Levelling Up the United Kingdom
Levelling Up the
United Kingdom
Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Levelling Up,
Housing and Communities
by Command of Her Majesty
2 February 2022
CP 604
© Crown copyright 2022
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ISBN 978-1-5286-3017-7
E02694177 02/22
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Contents
Foreword by the Prime Minister
viii
Foreword by the Secretary of State and Andrew Haldane
x
Executive summary
xii
Chapter 1 The United Kingdom’s Geographical Disparities: Drivers and Potential
Policy Approaches
1
1.1
A Brief History of Geographical Disparities
1
1.2
Geographical Disparities across the UK
16
1.2.1 The scale of geographical disparities across the UK
16
1.2.2 How the UK’s geographical disparities compare internationally
19
1.2.3 Broader measures of geographical disparities
21
1.2.4 Local level geographic disparities
27
1.2.5 Geographical disparities over time
30
1.2.6 Cities and productivity
33
1.2.7 Geographic differences and social mobility
37
1.2.8 Geographic and economic clustering
39
1.3
Explaining Economic Geographies
42
1.3.1
Economic growth theory
42
1.3.2 New economic geography
44
1.3.3 Social geography and infrastructure
45
1.3.4 Institutional capital and leadership
47
1.3.5 Complex adaptive systems
48
1.3.6 Synthesising the approaches
50
1.4
Future Structural Factors Driving the UK’s Economic Geography
51
1.4.1 The UK’s transition to Net Zero
52
1.4.2 The impact of COVID-19
55
1.4.3 Technological transformation
56
i
1.5
A Framework for Evaluating Geographical Disparities
58
1.5.1 Human capital
59
1.5.2 Financial capital
66
1.5.3 Social capital
69
1.5.4 Physical capital
71
1.5.5 Intangible capital
77
1.5.6 Institutional capital
84
1.5.7 Summary and synthesis
87
1.6
Interdependence between the Capitals
89
1.7
The Role of Public Policy
95
1.7.1
The desirability of Local Growth Policy
96
1.7.2 The feasibility of Local Growth Policy
100
Chapter 2 Systems Reform
105
2.1
Introduction
105
2.2
Principles for Successful Policy Regimes
105
2.2.1 History of public policy approaches in the UK
106
2.2.2 Lessons from past policy approaches
110
2.2.3 Lessons from other policy regimes
114
2.2.4 Principles for a successful policy regime
116
2.3 A New Policy Regime
117
2.3.1 Medium-term missions
117
2.3.2 Reshaping central government decision making
122
2.3.3 Empowering local decision making
133
2.3.4 The role of data, monitoring and evaluation
149
2.3.5 Transparency and accountability
156
Chapter 3 The Policy Programme
159
3.1
Introduction
159
3.2
Boost Productivity, Pay, Jobs, and Living Standards by Growing the Private Sector
160
3.2.1 By 2030, pay, employment and productivity will have risen in every area of the UK, with
each containing a globally competitive city, and the gap between the top performing
and other areas closing.
160
3.2.2 By 2030, domestic public investment in R&D outside the Greater South East will
increase by at least 40%, and over the Spending Review period by at least one third.
This additional government funding will seek to leverage at least twice as much private
sector investment over the long term to stimulate innovation and productivity growth.
170
3.2.3 By 2030, local public transport connectivity across the country will be significantly closer
to the standards of London, with improved services, simpler fares and integrated ticketing. 176
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
ii
3.2.4 By 2030, the UK will have nationwide gigabit-capable broadband and 4G coverage, with
5G coverage for the majority of the population
183
3.3
Spread Opportunities and Improve Public Services
186
3.3.1 By 2030, the number of primary school children achieving the expected standard in
reading, writing and maths will have significantly increased. In England, this will mean 90%
of children will achieve the expected standard, and the percentage of children meeting
the expected standard in the worst performing areas will have increased by over a third.
187
3.3.2 By 2030, the number of people successfully completing high-quality skills training will
have significantly increased in every area of the UK. In England, this will lead to 200,000
more people successfully completing high-quality skills training annually, driven by
80,000 more people completing courses in the lowest skilled areas.
193
3.3.3 By 2030, the gap in Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) between local areas where it is highest
and lowest will have narrowed, and by 2035 HLE will rise by five years.
200
3.4
Restore a Sense of Community, Local Pride and Belonging
206
3.4.1 By 2030, pride in place, such as people’s satisfaction with their town centre and
engagement in local culture and community, will have risen in every area of the UK,
with the gap between top performing and other areas closing.
207
3.4.2 By 2030, renters will have a secure path to ownership with the number of first-time
buyers increasing in all areas; and the government’s ambition is for the number of
non-decent rented homes to have fallen by 50%, with the biggest improvements in the
lowest performing areas.
221
3.4.3 By 2030, homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood crime will have fallen, focused
on the worst-affected areas.
228
3.5
Empower Local Leaders and Communities
233
3.5.1 By 2030, every part of England that wants one will have a devolution deal with powers
at or approaching the highest level of devolution and a simplified, long-term funding
settlement.
234
Chapter 4 Next Steps
245
4.1
Introduction
245
4.2
Engagement and Informal Consultation
245
4.3
Future Legislation
247
4.4 Conclusion
248
Delivering for all parts of the United Kingdom
249
Contents
iii
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 1.1
Largest Cities in the World since 7,000 BC
2
Figure 1.2 Change in population of selected UK cities 1821-2021 (1821=100)
5
Figure 1.3 Nominal (smoothed) GVA per hour worked (£), GB local authorities and
Northern Ireland, 2019
6
Table 1.1
Size of the gap: Differences in GVA per hour worked in £ and percent, UK and GB
countries and regions/local authorities, 2019
7
Figure 1.4 Distribution of GVA per hour worked (£), local authorities by GB countries and regions, 2019 7
Figure 1.5 Median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, UK local authorities, 2021
8
Table 1.2
Size of the gap: Differences in median gross weekly pay in £ and percent, UK countries
and regions/local authorities, 2021
9
Figure 1.6 Distribution of median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, local authorities by GB
countries and regions, 2021
9
Figure 1.7
Proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3 + qualifications by local authority,
UK, 2021
10
Table 1.3
Size of the gap: Differences in Level 3+ qualifications population in percent, UK countries
and regions/local authorities, 2021
11
Figure 1.8 Distribution of the proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3+, local
authorities by UK countries and regions, 2021
11
Figure 1.9 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), UK local authorities, 2017-2019
12
Table 1.4
Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Male) in years and percent, UK
countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19
13
Figure 1.10 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), local authorities by UK countries
and regions, 2017–2019
13
Figure 1.11 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), UK local authorities, 2017-2019
14
Table 1.5
Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Female) in years and percent, UK
countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19
15
Figure 1.12 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), local authorities by UK
countries and regions, 2017-2019
15
Figure 1.13 Spatial patterns: Which places are most left behind? Local authorities in the bottom
quartile for level 3+ equivalent skills in the adult population, Gross Value Added (GVA)
per hour worked, Median Gross Weekly Pay and healthy life expectancy
18
Figure 1.14 Regional productivity, GB countries and regions, 1900-2019
19
Figure 1.15 Ratio of top 20% richest regions to 20% poorest regions, OECD countries, 2008 and 2018
20
Figure 1.16 Correlation between labour productivity (GVA per hour worked) and other metrics
21
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
iv
Figure 1.17 Measures of income and productivity compared to UK average, UK countries and
regions, 2019
23
Figure 1.18 Life satisfaction, UK local authorities, 2020
25
Figure 1.19 Determinants of life satisfaction: Odds ratios of factors affecting life satisfaction, UK,
April 2016 to March 2017
26
Figure 1.20 GVA per filled job, local authorities by UK countries and regions, 2019
28
Figure 1.21
Income deprivation in Kensington and Chelsea
28
Figure 1.22 Income deprivation in Middlesbrough
29
Figure 1.23 Income deprivation by Moran's I, England local authorities, 2019
29
Figure 1.24 Employment rates, British SSRs (Standard Statistical Regions), 1901 to 1971; employment
rate (16+), UK countries and regions, 2004 to 2020
31
Figure 1.25 Life expectancy at birth, UK countries and regions, 2001-2003 to 2016-18
32
Figure 1.26 GVA per hour vs. population size, selected Western European cities, 2011
33
Figure 1.27 Productivity in Core Cities compared to second-tier cities in other countries, 2016
34
Figure 1.28 Population density in urban areas (excluding Urban areas below 10,000 people per
square km), UK and other Western European countries
35
Figure 1.29 Median earnings at 28 for boys who were on FSM at age 16, across local authorities in
England where they grew up
38
Figure 1.30 Illustrative map of the UK’s sectoral clusters and strengths
40
Figure 1.31 Productivity (GVA per hour worked) against income (gross disposable household income
per capita), GB local authorities, 2018
43
Figure 1.32 Productivity and economic complexity, GB urban areas, 2019
49
Figure 1.33 Net emissions of carbon dioxide per capita, UK local authorities, 2019
53
Figure 1.34 Potential employment opportunities and skills needs from Net Zero transition, UK
