as another
deterrent to investors, and South Africa’s own racial, class, and political divisions are seen as
sources of concern. Analysts have also highlighted the country’s executive “brain drain” as one of
the greatest threats to South Africa’s economic progress.
Changes Under Zuma or Business as Usual?
Some international investors initially expressed concern over the prospect of a Zuma presidency,
in view of his close relationship with the labor unions. He sought to reassure them in the early
days of his presidency, promoting long-serving Finance Minister Trevor Manuel to head a new
national planning commission that would formulate government strategy, and replacing him as
finance minister with the well respected former head of South Africa’s Revenue Service, Pravin
Gordhan. Gordhan has stressed that he will continue the economic policies pursued by his
predecessor. Gill Marcus, who replaced Tito Mboweni as Reserve Bank Governor in late 2009,
has maintained Mboweni’s monetary policy. She formerly served as both Deputy Finance
Minister and Deputy Reserve Bank Governor, and more recently served as an executive with
several corporations and public bodies, including Absa, one of South Africa’s four main banking
groups. The appointments appear to have allayed market concerns.
President Zuma has actively sought for South Africa to play an increasing role in world economic
fora. The country is a member of the G20, and was invited in late 2010 by China to join the BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China), a formation of major emerging market economies. Some
economists, including the Goldman Sachs analyst who originally coined the term “BRIC,” argue
that the country’s economy is considerably smaller than several other emerging markets, such as
South Korea, Mexico and Turkey, and question China’s motives for extending the invitation.52
China became South Africa’s largest trading partner, in both imports and exports, in 2009.
The Global Economic Crisis and The New Growth Path
Like many countries, South Africa was affected by the global economic downturn. By some
estimates, one million South Africans may have lost their jobs in 2009. In response, President
Zuma pledged to create half a million new jobs by the end of 2009 and a further four million jobs
by 2014 through an expanded public works program. The effort was hampered by reduced
government revenues, and the government failed to meet the 2009 target. Zuma’s ability to fulfill
his pledges to create new jobs may continue to be hindered by revenue shortfalls and private

50 See the Doing Business section of the World Bank’s website at http://www.worldbank.org.
51 The Transparency International index is based on the reported perceptions of business people and country analysts. A
country with the rank of 1 has the least corruption.
52 “What’s Behind China’s Move to Include South Africa in the BRIC Grouping?” International Business Times,
January 3, 2011.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
17
sector retrenchment. The Administration also continues to face challenges from the labor unions,
who brought the country to a standstill in August 2010 with a public sector strike that paralyzed
schools and health services for almost three weeks before agreeing to a 7.5% pay raise.
In November 2010, the South African Government launched a new growth strategy, with job
creation as its central theme. The strategy, known as the New Growth Path, aims to create five
million new jobs and reduce unemployment from 25% to 15% by 2020. It also commits the
government to fiscal discipline and emphasizes a role for the private sector. Structural barriers
such as skills shortages may create obstacles in the government’s efforts to meet its goals. Some
aspects of the new strategy, including a proposal to cap wages and bonuses, have met with
resistance, not only from ANC partner COSATU, but also from the business community, who
argues caps would deter foreign investment.
The 2010 World Cup
In June and July 2010, South Africa hosted the 2010 FIFA World Cup, games which the
government hoped would draw global attention to the country and boost tourism and economic
growth. The games also had significant symbolic value to many South Africans. Racially-mixed
sporting teams were banned under the country’s apartheid-era constitution, and South Africa was
suspended from the international soccer body, FIFA, in 1961, in one of the first acts of what
became an international sports boycott against the apartheid government. After a temporary
lifting of the suspension in 1963, South Africa was again banned from playing the sport
internationally, and was formally expelled from FIFA after the Soweto riots in 1976. A new multi-
racial team was readmitted to FIFA in 1992. The sport of soccer (referred to in South Africa as
football) played an important role in the lives of the political prisoners held on Robben Island
during the apartheid years. Wardens initially banned prisoners from playing the sport, but, after
intervention by the International Red Cross, the prisoners formed the Makana Football
Association. Nelson Mandela, who was kept isolated during his imprisonment, was unable to
play, but Jacob Zuma was a founding member.53 Other players included Kgalema Motlanthe,
Mosiuoa Lekota, and Tokyo Sexwale. South Africa was selected in 2004 by FIFA to host the 2010
World Cup. The country had hosted other international sporting events, including the 2003
Cricket World Cup and the 2009 soccer Confederations Cup, but nothing of this magnitude.