countries and regions
54
Figure 1.35 Proportion of jobs at high risk of automation, England local authorities, 2017
57
Figure 1.36 Real Human Capital per head (16-65 years old), UK countries and regions, 2018
59
Figure 1.37 Proportion of population aged 16 to 64 with different qualifications levels, UK countries
and regions, 2019
60
Figure 1.38 Proportion of population aged 16 to 64 with level 3+l qualifications, GB local authority
districts and Northern Ireland, 2020
61
Figure 1.39 Correlation between level 3 and equivalent or higher qualifications and GCSE attainment,
by local authority (England only)
62
Figure 1.40 Employment Support Allowance caseload rate (working-age population), UK countries
and regions, February 2021
63
Figure 1.41 Overweight and obesity prevalence, England local authorities, 2019/2020 and smoking
rates, GB local authorities 2019
64
Figure 1.42 Share of equity and debt finance deals compared to GVA, UK countries and regions, 2021
67
Figure 1.43 Distribution of equity activity across UK local authorities, 2011-2020
68
Figure 1.44 Geographic location of investor-investee pairings, UK countries and regions, 2011-2020
69
Figure 1.45 Local Trust Community Need Index Score, England local authorities, 2019
70
List of Figures and Tables
v
Figure 1.46 Satisfaction with local area, England regions, 2020-21
71
Figure 1.47 Jobs reachable within 60 mins for each job within five miles
72
Figure 1.48 Ratio of house price to residence-based earnings, England and Wales local authority
districts, 2020
73
Figure 1.49 Capital stock per worker, UK ITL2 subregions, 2019
75
Figure 1.50 Gross fixed capital formation compared to London, UK countries and regions, 2000-2019
76
Figure 1.51 Foreign Direct Investment per workforce job, UK countries and regions, 2019
77
Figure 1.52 Income from intellectual property by HE providers, UK ITL2 subregions, 2018
78
Figure 1.53 Patent applications, UK ITL2 subregions, 2012
79
Figure 1.54 High tech patents, UK ITL2 subregions, 2012
80
Figure 1.55 Percentage employment in STEM jobs, UK ITL2 subregions, 2019
81
Figure 1.56 High-tech employment, UK ITL2 subregions, 2019
82
Figure 1.57 Management practices score, GB countries and regions, 2020
83
Figure 1.58 R&D expenditure, UK countries and regions, 2019
84
Figure 1.59 Percentage of adults who agree they can influence decisions affecting their local area,
England regions, 2020/21
85
Figure 1.60 Onward Social Fabric Score, GB local authorities and Northern Ireland, 2020
86
Figure 1.61 Strength of LEP's local networks – Percentage of LEPs agreeing/disagreeing that the
following bodies play a full and active role in the LEP, 2015
87
Figure 1.62 Levelling Up Capitals Framework
88
Figure 1.63 Shares of population cohort moving ITL1 region and employer, 2017
90
Figure 1.64 Share of all moving graduates by institution and class of degree 2013/14 to 2014/15
90
Figure 1.65 Mobility patterns of graduates, age 16 to age 27, 2013/14 to 2016/17
91
Figure 1.66 Share of graduates moving regions and changing jobs and variance in the graduate
employment rate
93
Figure 1.67 Hypothetical increase in disposable earnings (median earnings less median rent) as a
result of moving local authority
93
Figure 1.68 Share of people moving region and employer, for those born outside the UK and those
born in the UK, 1994 to 2017.
94
Figure 1.69 Shares of graduates remaining at home and in non-graduate jobs
95
Table 1.6
The Income-Equivalent Benefits of Levelling Up – an illustration
97
Figure 1.70 GDP per capita annual growth and interregional inequality, OECD TL3 regions (excluding
former transition economies), 2000–2017
99
Figure 2.1
100 years of local growth policy
108
Table 2.1
Levelling Up Missions
120
Figure 2.2 Local growth funding pots introduced in the UK since 2011-12
127
Table 2.2
Places for Growth: Number of roles moving outside London by 2025 and 2030’
131
Figure 2.3 English Devolution Deal and City and Growth Deal geographies
134
Table 2.3 Devolution Framework
140
Table 2.4
Illustrative private sector initiatives
147
Figure 2.4 ONS subnational data explorer
152
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
vi
Figure 3.1 Gigabit coverage improvements, UK countries and regions, 2019, 2021 and 2025 (forecast)
184
Figure 3.2 4G coverage improvements, UK countries and regions, 2021 and 2026
184
Figure 3.3 Attainment 8, England local authorities, 2018/19
188
Figure 3.4 Education Investment Areas, England
191
Figure 3.5 Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy, England neighbourhoods by deprivation
decile, 2017-2019
201
Table 3.1
Brownfield Funding
210
Figure 3.6 LUF and Towns Fund recipients, UK local authorities
240
List of Figures and Tables
vii
Foreword by the
Prime Minister
From day one, the defining mission of this government has been to
level up this country.
To take the radical steps needed to make us more prosperous and
more united by tackling the regional and local inequalities that unfairly
hold back communities and to encourage private sector investment
right across the UK.
Because while we are without doubt one of the biggest and strongest
economies in the world we are also one of the most unbalanced.
A country in which the place of your birth is one of the clearest
determining factors in how you’ll get on, what opportunities will be
open to you, even the number of years for which you can expect
to live.
This is not a new observation. Politicians have been aware of this regional inequality for as long as it has
existed, yet have been content to focus instead on the big picture of national growth – a waste of talent
and a waste of this country’s economic potential.
The answer to it lies not in cutting down the tall poppies, or attempting to hobble the areas that are doing
well. Instead I am determined to break that link between geography and destiny, so that it makes good
business sense for the private sector to invest in areas that have for too long felt left behind.
If places that are currently underperforming start firing on all cylinders, national GDP will rise by tens of
billions each year. That means more growth, more jobs, and higher wages right across the UK. And if we
can level up this country – and close our productivity gap – we will have the most prosperous economy in
Europe.
That is the theory; this White Paper describes the practice. The practical steps this government will take in
everything from education to art to investment that will make this a better, fairer country for us all.
It’s no small task. The challenges we face have been embedded over generations and cannot be dug out
overnight. But this White Paper is the crucial first step in doing so. The most comprehensive, ambitious
plan of its kind that this country has ever seen.
A vision for the future that will see public spending on R&D increased in every part of the country;
transport connectivity reaching London-like levels within and between all our towns and cities; faster
broadband in every community; life expectancies rising; violent crime falling; schools improving; and
private sector investment unleashed.
viii
We’ll usher in a revolution in local democracy. Harness the incredible power of data not just at a national
and regional level but all the way down to neighbourhoods. Introduce a whole new way of thinking in
central government, recognising that national success alone is not enough if it masks local failings.
We’ll use the freedoms restored by Brexit – in trade, regulation, immigration, public procurement and
more – to help businesses, communities and individuals in every part of the country.
And that is just the beginning. Because everyone knows that talent and energy and enthusiasm and flair are
not located solely in isolated pockets of our country. They are and have always been evenly spread right
across the UK. It is opportunity that is not.
Fixing that is the economic, social and political challenge of our time. And, with this White Paper, it is a
challenge to which this government will continue to rise.
Foreword by the Prime Minister
ix
Foreword by the Secretary of
State and Andrew Haldane
“Stay local, go far.” This was the rallying cry on a
recent poster in Teesside.
Teesside is making good on that ambition, with the
recent rebirth of its high tech, high skill, high wage
economy under mayor Ben Houchen’s inspirational
leadership. We see similar success stories
throughout the country.
But this is not the whole picture of the UK.
There are stark geographical inequalities between
and within our cities, towns and villages. For every
local success, there is a story of scarring and stagnation elsewhere. While talent is distributed evenly across
the UK, opportunity is not. For many, if you want to get on you need to get out.
Levelling up is a mission – part economic, part social, part moral – to change that for good. It is about
unleashing opportunity, prosperity and pride in places where, for too long, it has been held back. It is
about growing the pie and everyone sharing in the fruits of this success, increasing not only peoples’ living
standards but the length and quality of their lives.
No single, short-term intervention can effect this change. We need to mobilise all the forces that drive
progress and human flourishing – investment, skills, innovation, finance, trust and institutions. And we
need to bring all sectors of society together, with the very best of government, the private sector and civil
society working in partnership.
It is these forces that transformed Renaissance Florence, that spurred the Industrial Revolution in Britain
and which drive today’s super-cities like Seoul, New York and London. To level up and unite our country,
we must follow a similar path. This requires a new model of government and governance of the UK.
This new model is anchored around an ambitious set of missions, galvanising action across sectors to
improve jobs, incomes, health, skills, transport, pride in place, safety and well-being across the UK.
These clear, quantified missions mean no-one can any longer be in any doubt about what is meant by
success in levelling up.