In preparation for the games, South Africa invested almost $5 billion in construction and
infrastructure improvements, refurbishing the Johannesburg and Cape Town international airports
and building a new one in Durban; adding commuter rail links; widening highways; building
stadiums; and improving telecommunications infrastructure. The government also made
significant investments to ensure security during the event. Nine cities hosted the 64 matches,
which were held in 10 new, refurbished, or upgraded stadiums. Ticket costs were high for non-
South Africans, and there was a lack of affordable tickets for citizens other African countries. The
tourist draw was lower than expected, with approximately 310,000 visitors coming to South
Africa rather than the anticipated 450,000. Nevertheless, over 3 million fans attended the games,
marking the third highest turnout in FIFA history. The World Cup drew approximately $500

53 For more information, see Chuck Korr and Marvin Close, More Than Just a Game: Soccer vs. Apartheid: The Most
Important Soccer Story Ever Told, (Thomas Dunne Books: New York) April 27, 2010.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
18
million in foreign spending to the economy. By some estimates, the event may have added an
additional 0.5% to the country’s 2010 GDP growth.54
Electricity Shortages and “Green” Energy Proposals
The country’s economic growth is also threatened by an overstretched electricity network. In spite
of abundant coal resources, South Africa currently lacks sufficient generating capacity to meet its
power needs. In January 2008, South Africans experienced severe electrical power cuts
throughout the country. Estimates indicate that the cuts may have cost the economy millions.55
The crucial mining sector was hit particularly hard, causing global gold and platinum prices to
rise. Many mines closed for several days as the power cuts threatened worker safety. Electricity
from South Africa was also temporarily cut to neighboring countries. State-owned Eskom, one of
the world’s largest power companies, and the Mbeki Administration blamed one another for the
crisis. The government began rationing electricity and has accelerated plans to build new power
plants and rehabilitate old ones. South Africa is investing significant resources to upgrade its
electricity infrastructure, in part through a $3.7 billion loan from the World Bank to Eskom.
Experts suggest the shortages may nevertheless continue for several years, and consumers have
faced steep increases in their power bills.
The South African government has announced plans to increase the percentage of the country’s
electricity that comes from renewable sources and to ultimately cut its carbon emissions by 42%
over the next 15 years. It also hopes to create 300,000 “green” jobs in the next decade. Eskom
currently produces an estimated 95% of the country’s electricity, but a new subsidy plan
announced in 2009 to buy energy from renewable sources through independent producers is
scheduled to begin in 2011. To date the government’s investment in renewable energy has been
limited, and some question the government’s commitment to implementing the new policies.56
U.S. Relations
U.S. policymaking toward South Africa and the anti-apartheid struggle was contentious from the
1960s through the 1980s, with many arguing that the United States was doing too little to promote
human rights and democratic rule. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of
1986 (P.L. 99-440) over President Reagan’s veto in order to affirm U.S. support for democratic
change. The legislation imposed a number of sanctions against South Africa. The Reagan
Administration, by contrast, had been pursuing a policy of “constructive engagement” (i.e.,
dialogue) with the white South African regime, regarding this approach as the most effective way
to promote change.
In the early 1990s, the United States assumed a lead role in supporting South Africa’s transition to
democracy. Policy makers at that time saw the South African democratization process as a model
for other African countries, and expected that the country would soon become a stabilizing force

54 “S Africa Asks ‘Was World Cup Worth It?’” Agencé France-Press, December 9, 2010.