Meeting these missions will require a country-wide effort, with the UK Government working with all tiers
of government, including the devolved administrations, civil society and the private sector. At the same
time, we are rewiring Whitehall to put place at the heart of decision making, including by moving more
civil servants outside London. It also requires a further devolution of decision-making powers to local
leaders where decisions are often best taken. A new devolution framework provides a roadmap for
doing so.
x
Underpinning all of this will be improved data and transparency, oversight and analytics, evaluation and
experimentation. With local powers come local responsibilities. Monitoring local performance and policies
is crucial if they are to be understood and responded to by local citizens and improved by local leaders
over time. A new local government body will have oversight and drive transparency, and there will be a
statutory responsibility on government to report on progress towards the missions.
This is a clear, measurable, actionable plan for levelling up the UK, from Aberdeen to Antrim, Newport to
Norwich. And while the White Paper is a long-term plan for changing the UK, it also establishes some
important first steps. They include inviting local leaders representing nine million people to begin
negotiations to agree new devolution deals; a transformative new online UK National Academy and 55 new
Education Improvement Areas; 20 new transformative regeneration projects; significantly increased R&D
spending outside the Greater South East, with new Innovation Accelerators to catalyse innovation clusters;
a transformation in the quality of housing, in particular in the private rented and social housing sectors;
details of the £2.6bn Shared Prosperity Fund to restore pride in place across the UK; boosting investment
in culture where it’s been absent for too long; and greater powers and money for local communities.
As this long-term programme of change is delivered, the difference will begin to be felt in communities,
high streets, workplaces, pubs, restaurants, football grounds and theatres. People deserve to live in a
country where life is not a postcode lottery, where by staying local you can go far. The publication of this
White Paper marks an important step towards that goal.
Foreword by the Secretary of State and Andrew Haldane
xi
Executive summary
The United Kingdom is an unparalleled success story – a multi-cultural,
multi-national, multi-ethnic state with the world’s best broadcaster; a vibrantly
creative arts sector; a National Health Service which guarantees care for every
citizen; charities and voluntary groups which perform a million acts of kindness
daily; globally renowned scientists extending the boundaries of knowledge
every year; entrepreneurs developing the products and services which bring joy
and jobs to so many; and millions of citizens whose kindness and compassion
has been so powerfully displayed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
But not everyone shares equally in the UK’s success. While talent is spread equally
across our country, opportunity is not. Levelling up is a mission to challenge, and
change, that unfairness. Levelling up means giving everyone the opportunity to
flourish. It means people everywhere living longer and more fulfilling lives, and
benefitting from sustained rises in living standards and well-being.
This requires us to end the geographical inequality which is such a striking
feature of the UK. It needs to begin by improving economic dynamism and
innovation to drive growth across the whole country, unleashing the power of
the private sector to unlock jobs and opportunity for all. While there are
world-leading and enterprising businesses and innovators right across the UK,
economic growth and the higher productivity which drives it has been
over-concentrated in specific areas, particularly the South East of England.
A long tail of low-productivity businesses and places explain why UK
productivity growth is too low compared to competitors.
It is vital that we preserve and enhance the economic, academic and cultural
success stories of the UK’s most productive counties, towns and cities. But it is
equally critical that we improve productivity, boost economic growth,
encourage innovation, create good jobs, enhance educational attainment and
renovate the social and cultural fabric of those parts of the UK that have
stalled and not – so far – shared equally in our nation’s success.
The UK Government has made progress towards spreading opportunity around the
country since 2019, alongside mitigating the worst effects of the pandemic, with:
• £5bn for Project Gigabit to bring gigabit-capable broadband to 85% of the
UK by 2025, and the £1bn Shared Rural Network deal with mobile operators
delivering 4G coverage to 95% of the UK by the end of 2025;
• five-year consolidated transport settlements amounting to £5.7bn in eight
city regions outside London, £5bn of funding for buses and active travel
over this Parliament; and £96bn for the Integrated Rail Plan delivering faster,
more frequent and more reliable journeys across the North of England and
the Midlands;
The United
Kingdom is an
unparalleled
success story
Levelling up
means giving
everyone the
opportunity
to flourish
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xii
•
a new schools funding formula in England ending the previous postcode
lottery, and an extra £4bn for schools in England next year, rising to £4.7bn
in 2024-25
•
investment of £3.8bn in skills planned by 2024-25 and a Lifetime Skills
Guarantee in England, enabling 11m adults to gain an A Level or equivalent
qualification for free, as well as a new UK-wide adult numeracy programme
and skills bootcamps;
• £23.3bn extra for the NHS in England over the 2021 Spending Review (SR21)
period, a commitment to build 40 new hospitals by 2030 and an ambition
to deliver 50,000 more nurses;
•
a lower Universal Credit taper rate – down from 63% to 55% – and a higher
National Living Wage, making work pay for millions of people, and letting
them keep more of what they earn;
•
20,000 more police officers on our streets by 2023 and a £70m Safer Streets
Fund to improve the environment and cut offending in high-crime areas;
•
control of our immigration system by ending free movement and
introducing a new points-based immigration system, giving the UK the
freedom to decide who comes to our country based on the skills people
have to offer;
•
£1.49bn in City and Growth Deals in every part of Scotland, £791m across
Wales and £617m for deals covering the whole of Northern Ireland;
•
eight innovative Freeports bringing jobs, investment and prosperity across
England with a commitment to deliver more Freeports in each of Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland;
•
101 towns across England receiving £2.4bn from the Towns Fund to unleash
their economic potential, and the £830m Future High Streets Fund
regenerating 72 towns and high streets and helping them recover from
the pandemic;
•
a £2bn Culture Recovery Fund helping museums, theatres, cinemas and
heritage organisations survive the pandemic;
•
£4.8bn infrastructure investment in towns across the UK via the Levelling
Up Fund;
•
a £150m Community Ownership Fund, giving people across the UK the
chance to become owners of their local pubs or football grounds;
•
£26bn of public capital investment for the green industrial revolution and
transition to Net Zero; and
•
the movement of UK Government functions and civil servants out of
Whitehall, ensuring levelling up is not directed from London, creating
local jobs and taking decision-making closer to the communities the
Government serves, including HM Treasury to Darlington, the Cabinet
Office to Glasgow, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
(FCDO) to East Kilbride and the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and
Communities (DLUHC) to Wolverhampton.
Executive Summary
xiii
This paper sets out the next stages in this programme to level up the UK.
This programme has to be broad, deep and long-term. It has to be rooted in
evidence demonstrating that a mix of factors is needed to transform places
and boost local growth: strong innovation and a climate conducive to private
sector investment, better skills, improved transport systems, greater access to
culture, stronger pride in place, deeper trust, greater safety and more resilient
institutions.
History illustrates what is possible by following this path. The Renaissance
flourished in Italian city states that combined innovation in finance with
technological breakthroughs, the cultivation of learning, ground-breaking
artistic endeavour, a beautiful built environment and strong civic leadership.
And the first Industrial Revolution in Britain came about through the interplay
of innovative financial instruments, sharper rewards for enterprise, new
institutions of learning, improvements in transportation and rivalrous emulation
between local leaders and entrepreneurs. Those same concerted forces are
needed to drive productivity, innovation and growth across the UK today.
This contemporary Medici model, our twenty-first century recipe for a new
Industrial Revolution, depends on harnessing an array of interventions and
catalysing a range of sectors. Levelling up will require us to:
a. boost productivity, pay, jobs and living standards by growing the private
sector, especially in those places where they are lagging;
b. spread opportunities and improve public services, especially in those places
where they are weakest;
c. restore a sense of community, local pride and belonging, especially in those
places where they have been lost; and
d. empower local leaders and communities, especially in those places lacking
local agency.
Levelling up is not about making every part of the UK the same, or pitting one
part of the country against another. Nor does it mean dampening down the
success of more prosperous areas. Indeed, by extending opportunity across the
UK we can relieve pressures on public services, housing and green fields in the
South East. And levelling up can improve well-being in the South East by
improving productivity in the North and Midlands.
So, it is about the success of the whole country: realising the potential of every
place and every person across the UK, building on their unique strengths,
spreading opportunities for individuals and businesses, and celebrating every
single city, town and village’s culture. This will make the economy stronger,
more equal and more resilient, and lengthen and improve people’s lives.
The economic prize from levelling up is potentially enormous. If underperforming
places were levelled up towards the UK average, unlocking their potential, this
could boost aggregate UK GDP by tens of billions of pounds each year. Levelling
up skills, health, education and wellbeing would deliver similarly-sized benefits.
Accumulated over time, those gains could easily surpass annual UK GDP. Success
in levelling up is about growing the economic pie, everywhere and for everyone,
not re-slicing it.
This
programme
has to be
broad, deep
and long‑term
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xiv
The United Kingdom’s Geographical Disparities: Drivers
and Potential Policy Approaches
What does the economic and social geography of the United Kingdom
look like?
The UK has larger geographical differences than many other developed countries
on multiple measures, including productivity, pay, educational attainment and
health. Urban areas and coastal towns suffer disproportionately from crime,
while places with particularly high levels of deprivation, such as former mining
communities, outlying urban estates and seaside towns have the highest levels
of community need and poor opportunities for the people who grow up there.
These disparities are often larger within towns, counties or regions than
between them. They are hyper-local and pockets of affluence and deprivation
may exist in the same district. Indeed, many of the worst areas of deprivation
are found in the UK’s most successful cities. While change is possible, in some
cases, these differences have persisted for much of the last century. And some
of the UK’s most successful cities – such as Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds,
Glasgow and Cardiff – lag behind their international comparators when it
comes to productivity and incomes.
What are the current and future drivers of geographical disparities?
Over the past century, many trends have combined to create the spatial
patterns seen across the UK today. Globalisation, technological progress,
advances in transport, logistics and power, and the shift from heavy industry
to knowledge-intensive sectors, as well as the rise of foreign holidays and shift
from technical training to university education, have had a large and lasting
impact on the economic geography of the UK.
These dynamics of the global economy have benefited the UK overall,
improving productivity, increasing wealth and driving up living standards
through more innovation and competition. These dynamics, however, have not
had the same positive economic and social impacts across the UK. While
London and much of the South East have benefited economically, former
industrial centres and many coastal communities have suffered. This has left
deep and lasting scars in many of these places, damaging skills, jobs, innovation,
pride in place, health and wellbeing.
What are the factors that will help drive levelling up?
Levelling up requires a focused, long-term plan of action and a clear framework
to identify and act upon the drivers of spatial disparity. Evidence from a range
of disciplines tells us these drivers can be encapsulated in six “capitals”.
• Physical capital – infrastructure, machines and housing.
• Human capital – the skills, health and experience of the workforce.
•
Intangible capital – innovation, ideas and patents.
• Financial capital – resources supporting the financing of companies.
• Social capital – the strength of communities, relationships and trust.
Executive Summary
xv
• Institutional capital – local leadership, capacity and capability.
The six capitals in this framework are individually important. But their real
significance comes in combination, when they act in a mutually reinforcing
fashion as in Renaissance Italy or in the UK at the time of the Industrial
Revolution. The sum of these factors is then greater than its individual parts,
a process known as agglomeration.
Places with rich endowments of all six capitals benefit from a virtuous circle of
agglomeration. They are home to skilled people with high quality jobs and have
access to outstanding schools and globally-competitive universities. They have
good roads, trains and fast internet. Residents live in fine housing. Funding is
available for local businesses to invest and innovate, and communities are
bound together by good relationships and a strong sense of belonging. Local
leaders are able to build on these foundations to deliver improvements for
their local community.
By contrast, where endowments of these capitals are weak or depleted, places
are unable to attract or retain talent, businesses are less likely to invest and
innovate, civic institutions tend to lack capacity and capability, and pride in
local communities is depleted. This vicious and self-reinforcing cycle in some
places has seen a depletion of skills, businesses, finance and culture, with
communities and town centres declining for decades. These cumulative forces
– in some places positive, in others negative – have widened geographical
disparities in the UK over time. Without policy action, they will continue to
do so.
Levelling up is about aspiring for every place in the UK to have a rich
endowment of all six capitals, so that people do not have to leave their
community to live a good life. It means taking action to replenish the capitals
where they are weak or depleted, transforming vicious circles into virtuous
ones. With opportunity spread more equally across the UK, people in places
that were once struggling would then fulfil their potential, living longer,
healthier and happier lives. With each part of the UK achieving its potential,
the economy as a whole would be both larger and more equal.
System Change: A New Policy Regime for Levelling Up
There has been no shortage of attempts to tackle geographical disparities in
the UK over the past century. These have been insufficient to close the
widening gaps. That is because these efforts have tended to be short-term,
lacked scale and coordination, and were hamstrung by a lack of data and
effective oversight. Local leaders have also lacked the powers and
accountabilities to design and deliver effective policies for tackling local
problems and supporting local people. The direction of travel since 2010 has
been towards greater local empowerment – with the introduction of the
Localism Act, Police and Crime Commissioners, City Deals and democratically
elected metro mayors. But a renewed and coordinated focus is now needed to
take this forward.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xvi
Learning lessons from the past, a new policy regime is needed to reverse these
embedded historical trends. At root, that is about creating the right
information, incentives and institutions to deliver profound changes to how
decisions are made, where they are made and who makes them. System change
is not about a string of shiny, but ultimately short-lived, new policy initiatives.
It is about root and branch reform of government and governance of the UK.
It is about putting power in local hands, armed with the right information and
embedded in strong civic institutions.
This new policy regime is based on five mutually reinforcing pillars.
First, the UK Government is setting clear and ambitious medium‑term
missions to provide consistency and clarity over levelling up policy objectives.
These will serve as an anchor for policy across government, as well as catalysing
innovation and action by the private and civil society sectors. These missions
are ambitions that the UK Government has for all parts of the UK. Delivering
on them, while being fully respectful of the devolution settlements, will
require close and collaborative work with the devolved administrations.
The missions are rolling decade-long endeavours and will be reviewed
periodically by the UK Government.
Levelling Up Missions
Focus Area
Mission
Boost productivity, pay, jobs and living standards by growing the private
sector, especially in those places where they are lagging
Living
Standards
By 2030, pay, employment and productivity will have risen in
every area of the UK, with each containing a globally
competitive city, and the gap between the top performing
and other areas closing.
Research &
Development
(R&D)
By 2030, domestic public investment in R&D outside the
Greater South East will increase by at least 40%, and over
the Spending Review period by at least one third. This
additional government funding will seek to leverage at least
twice as much private sector investment over the long term
to stimulate innovation and productivity growth.
Transport
Infrastructure
By 2030, local public transport connectivity across the
country will be significantly closer to the standards of
London, with improved services, simpler fares and
integrated ticketing.
Digital
Connectivity
By 2030, the UK will have nationwide gigabit-capable
broadband and 4G coverage, with 5G coverage for the
majority of the population.
The UK
Government is
setting clear
and ambitious
medium‑term
missions
Executive Summary
xvii
Levelling Up Missions
Focus Area
Mission
Spread opportunities and improve public services, especially in those places
where they are weakest
Education
By 2030, the number of primary school children achieving
the expected standard in reading, writing and maths will
have significantly increased. In England, this will mean 90%
of children will achieve the expected standard, and the
percentage of children meeting the expected standard
in the worst performing areas will have increased by over
a third.
Skills
By 2030, the number of people successfully completing
high-quality skills training will have significantly increased in
every area of the UK. In England, this will lead to 200,000
more people successfully completing high-quality skills
training annually, driven by 80,000 more people completing
courses in the lowest skilled areas.
Health
By 2030, the gap in Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) between
local areas where it is highest and lowest will have narrowed,
and by 2035 HLE will rise by five years.
Well-being
By 2030, well-being will have improved in every area of the
UK, with the gap between top performing and other areas
closing.
Restore a sense of community, local pride and belonging, especially in
those places where they have been lost
Pride in Place
By 2030, pride in place, such as people’s satisfaction with
their town centre and engagement in local culture and
community, will have risen in every area of the UK, with the
gap between top performing and other areas closing.
Housing
By 2030, renters will have a secure path to ownership with
the number of first-time buyers increasing in all areas; and
the government’s ambition is for the number of non-decent
rented homes to have fallen by 50%, with the biggest
improvements in the lowest performing areas.1
Crime
By 2030, homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood
crime will have fallen, focused on the worst affected areas.
Empower local leaders and communities, especially in those places lacking
local agency
Local
Leadership
By 2030, every part of England that wants one will have a
devolution deal with powers at or approaching the highest
level of devolution and a simplified, long-term funding
settlement.
1 Government will consult on the impact on the private rented market and particularly those on the lowest incomes.
Further detail will be set out once the review of the Decent Homes Standard has concluded.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xviii
Second, central government decision‑making will be fundamentally
reoriented to align policies with the levelling up agenda and hardwire spatial
considerations across Whitehall. This will require greater transparency around
the geographic allocation of funding and simplification of local growth funding.
It will mean running levelling up through central government decision-making
as a golden thread for which departments are held accountable. And it will
mean extra resources being deployed to local areas, including moving 22,000
civil servants out of London by 2030.
Third, the UK Government will empower decision‑makers in local areas by
providing leaders and businesses with the tools they need. A new framework
will extend, deepen and simplify local devolution in England. Ongoing support
will be provided to existing City and Growth deal areas in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland, pan-regional partnerships like the Northern Powerhouse and
Midlands Engine, and local private sector initiatives. The UK Government will
support existing and embryonic private sector clusters of economic activity,
which exist in all parts of the UK and are the wellspring of new innovation and
job creation.
Fourth, the UK Government will transform its approach to data and
evaluation to improve local decision-making. In the past, it has been difficult
to see what is being spent, where and how it is being spent, and its impact.
The Office for National Statistics’ Subnational Data Strategy aims to improve
the UK’s subnational data, mapping local economic geographies and helping
improve transparency and accountability to the public. The UK Government is
making available interactive tools and maps to facilitate this process. It will also
encourage innovative uses of real-time data at the local level, giving leaders
across the UK the information they need to deliver, experiment and evaluate
swiftly and effectively.