55 EIU, “South Africa: Power Down,” January 31, 2008.
56 Pew Charitable Trusts, Who’s Winning the Clean Energy Race? Growth, Competition and Opportunity in the
World’s Largest Economies, 2010; Simon Mundy, “South Africa Moves Forward on Green Power Subsidies,”
Financial Times, December 7, 2010.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
19
as well as an engine for economic growth throughout the sub-Saharan region. South Africa’s need
to focus on domestic economic and social problems meant that U.S. expectations for the country’s
regional role were perhaps not met in full in the first post-apartheid years. But South Africa’s
leadership in the launching of NEPAD; the deployment of South African peacekeepers to
Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, and Sudan; and intensive South African involvement in the peace process
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have highlighted South Africa’s capabilities as a
regional actor. South Africa also assisted U.S. efforts to resolve Haiti’s political crisis in 2004 by
providing an exile location for former President Bertrand Aristide. Given South Africa’s role in
conflict mediation and resolution throughout the continent, the United States has worked to
expand the country’s peacekeeping abilities.57
Since 1992, South Africa has been among the leading African recipients of U.S. aid. U.S.
assistance to South Africa has increased in recent years, rising from an estimated $224 million in
FY2006, to an estimated $574 million for FY2008, almost $545 million for FY2009, and an
estimated $578 million in FY2010. The overwhelming majority of this funding goes to
HIV/AIDS and related health programs. In its FY2008 congressional budget justification, the
State Department reported that “the U.S. Government’s relationship with South Africa is
transforming from that of donor to one of strategic partnership,” and accordingly, “activities in
Peace and Security will continue to increase in importance while development programs will be
phased out in the next couple of years.” U.S. assistance continues to focus on fighting HIV/AIDS
and tuberculosis, promoting economic growth, and improving South Africa’s capacity to support
regional peacekeeping operations and counter transnational crime. USAID programs have
supported efforts to promote good governance, reduce unemployment and poverty, increase
access to shelter and municipal services, and improve the quality of education and healthcare. The
South African government places a strong emphasis on budget transparency, ranking second, after
the United Kingdom, in public spending transparency in the Open Budget Index.58
The United States provides significant assistance to South Africa’s fight against HIV/AIDS
through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), having contributed more
than $2 billion since the program’s inception in FY2004. In FY2010, the PEPFAR program
provided ARV therapy to an estimated 917,700 patients, transmission prevention treatment to
over 682,400 pregnant HIV-infected women, counseling and testing for over five million, and
palliative and/or tuberculosis care for 2,160,300 South Africans. PEPFAR’s South Africa program
also funds public education efforts to promote abstinence, faithfulness, and healthy behavior to
reduce the risk of transmission among high-risk groups. In December 2010, the United States and
South Africa signed a five-year Partnership Framework to improve coordination on PEPFAR.
The Obama Administration has publically emphasized South Africa’s important leadership role,
both regionally and globally.59 The United States supports South Africa’s efforts to deliver foreign
assistance to other African countries through a $1.3 million Trilateral Assistance Program. This

57 For more information see CRS Report RL32773, The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Nina M. Serafino.
58 The Open Budget Index is compiled by the International Budget Partnership, based in Washington, DC, based on the
findings of independent civil society organizations in the participating countries. It measures the extent to which
governments make information on key budget documents available to the public during the budget process at the
national level. The United States ranked fifth on the Index in 2008, the most recent year available. South Africa is one
of only 5 of 85 countries surveyed that makes extensive information on their budgets publicly available.
59 Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, “Current Status of U.S.-South African
Relations,” June 10, 2009.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
20
partnership began in 2008 with the two countries working together to develop local government
structures in the DRC; the programs currently supports South African efforts in Southern Sudan
and Malawi. During Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to South Africa in August 2009, she
pledged to “deepen and broaden our engagement with South Africa” and noted that the two
governments had agreed to reengage in a “high-level, bilateral, strategic dialogue.”60 That
dialogue was launched in April 2010, and the first round of bilateral meetings were held in
December 2010. The working-level meetings focused on law enforcement, trade, transportation,
human rights, health, and agriculture. Prior to the December talks, according to the State
Department, U.S.-South Africa cooperation had already resulted in progress on renewable energy,
nuclear power, AIDS and other health programs, and defense cooperation.
Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism
U.S. and South African law enforcement authorities have cooperated on terrorism investigations,
including investigations into the possibility that Islamic militants from outside the region have
had a presence in or ties to support groups within South Africa. In 1999, South African authorities
arrested Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, a Tanzanian later convicted in the bombing of the U.S.
embassy in Dar es Salaam, and deported him to the United States. Khalfan had reportedly sought
to hide among Cape Town’s Muslim community after he fled Tanzania. There is continuing
concern that other terrorists may seek to hide in South Africa, or make use of its modern
transportation and communications systems for transit, smuggling, and money-laundering.61
There is concern over the potential use of South African travel documents by would-be terrorists.
Several foreign nationals with suspected ties to terrorism have been apprehended at U.S. and
British borders, as well as in Pakistan and elsewhere in Africa, with South African travel
documents. South African passports were found during raids by British police on suspected terror
groups in London in 2004 and 2005. The U.S. State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism has repeatedly noted concern regarding fraudulent South African travel
documents, linking them to a lack of institutional capacity and corruption within the Department
of Home Affairs, which is responsible for immigration services.62
The United States provides assistance to a range of South African authorities, including the South
African Police Service, to support their efforts to counter terror in South Africa and the region,
and to prevent illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Homeland Security
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assisted South Africa in the development of a dedicated
law enforcement unit within the South African Revenue Service (SARS) focused on WMD
issues. SARS has a CBP Container Security Initiative team that screens containers passing
through the port of Durban. U.S. assistance has also supported training for security contingencies
related to the 2010 World Cup, including airport security management, border control
management, critical incident management, and preventing attacks on soft targets.
The U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) includes several
South African nationals in its Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), which sanctions
individuals and groups believed to have links to terrorism. In a controversial move, the South

60 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at an Embassy Meet and Greet in Pretoria, August 7, 2009.
61 For more recent information, see the State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism.
62 U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2010.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
21
African government used its position in 2007 as a member of the U.N. Security Council’s Al-
Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee, also known as the 1276 Committee, to block United
Nations travel and financial sanctions on two of these individuals, Farhad Ahmed Dockrat and Dr.
Junaid Ismail Dockrat. South Africa argued that the evidence against the two was insufficient.63
The South African government has expressed differences with the United States in the latter’s
designation of Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. In May 2007, prior to the Hamas
military seizure of the Gaza Strip, the South African Minister of Intelligence met with Hamas
leader and then-Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority Ismail Haniyeh. According to some
media reports, he publically praised Hamas and invited Haniyeh to visit South Africa.
Diplomatic Differences
Despite the cordial relations that officially exist between South Africa and the United States,
some analysts suggest that diplomatic differences in recent years highlighted what a former U.S.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs referred to as a “rough patch” in U.S.-South
African relations.64 As one U.S. official pointed out, the country has had close ties with the Non-
Aligned Movement countries, and has exhibited “marked sympathy toward countries that exert
their independence from the West.”65 Some South African officials expressed opposition to the
Bush Administration’s initial proposal to locate the new U.S. combatant command, Africa
Command or AFRICOM, on the continent.66 However, the government later allowed a historic
visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Theodore Roosevelt, in late 2008, and its navy engaged in
a range of training exercises with the USS Arleigh Burke, a guided missile destroyer, in 2009.
Military relations are reportedly improving. South Africa took a critical stance toward the war in
Iraq, and former President Nelson Mandela was vocal in his opposition to what he viewed as U.S.
unilateralism on Iraq. South Africa has also differed significantly with the United States on Iran.67
The United Nations
South Africa’s role as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council from 2007 through
2008 was controversial, and the Mbeki Administration was criticized by the United States as well
as by many human rights activists for its lack of support for human rights issues raised before the
Council.68 In January 2007, South Africa voted against a resolution on political prisoners in

63 “Terrorism Financing Blacklists at Risk; Global System Faces Multiple Challenges,” Washington Post, November 2,
2008.