Fifth, the UK Government will create a new regime to oversee its levelling
up missions, establishing a statutory duty to publish an annual report analysing
progress and a new external Levelling Up Advisory Council. The Council will
support Ministers by advising on the design, delivery and impact of levelling up
policy. The annual report will update the public on progress against the
missions so that levelling up is subject to rigorous external scrutiny, including
by Parliament.
Over time, these five pillars acting in combination will improve the information
and incentives facing decision-makers locally and nationally, and strengthen the
institutions driving local transformation. And it is those shifts in the system of
governance and government across the UK that will anchor success in meeting
the medium-term levelling up missions.
How will levelling up be delivered across the Union?
Levelling up can only succeed as a shared national project. The six capitals –
physical, human, intangible, financial, social and institutional – straddle areas
of responsibility and tiers of government across the UK. The capitals are
interdependent and success will only be achieved if each of them is thriving in
a given place. For example, the UK Government can use its collective economic
might to attract investment and job creation, but education outcomes,
Central
government
decision‑
making will be
fundamentally
reoriented to
align policies
with the
levelling up
agenda
Executive Summary
xix
delivered by devolved administrations, are crucial to developing a workforce
able to take advantage of these opportunities.
Devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland recognise that
devolved governments are best placed to deliver certain services, like health
and education. But outcomes are a shared interest for the whole of the UK.
Our broad UK-wide tax base already funds public services across the UK,
ensuring for example that the NHS can deliver for people whether in Scotland,
Wales, England or Northern Ireland. In practice, this means all layers of
government need to come together with a common purpose. The UK
Government is committed to facilitating collaboration and engagement
with the devolved governments and stakeholders in Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland.
The Policy Programme: Policy Initiatives to Level Up the
United Kingdom
Achieving the ambitious medium-term missions will require a new model of
economic growth, public and private investment, a business friendly environment,
incentives for inward investment and a high skill, high wage labour market.
The time horizon for our missions is 2030. But we also recognise that certain
communities and people need greater support in the more immediate term.
The policies set out here will begin to have visible effects, on high streets and
in local communities, in the next few years.
Boosting productivity, pay, jobs and living standards by growing the
private sector
A well-functioning and productive economy in every part of the UK is essential
to levelling up. By 2030, the UK Government wants to ensure that pay,
employment and productivity has risen in every area of the UK, with the gap
between the top performing and other areas closing (Mission One).
That means supporting the private sector – the real engine of wealth creation
– to invest more, grow more and take more risks. As well as developing a more
flexible and better regulatory model for business outside the EU, we will also
reform outdated EU rules restricting investment from pension funds and
others so we can see more money flow into long-term capital assets.
And also, outside the EU, the UK is putting competitive advantage in science
and technology at the heart of a new economic model. A series of new
Research and Development (R&D) investments will strengthen our science base
across the country. The increase in public R&D investment to £20bn by 2024-25
and the target for total UK R&D investment to reach 2.4% of GDP by 2027 must
see every region of the UK experience an uplift in investment. The
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) will aim to
invest at least 55% of its total domestic R&D funding outside the Greater
South East by 2024‑25; the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) will
increase National Institute for Health Research investment outside London,
Oxford and Cambridge; and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) will expand the
regional footprint of the Defence Science & Technology Laboratory (Dstl).
These will contribute towards our ambition to increase total domestic public
The UK
government
wants to ensure
that pay,
employment
and
productivity
have risen in
every area
of the UK
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xx
R&D investment outside the Greater South East by at least a third over the
Spending Review period and at least 40% by 2030, with that additional
government funding seeking to leverage at least twice as much private sector
investment over the long-term to stimulate innovation and productivity
growth (Mission Two).
In addition, the UK Government will target £100m of investment in three new
Innovation Accelerators, private-public-academic partnerships which will aim
to replicate the Stanford-Silicon Valley and MIT-Greater Boston models of
clustering research excellence and its direct adoption by allied industries.
These pilots will be centred on Greater Manchester, the West Midlands and
Glasgow City-Region. These new clusters will be our Fourth Industrial
Revolution Foundries, leveraging our global lead in scientific research.
We must support high-growth businesses and reverse the historic decline
in manufacturing in the UK with more of the sort of innovation which
characterises economies such as South Korea and Israel. The new Britishvolt
gigafactory in Blyth, the investment by GE to establish a new wind turbine blade
manufacturing centre at Teesworks in Redcar, the renewed commitment by
Nissan and Envision to manufacture electric vehicles in Sunderland, and the new
hydrogen buses being built in Ballymena, which are already on the streets of
Aberdeen, are all examples of green manufacturing innovation bringing high-skill
and high-wage jobs to areas which have faced economic headwinds in the past.
So we must also spread financial capital and investment to the places, projects
and people that need it most. The £3bn the UK Government is investing in the
next generation of British Business Bank Regional Investment Funds and the
new Global Britain Investment Fund will improve access to finance for SMEs
and increase globally mobile investment across the UK. This builds on progress
made to support local banking, through more challenger banks and mutuals.
Levelling up requires mobilising previously underutilised sources of capital. That
is why we’re using the tax system to incentivise private sector investment,
through Freeports, Enterprise Zones and the Super-deduction. It is also why
the Prime Minister and Chancellor have called on the UK’s institutional
investors to seize the moment for an “Investment Big Bang” to boost Britain’s
long-term growth. The UK Government will go further and work with Local
Government Pension Funds to publish plans for increasing local investment,
including setting an ambition of up to 5% of assets invested in projects
which support local areas.
Outside the EU, we will harness the power of public procurement to support
communities, moving away from the complex EU rules-based approach that
was designed first and foremost to facilitate the EU Single Market, and
adopting instead a new simplified approach that prioritises growth and
productivity in the UK. We have already introduced a policy which allows
smaller contracts to be reserved for UK suppliers and will legislate to put social
value at the heart of government spending – weaving a thread of social
improvement and civic responsibility through the UK Government’s £300bn
annual expenditure on procurement.
Cities, towns and communities must be physically and digitally connected if
they are to thrive. We want transport networks in all our major urban centres
These new
clusters will be
our Fourth
Industrial
Revolution
Foundries
Executive Summary
xxi
to be significantly closer to the standard of London. We will implement the
£96bn Integrated Rail Plan, improving the rail network in the North and
Midlands, and invest £24bn in our busiest roads and motorways, £5.7bn in City
Region Sustainable Transport Settlements and £5bn for buses, cycling and
walking networks. Together, this will bring local public transport connectivity
across the country closer to London’s standards (Mission Three).
We will enhance digital connectivity through Project Gigabit and the Shared
Rural Network so that by 2030, the UK Government and private sector will
deliver nationwide gigabit-capable broadband and 4G coverage, with 5G
coverage for the majority of the population (Mission Four).
To help address the disparities of low pay seen in areas across the country, the
UK Government will continue to increase the National Living Wage. Meanwhile,
the introduction of a points-based immigration system gives the UK greater
control over who comes to this country based on their skills, aligning this to
the needs of the economy.
The support of the private sector is essential to deliver on these missions.
The UK Government is committed to enabling and empowering the private
sector to increase investment, jobs and growth at a local level.
Spreading opportunities and improving public services
Improving productivity, and spreading prosperity, crucially depends on
enhancing people’s education and skills – giving everyone access to good
schools and the opportunity to receive excellent education and training.
Good health is just as important in spreading opportunity, contributing not
only to the economy but also ensuring that everyone, wherever they live,
can enjoy fulfilling, happy and productive lives. Strong public services not only
support positive health and educational outcomes but also attract new talent
and investment to an area, boosting local economies.
The UK Government will drive further school improvement in England through
55 new Education Investment Areas (EIAs) in places where educational
attainment is currently weakest. The Department for Education (DfE) will
support strong multi-academy trusts to expand into these areas and offer
retention payments to help schools with supply challenges in these areas to
retain the best teachers in high-priority subjects. More intensive investment
will be available across some EIAs to tackle wider issues that may be limiting
school improvement. The UK Government will ensure that talented children
from disadvantaged backgrounds have access to a post-16 provider with a track
record of progress on to leading universities by opening new 16-19 free schools
targeted in areas where they are most needed, such as high priority EIAs.
In addition, we will create the UK National Academy. Just as the UK pioneered
the Open University, this new digital education service will support pupils from
all backgrounds and areas of the UK to succeed at the very highest levels.
The UK National Academy will be free and made available online to support
the work of schools up and down the country. It will allow students to acquire
additional advanced knowledge and skills, offering even more opportunities for
every child to thrive.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xxii
With the help of these reforms, we will focus on eliminating illiteracy and
innumeracy. By 2030, our aim is that 90% of all primary school children in
England will achieve the expected standard in reading, writing and maths,
with the percentage of children meeting the expected standard in the worst
performing areas improving by a third (Mission Five).
We will also step up efforts to give all students the skills employers need.
Our reforms will aim to put local employers at the heart of skills provision; to
strengthen locally accessible institutions, notably the national network of
further education colleges; ensure that all individuals have lifetime access to
training; and offer new opportunities to access high quality work and progress
in the workplace.
The funding of courses and the governance of colleges will be overhauled in
line with employers’ needs. Local Skills Improvement Plans, together with
supporting funding, will be set up across England to set out the key changes
needed in a place to make technical skills training more responsive to skills
needs. Nine new Institutes of Technology with strong employer links will be
established in England, helping to boost higher technical skills in STEM subjects.
We will introduce the In‑Work Progression offer to help people on low
incomes address barriers to better employment opportunities. The
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) will provide £1.3bn over the SR21
period to provide employment support for disabled people and people with
health conditions. This builds on the National Disability Strategy, Health and
Disability Green Paper and Health is Everyone’s Business consultation. The
Multiply scheme will target disparities in numeracy levels across the UK,
investing £560m in courses for adults.
Through our skills reforms and investment, by 2030, we will aim to have
significantly increased the number of people to have successfully completed
high quality skills training in every part of the UK, including 200,000 more people
successfully completing high quality skills training annually in England, driven by
80,000 more people completing courses in the lowest skilled areas (Mission Six).
One of the gravest inequalities faced by our most disadvantaged communities
is poor health. The COVID-19 pandemic powerfully underlined the disparities in
health across this country. The DHSC will shortly publish a White Paper
designed to tackle the core drivers of disparities in health outcomes.
However, we will act now to deal with one of the biggest contributors to ill
health: poor diet and obesity. We will take forward recommendations from
Henry Dimbleby’s independent review towards a National Food Strategy
including piloting Community Eatwell and a school cooking revolution. We will
introduce a new Tobacco Control Plan and set up at least 100 Community
Diagnostic Centres in England by 2025 to improve access to diagnostic services.
These and other changes will contribute to narrowing the gap in Healthy Life
Expectancy (HLE) between local areas where it is highest and lowest by 2030,
and increasing Healthy Life Expectancy by five years by 2035 (Mission Seven).
Taken together, these missions will help achieve the overarching ambition to
improve well-being in every area of the UK, with the gap between top
performing and other areas closing (Mission Eight).
Our reforms
will aim to put
local employers
at the heart of
skills provision
Executive Summary
xxiii
And because responsibility for spreading opportunity and improving public
services sits across all tiers of government, we will work with local leaders from
across the UK and devolved administrations to bring together evidence on
“what works” from policies to reduce spatial disparities, particularly in areas
where policy responsibility has been devolved and different groups have
delivered policies in innovative ways.
Restoring a sense of community, local pride and belonging
The £2.6bn UK Shared Prosperity Fund will be used to restore local pride across
the UK by focusing investment on three main areas for investment: improving
communities and place, people and skills, and supporting local business.
We will slash away the bureaucracy of the old EU regional funds. Instead, local
leaders will be empowered to direct funding towards their own, locally
identified priorities, whether that be promoting new outdoor markets,
reducing litter, graffiti and anti-social behaviour, reviving high streets,
supporting local businesses or introducing skills provision to match local labour
market need and support those furthest from the labour market.
We will also regenerate 20 of our towns and cities by assembling and
remediating brownfield land and working with the private sector to bring
about transformational developments combining housing, retail and business in
sustainable, walkable, beautiful new neighbourhoods. These new
developments amongst others will be supported by an Office for Place which
will pioneer design and beauty, promoting better architectural aesthetics to
ensure they enhance existing settlements, gladden the eye and lift the heart.
We will explore what further measures can make high streets and town centres
the thriving hearts of our communities again, including ways to incentivise
landlords to fill vacant units. For instance, powers for local authorities to
require landlords to rent out long-term vacant properties to prospective
tenants, such as local businesses or community groups.
Ensuring natural beauty is accessible to all will be central to our planning
system, with improved Green Belts around towns and cities, supported by
Local Nature Recovery Strategies reflected in plan making, and woodland
creation supported across the UK.
Building on this White Paper, we will publish the second report on rural proofing
in England this spring. This report will set out how government departments are
working to support levelling up in rural areas, through targeted approaches where
needed, and how we are strengthening the rural economy, developing rural
infrastructure, delivering rural services and managing the natural environment.
For levelling up to mean something to people in their daily lives, we need to
reach into every community in the country, from city centres to rural areas, in
order to start to rebuild social capital and self-reliance in our most abandoned
neighbourhoods. This needs to flow through central and local government,
through MPs and their local offices, philanthropists, volunteers, schools, GPs
and other community leaders. We will pilot a set of Community Covenant
approaches: new agreements between councils, public bodies and
communities themselves to empower communities to shape the regeneration
of their areas and improve public services.
The £2.6bn
UK Shared
Prosperity Fund
will be used to
restore local
pride across
the UK
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xxiv
Community-led regeneration cannot be achieved with a stop-start funding
stream that first builds hope, then destroys it, leaving people less optimistic
and trusting, and feeling more disempowered than ever. We will consider a
Community Wealth Fund, financial inclusion and other social investment as
part of our consultation on £880m in Dormant Assets funding, and focus
lottery cash to reach into the most deprived small areas of the country. In this
spirit of civic renewal, we will also ensure that access to sporting and cultural
excellence is spread more equitably across the UK.
With the Football Foundation in England, and Football Associations in Scotland,
Wales and Northern Ireland, we are delivering grassroots pitches across the
UK – this year the UK Government has contributed funding to enable over 800
new grass pitches and 60 new artificial grass pitches in England alone. The UK
Government has committed £205m to build on this across the UK over the
next three years. This will ensure local clubs and school teams have the
facilities they need to thrive. We have also endorsed in principle the main
recommendation of the Fan Led Review of Football Governance that football
requires a strong, independent regulator, and have written to Football
Authorities to ask what action they will take immediately to protect local
identities, traditions and facilities.
We will also ensure that great cultural institutions play their part in spreading
access to excellence. As we significantly increase cultural spending outside
the capital, 100% of the Arts Council England funding uplift announced at SR21
will be directed outside London, with support for theatre, museums and
galleries, libraries and dance in towns which have been deprived of investment
in the past. We will explore how more flagship national cultural institutions can
support the strength of our historic cultural heritage in great cities such as
Stoke and Manchester.
Further, £560m will be invested in young people for new and improved youth
facilities, services and experiences in England where they are needed most,
launching a new National Youth Guarantee so that by 2025 every young person
in England will have access to regular out of school activities, adventures away
from home and opportunities to volunteer. We will ensure the Duke of
Edinburgh Award is offered to every state secondary school in England. We will
give more students the transformative opportunity to join the cadets, providing
more support to the state school sector to increase Combined Cadet Force
participation. This will include linking funding of cadet units in private schools
with a requirement to ensure support for the expansion of cadet forces in state
schools and open access to nearby state school students.
Government will also lead by example, relocating more senior civil service
roles out of London. We have already established a new economic campus in
Darlington, a Home Office hub in Stoke and DLUHC’s second headquarters in
Wolverhampton. More civil service roles will move to locations across the UK,
including Glasgow, Edinburgh, Cardiff, Belfast, Manchester, Newcastle,
Birmingham, Bristol and Leeds, as key decision-makers are re-deployed to be
closer to those they serve. The White Paper reinforces our commitment to the
Places for Growth programme and confirms departments’ detailed numbers
and locations for relocation of roles to 2025 and 2030.
Executive Summary
xxv
Our aim with these reforms is to improve pride in place in every area of the UK,
with the gap between top performing and other areas narrowing (Mission Nine).
Poor housing quality, overcrowding and a reliance on temporary accommodation
for vulnerable families also contribute to unnecessarily poor health and quality
of life for many. We will take action on two fronts. First, building more housing in
England, including more genuinely affordable social housing. Second, we will
launch a new drive on housing quality to make sure homes are fit for the
21st century.
We will ensure home ownership is within the reach of many more people.
The Help to Buy scheme launched last year is focussing entirely on first time
buyers and we will build on the success of the Mortgage Guarantee Scheme by
working with the lending industry to maximise the availability of low deposit
mortgages. Alongside this, we will improve the home buying and selling
process, working with the industry to ensure the critical information buyers
need to know is available digitally wherever possible from trusted and
authenticated sources. We will also scrap the 80/20 funding rule that focused
investment in Greater London, and instead invest in more homes in the North
and Midlands to relieve pressure on the South East.
To deliver our mission to improve housing conditions, we will introduce new
legislation to improve the quality and regulation of social housing, give
residents performance information so that they can hold their landlord to
account and ensure that when residents make a complaint, landlords take quick
and effective action to put things right. And we will publish a landmark White
Paper in the spring to consult on introducing a legally binding Decent Homes
Standard in the Private Rented Sector for the first time ever, explore a
National Landlord Register and bring forward other measures to reset the
relationship between landlords and tenants, including through ending section
21 “no fault evictions”.