64 Janine Zacharia, “U.S. Finds an Antagonist in a Country on the Rise,” International Herald Tribune, June 27, 2007.
65 Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Linda Thomas-Greenfield, “U.S.-South Africa Relations: The View
from Washington,” Washington, D.C., September 14, 2006.
66 According to South African media reports, in July 2007, then-U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, Eric Bost, publicly
expressed frustration that the country’s defense minister would not respond to requests for a meeting with General Kip
Ward, commander of AFRICOM. For more information, see CRS Report RL34003, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic
Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, by Lauren Ploch.
67 During a 2006 visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Pretoria, South Africa affirmed its support for Iran’s
“inalienable right to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” at the same time that the Mbeki government
announced its intention to consider renewing its uranium enrichment program. South Africa, which dismantled its own
nuclear weapons program after the fall of apartheid, insisted that any enrichment program would be strictly peaceful in
nature. “South Africa’s Support for Iran’s Nuclear Program ‘Holds Firm’,” BBC Monitoring Africa, September 1, 2006.
68 See, for example, Colum Lynch, “South Africa’s U.N. Votes Disappoint Some,” Washington Post, April 16, 2007;
James Kirchick, “Why, the Beloved Country?,” Los Angeles Times, July 29, 2007.
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
22
Burma, arguing that alleged human rights abuses in sovereign countries are not covered by the
mandate of the Security Council as defined by the U.N. Charter. It argued that because the abuses
do not pose a direct threat to international peace and security, they would be more appropriately
addressed by the U.N. Human Rights Council.69 In March 2007, while serving a one-month term
as President of the Security Council, South Africa reportedly blocked discussion of human rights
abuses in Zimbabwe.70 Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu said of the Burma vote, in
which China and Russia cast a double veto, “I am deeply disappointed by our vote. It is a betrayal
of our own noble past.... The tyrannical military regime is gloating, and we sided with them. If
others had used the arguments we are using today when we asked them for their support against
apartheid, we might still have been unfree.”71 Former DA leader Tony Leon expressed similar
sentiments on his government’s alleged refusal to address the Zimbabwe situation, calling it
“extraordinary irony” that the ANC government would use the same argument used to block
debate on the abuses of the former apartheid regime in South Africa.72
In July 2008, South Africa voted with Russia, China, Vietnam, and Libya in opposition to a U.S.-
sponsored resolution on Zimbabwe (S/2008/447) that called for targeted sanctions on select
members of the Mugabe regime, an international arms embargo, the appointment of a U.N.
Special Representative on Zimbabwe, and the creation of a Panel of Experts to monitor and
evaluate the situation and the effects of the sanctions.
South Africa and the United States also differed on Middle East issues addressed by the Security
Council. In 2007, South Africa abstained from a U.S.-sponsored resolution to establish an
international tribunal to investigate political killings in Lebanon, arguing that although it
supported a tribunal with “Lebanese ownership,” it was not appropriate for the Security Council
to impose a tribunal upon the country and “politicize international criminal law.”73 The country
was vocal in its opposition to sanctions on both Sudan and Iran, arguing that they would
ultimately harden the target governments’ positions rather than reduce tensions. However, after
efforts to modify resolution language, South Africa ultimately did vote for sanctions against Iran
in March 2007, “to remind Iran of its responsibility towards the IAEA and the Nonproliferation
Treaty.”74 South Africa began a new term on the Security Council in January 2011.
Zimbabwe 75
Political and economic turmoil in neighboring Zimbabwe over the last decade led to a massive
exodus of Zimbabweans in search of work. A nationwide outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe in
2008 and early 2009 exacerbated the flight. Some sources estimate that as many as four million
Zimbabweans (30% of the total population) may have left the country by 2009. Zimbabwe’s other
neighbors, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique, also saw a significant rise in immigration during

69 U.N. document, S/2007/14, January 12, 2007.
70 “Britain Wants U.N. Security Council Attention on Zimbabwe,” Voice of America, March 16, 2007.