This will all help to ensure that by 2030, renters will have a secure path to
ownership with the number of first-time buyers increasing in all areas; and our
ambition is for the number of non-decent rented homes to have fallen by 50%
with the biggest improvements in the lowest performing areas (Mission Ten).
We are intent on tackling the crime, drug abuse and anti-social behaviour which
blight so many communities. We are investing £50m from the Safer Streets
Fund every year of the SR21 period to give Police and Crime Commissioners and
local authorities in England and Wales the resources they need to tackle crime
and anti-social behaviour. Through this, by 2030, we will have reduced homicide,
serious violence and neighbourhood crime, focused on the worst-affected areas
(Mission Eleven).
We will also clamp down on the factors that damage people’s pride in their
area and expect that people will give back to their communities when they
are found to have broken the law. Too many communities are blighted by
anti-social behaviour and criminality, sometimes committed by children.
We will therefore work with partners across the youth justice system to
make sure 16- and 17-year olds who commit crimes pay their community back
with visible labour to improve the local environment.
We will
introduce new
legislation to
improve the
quality and
regulation of
social housing
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xxvi
Empowering local leaders and communities
Mayors have already shown how strong local leadership can enhance economic
and other opportunities in urban areas, and we will ensure that the model is
strengthened, extended and adopted more widely. With a direct mandate,
fixed term, convening power, a clear incentive to demonstrate economic
improvement and accountability for extending opportunity, mayors work for
their communities. And meaningful devolution of power and responsibility for
economic growth to an accountable local leader has been proven to help once
declining areas to recover.
We will extend, deepen and simplify devolution across England so that by
2030, every part of England that wants one will have a devolution deal with
powers at or approaching the highest level of devolution with a simplified,
long-term funding settlement (Mission Twelve).
We want to usher in a devolution revolution, introducing a new model for
counties with mayors or “governors”. We will open negotiations on trailblazer
deeper devolution deals with the West Midlands and Greater Manchester
combined authorities. These deals will act as the blueprint for other mayoral
combined authorities (MCAs) to follow, with bids for more powers welcome.
We will likewise recast the geography of MCAs, where necessary, to ensure
there is greater economic coherence. We will further invite nine areas to agree
new County Deals and seek to agree further MCA deals, extending devolution
to much more of England.
It is also important that devolution is accompanied by sharper and clearer
accountability. Across the local government sector, we will strengthen transparency
for local people and publish rigorous, comparable data on performance. A new
independent body will be set up to drive this, empowering citizens, strengthening
local leaders’ knowledge of their services, and increasing central government’s
understanding of the sector. And we will support local leaders to make a difference
in their communities by simplifying the disparate funding landscape so that local
leaders can better support economic growth, as well as bringing local leaders into
the heart of government decision-making with a new role for mayors and strong
local leaders in the shaping of local growth strategy.
Next Steps
Levelling up is a long-term endeavour. It is a programme of change that
requires a fundamental shift in how central and local government, the private
sector and civil society operate. The UK Government will embark on a process
of sustained and systematic engagement and consultation with a wide range of
stakeholders, including devolved administrations, on the White Paper.
We will be setting out further detail on a number of these policy
commitments in future publications. In addition, we will introduce legislation
to Parliament to underpin in statute the changes fundamental to levelling up,
alongside wider planning measures.
This White Paper is the catalyst for delivering a long-term programme of
change to unlock the potential of people and places in every part of the UK.
This will create jobs, drive productivity, improve people’s quality of life and
help restore their pride in the places where they live.
We will extend,
deepen and
simplify
devolution
across England
Executive Summary
xxvii
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
xxviii
1
Chapter 1
The United Kingdom’s
Geographical Disparities:
Drivers and Potential
Policy Approaches
To reduce spatial disparities, it is first important to understand what causes
them. This chapter draws on historical, theoretical and empirical evidence to
explain the drivers of spatial disparities, in the UK and internationally. It then
sets out a framework for assessing and understanding these disparities; the
benefits of addressing them; and how public policy might most effectively
do so.
1.1
A Brief History of Geographical Disparities
All natural and social systems undergo slow-moving fluctuations over the
course of decades or even centuries. These long waves of expansion and
contraction are driven by shifts in the natural environment, technology and
behaviour. Economic systems are no exception.2 As economies expand and
contract over time, so do the economic fortunes of the places and
communities embedded in them.
Differences in the economic geography of a nation or locality at any one point
in time, and changes in economic geographies over time, are an inevitable
feature of dynamic, evolving economies. To some extent, these changes can be
desirable as economies adapt to new circumstances and seize new
opportunities. For that reason, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter
called this dynamic process “creative destruction”.3
The history of economic growth, nationally and subnationally, shines a light
both on the opportunities it presents for places expanding but also the
challenges for places contracting. It illustrates the natural undulations in
economic performance over time and the cumulative growth process in
expanding cities and communities. It also illustrates the long-term economic
scars left when places contract. At the spatial scale, change is often as
destructive as it is creative.
2
Economists call these long cycles Kondratiev waves. Kondratiev, N. D. The Major Economic Cycles (in Russian). The Long
Wave Cycle. Richardson & Snyder, 1984.
3
Schumpeter, J., Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. Harper & Brothers. 1942. Note: Throughout this chapter, UK-wide
data is used where it is available on a consistent basis.
As economies
expand and
contract over
time, so do the
economic
fortunes of the
places and
communities
embedded in
them
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
2
Figure 1.1 Largest Cities in the World since 7,000 BC4
7000 BC
5000 BC
3600 BC
3500 BC
2500 BC
2300 BC
2100 BC
1650 BC
1300 BC
1000 BC
700 BC
3800 BC
6500 BC
4000 BC
3700 BC
3550 BC
3100 BC
2400 BC
2250 BC
1800 BC
1360 BC
1200 BC
900 BC
650 BC
Jericho
Çatalhöyük
Tell Brak
Uruk
Dobrovody
Eridu
Maydanets
Talianki
Abydos
Memphis
Lagash
Mohenjo-daro
Girsu
Akkad
Ur
Mari
Avaris
Thebes
Yinxu
Chengzhou (Luoyang)
Linzi
Pi-Ramses
Nineveh
Haojing (Xi’an)
500 BC
460 BC
200 AD
575 AD
800 AD
1100 AD
1180 AD
1300 AD
1400 AD
1700 AD
1925 AD
200 BC
479 BC
300 BC
100 BC
500 AD
600 AD
935 AD
1160 AD
1210 AD
1350 AD
1500 AD
1850 AD
2000 AD
Babylon
Pataliputra
Ctesiphon
Kaifeng
Hangzhou
Ayutthaya
Rajagriha
Rome
Baghdad
Polonnaruwa
Jinling
New York (urban area)
Carthage
Constantinople
Cordova
Merv
Beijing
Tokyo (urban area)
Sravasti
Alexandria
Daxing (Chang’an)
Fez
Cairo
London
Largest Cities in the World since 7,000 BC
4
The Guardian. From Jericho to Tokyo: the world’s largest cities through history. Exploring Urban Data Hub.
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
3
As social animals, humans have always congregated in groups. These
communities were typically found close to natural resources and seaways, for
food and trade. The earliest known permanent settlement to be classified as
urban was Jericho around 10,000 years ago (Figure 1.1). The city had natural
irrigation from the Jordan River, allowing it to produce and export the most
expensive essential oil in the ancient world. This enabled Jericho to become
a hub not only for commerce and trade, but for people and skills, culture
and finance.
Constantinople was the capital of the Roman/Byzantine Empire (330-1204 and
1261-1453), the Latin Empire (1204-1261) and the Ottoman Empire (1453-1922).5
Its growth followed a similar model. Built on the Bosphorus Strait, it was easily
accessible to other parts of the Roman Empire via the Mediterranean Sea,
Black Sea and Danube River. It too became a magnet for commerce, culture
and finance.
The strategic importance of London’s location was first recognised by the
Romans, with the town of Londinium established around AD 47-50.6
Its location on the deepest and second longest river in the UK allowed
large military and trading vessels access to the world’s seaways. This quickly
established London as a multicultural hub for people, commerce, finance and
culture, a position (unusually by historical standards) that it has retained for
2,000 years.
Across Europe, the Renaissance period in Italy and the Golden Age in Holland
offered examples of similar periods of transformative, city-centric growth.7
In both cases the recipe was a familiar one – the magnetic attraction of people,
culture, commerce and finance spreading ideas, innovation and ultimately
growth. Indeed, in deference to the role of the Medicis in driving success in
15th century Renaissance Italy, this creative crucible is sometimes referred to as
the “Medici effect”.8 This process was replicated throughout pre-Industrial
history. By the time of the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century, similar
patterns of growth had been in place for several millennia. Cities emerged and
grew rapidly as creative and commercial hubs were formed and built
cumulatively, and persisted for centuries. But it was not permanent, and few of
the world’s largest cities of the pre-Industrial past are in the world’s top 100
today and a number are now small and poor by global standards.
5
See Turnbull, S. The Walls of Constantinople AD 324-1453. Osprey Publishing. 2004. and World History Encyclopaedia.