71 “Desmond Tutu ‘deeply disappointed with South Africa’s vote against U.N Security Council resolution on
Myanmar,” International Herald Tribune, January 21, 2007.
72 “South Africa Reportedly Blocking U.N. Debate on Zimbabwe Crisis,” Business Day, March 20, 2007.
73 China, Indonesia, the Russian Federation, and Qatar also abstained. U.N. document, S/2007/315, May 30, 2007.
74 U.N. Document S/Res/1747, March 24, 2007. For South African government statements on the vote, see “Iran Keeps
Up Nuclear Consultation with SA,” Business Day, July 9, 2007.
75 For more information on South Africa’s policies on Zimbabwe, see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The
Transitional Government and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch
South Africa: Current Issues and U.S. Relations

Congressional Research Service
23
that period. Those who were caught by South African police entering the country illegally were
sent back to Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s economy has recovered slightly since the formation of the
new government in early 2009, and basic goods are again available in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless,
less than 10% of the population is estimated to be formally employed in Zimbabwe, and many
who fled the country in the last decade currently see little economic opportunity at home.
In April 2009, the South African government suspended the deportation of illegal Zimbabwe
immigrants, but in September 2010, the government announced an end to the special
dispensation, requiring Zimbabweans to apply for a residency permit before 2011 or be deported.
Over one million Zimbabweans are estimated to currently reside in South Africa, and those who
are unemployed or hold part-time jobs are ineligible for permits. With thousands lining up in
December 2010, the government relaxed requirements that applicants show a Zimbabwean
passport, a document that is reportedly expensive and difficult to acquire. Advocacy groups have
expressed concern that deportations may begin in April 2011.76
As mentioned above, tensions over perceived competition for resources led in mid-2008 to
xenophobic attacks on Zimbabweans and other immigrants in townships throughout South Africa.
Many were rendered homeless and forced to seek shelter in temporary camps established by the
South African government, while others chose to return to their country of origin. Resentment
against immigrants remains a potential flashpoint for violence in South Africa.
During his 2003 visit to Africa, President George W. Bush called then-President Mbeki his “point
man” on Zimbabwe.77 The United States has been outspoken in its criticism of the policies of
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe with respect to human rights, democracy, and land reform,
and has imposed “targeted sanctions” prohibiting travel to the United States by Zimbabwe
leaders. President Mbeki, by contrast, chose to deal with President Mugabe through “quiet
diplomacy,” or diplomatic engagement. Mbeki’s Zimbabwe policies drew criticism from within
South Africa; former President Mandela, Archbishop Tutu, former opposition leader Tony Leon,
and even the ANC’s ally, COSATU, were vocal detractors.
South African officials have called for western countries to reconsider the penalties they have
imposed on Zimbabwe. Although the United States has expressed support for Zimbabwe’s
coalition government, U.S. officials remain critical of the presence of Mugabe and other
“hardliners” in the government, and have been reluctant to ease sanctions. The United States and
other donor governments remain concerned with the lack of progress on several outstanding
issues related to political and press freedoms and government appointments. The opposition and
others, including the United States, have requested that SADC, as mediator and guarantor of the
political agreement between the opposition and Mugabe’s party, press for reforms.
As Zimbabwe’s largest trading partner, many observers consider South Africa to be in a position
to exert substantial leverage on its neighbor. At the same time, South Africa must weigh the
unintended effects of such leverage—increasing instability or state collapse across its northern
border could produce a sharp increase in illegal migration and have a substantial impact on South
Africa. For more information, see CRS Report RL34509, Zimbabwe: The Transitional
Government and Implications for U.S. Policy, by Lauren Ploch.

76 “South Africa Could Deport 1.2 Million Zimbabweans, Lawyers Say,” Bloomberg Businessweek, January 3, 2010.
77 Comments made by President Bush during press conference on July 9, 2003, in Pretoria http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/07/20030709.html.