Constantinople Timeline.
6 Williams, T. The foundation and early development of Roman London: A social context. Antiquity, 64(244), 599-607. 1990.
7
Fouquet, R., Broadberry, S. Seven Centuries of European Economic Growth and Decline. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
pp. 227-44. 2015.
8
The Medici effect is innovation that happens when diverse industries, cultures and disciplines intersect, bringing ideas from
one field into another. See Johansson, F. The Medici Effect: Breakthrough Insights at the Intersection of Ideas, Concepts,
and Cultures. Harvard Business Review Press. 2004.
Few of the
world’s largest
cities of the
pre‑Industrial
past are in the
world’s top 100
today
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
4
After the Industrial Revolution, these spatial forces continued, but widened
and deepened due to the world’s first-ever period of sustained economic
growth. This was led by industrial cities, which transformed the world’s
economic geography. In 1750, more than 50% of the world’s industrial output
was produced in China and India, compared to 18% in Western Europe. The
following 80 years saw Western Europe’s industrial output more than double
and the UK’s rise seven-fold.9
Subnationally, the Industrial Revolution saw the emergence of large industrial
cities. These were typically still located close to waterways and natural resources
such as coal. But these benefits were now amplified by the needs of industry.
The rapid growth in industrial cities followed a similar spatial pattern to the past,
with a convergence of business, finance, people and culture. But as economies
grew as never before, this process of clustering of assets and people occurred at
a greater pace and scale than had ever happened previously.
By 1900, all 20 of the US’s largest cities were on major waterways.10 Europe was
now home to half the world’s urban population and more than half of its 100
largest cities, including industrial centres such as Hamburg, Munich, Milan,
Rotterdam, Turin and Lille.11 In the UK, the industrial powerhouses of
Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Liverpool were all among the world’s 20
largest cities, with their populations rising tenfold (Figure 1.2).12
Since the turn of the 20th century, the forces of globalisation and
technological progress had once again reshaped the world’s economic
geography. Advances in transport, logistics and energy had reduced the cost
advantages traditionally offered by industrial cities. And increasing globalisation
meant that manufacturing businesses have often found it cheaper to offshore
lower skilled, more routine activities such as assembly production lines.13
That has resulted in a seismic shift away from heavy industrial cities in
advanced economies. At the end of the 19th century, Detroit was a hotbed of
innovation. Its economic power peaked in 1950 when it became the third
richest city in the US.14 As car production has shifted towards cheaper
competitors, Detroit has been losing residents for 50 years. Its population
today is the same as a century ago. A third of its residents now live below the
poverty line, even if in more recent times, regeneration efforts are helping the
city turn the corner.15
9
Crafts, N. & Venables, A. Globalization in History: A Geographical Perspective. Globalisation in Historical Perspective.
University of Chicago Press. 2003.
10 Glaeser, E. Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier.
Penguin Publishing Group. 2011
11
Satterthwaite, D. The world’s 100 largest cities from 1800 to 2020, and beyond. International Institute for Environment and
Development. 2020.
12 GB Historical GIS / University of Portsmouth. Cardiff District through time, Population Statistics, Total Population.
A Vision of Britain through Time.; Census of Ireland 1911. The Online Historical Population Reports Accessed: via Histpop in
Dec 2021.
13
Swinney, P., Thomas, E. A century of cities: Urban economic change since 1911. Centre for Cities. 2015.
14 Moretti, E. The new geography of jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2012.
15 Moretti, E. The new geography of jobs. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 2012.
Globalisation
and
technological
progress had
once again
reshaped the
world’s
economic
geography
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
5
Figure 1.2 Change in population of selected UK cities 1821-2021 (1821=100)16
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Belfast
Edinburgh
Leeds
Sheffield
Manchester
Bristol
Liverpool
Glasgow
Birmingham
London
1821
183
1
184
1
185
1
1861
187
1
188
1
1891
190
1
191
1
192
1
193
1
194
1
195
1
196
1
197
1
198
1
199
1
20
01
20
11
20
20
Population (1821 = 100)Change in Population of Selected UK Cities, 1821-2020 (1821 = 100)
This pattern has been replicated elsewhere. Eight of the ten largest US cities in 1950 have lost at least a
sixth of their population. Six of the 16 largest cities in 1950 – Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, New Orleans,
Pittsburgh and St. Louis – have lost more than half their population. In Europe, cities like Liverpool,
Glasgow, Rotterdam, Bremen and Vilnius are all much smaller than a century ago.17 At its peak in 1937,
Liverpool had 867,000 residents. Since then, it has lost nearly half its population (Figure 1.2).18
In place of these fallen industrial powerhouses, a new generation of knowledge-intensive super-cities
emerged during the late 20th and early 21st centuries.19 This includes London, New York, San Francisco and
Tokyo. These super-cities have benefited from a modern-day version of the Medici effect, with a creative
and commercial critical mass developing through the clustering of people, business, finance and culture.
Digital technologies have made agglomeration effects more powerful than at any time in the past as
globalisation has reduced the barriers on cross border trade and investment.20
16
GB Historical GIS / University of Portsmouth. Population Statistics. Taken from UK Census data 1801-2011, Total Population.
A Vision of Britain through Time.; ONS. Estimates of the population for the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland. Mid 2020. Note – data not available on a consistent basis for all years. Changes in the population of
selected UK cities might reflect changes to the geography used to report these figures. Census figures for Belfast for 1926
and 1937 have been moved to 1921 and 1941.
17 Glaeser, E. Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier.
Penguin Publishing Group. 2011
18 Glaeser, E. Triumph of the city: how our greatest invention makes us richer, smarter, greener, healthier, and happier.
Penguin Publishing Group. 2011
19 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018
Revision. United Nations. 2019.
20 OECD. Foreign direct investment and reverse technology spillovers: The effect on total factor productivity. 2015.; Tranos E.,
Ioannides, Y.M. Ubiquitous digital technologies and spatial structure; an update. PLoS ONE 16(4): e0248982. 2021.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
6
Productivity
Productivity varies substantially across and within regions. Although London and the South East are the
only regions above the UK average, they also host some of the UK’s least productive local authorities.
Local authorities in Scotland, the Midlands and the North West are also some of the most productive.
Figure 1.3 Nominal (smoothed) GVA per hour worked (£), GB local authorities and
Northern Ireland, 2019
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
7
Table 1.1 Size of the gap: Differences in GVA per hour worked in £ and percent, UK and GB
countries and regions/local authorities, 2019
Lowest performing
Difference compared to UK
average in £ and (%)
Highest performing
Difference compared to
UK average in £ and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
Northern Ireland
£6.41 (-18.24%)
London
£11.23 (+31.95%)
Sub‑regional (district/
unitary local authorities,
Great Britain only)
Powys
£14.90 (-42.39%)
Runnymede
£27.20 (+77.38%)
Figure 1.4 Distribution of GVA per hour worked (£), local authorities by GB countries and
regions, 2019
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
Ea
st
Ea
st
Midla
nd
s
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
Ea
st
No
rth
W
es
t
Sout
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
an
d
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
sDistribution of GVA per hour worked (£), local authorities by GB countries
and regions, 2019
Source: ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: February 2020. 2020.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
8
Earnings
Incomes track productivity closely, with average pay in the South East and London significantly above the
national average. However, there is significant variation within regions. In the East of England median
weekly pay in South Cambridge and St Albans is nearly double that of Norfolk, whilst median pay in
Monmouthshire/Sir Fynwy in Wales is higher than half of London’s local authorities.
Figure 1.5 Median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, UK local authorities, 2021
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
9
Table 1.2 Size of the gap: Differences in median gross weekly pay in £ and percent, UK countries
and regions/local authorities, 2021
Lowest performing
Difference compared to UK
average in £ and (%)
Highest performing
Difference compared to
UK average in £ and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East
-£41 (-8.21%)
London
£109 (21.59%)
Sub‑regional (county/
unitary local
authorities)
Ards and North Down
-£128 (-25.3%)
Westminster
£267 (52.97%)
Figure 1.6 Distribution of median gross weekly pay (£) for all employee jobs, local authorities by
GB countries and regions, 2021
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
Ea
st
Ea
st
Midla
nd
s
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
Ea
st
No
rth
W
es
t
Sout
h E
ast
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
Yorks
hir
e a
nd
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
Source: ONS. Earnings and hours worked, place of residence by local authority: ASHE Table 8. 2021
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
10
Skills
The North East is the lowest performing region with seven out of twelve Local Authorities falling in the
bottom quartile of the UK distribution. The East Midlands has the largest within region variation, with the
population of Rushcliffe having a level 3+ attainment rate of 77.2% compared to 37% for Bolsover.
Figure 1.7 Proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3 + qualifications by local
authority, UK, 2021
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
11
Table 1.3 Size of the gap: Differences in Level 3+ qualifications population in percent, UK
countries and regions/local authorities, 2021
Lowest performing
Difference compared to UK
average (%)
Highest performing
Difference compared to
UK average (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East
(-6.1%)
London
(+9.8%)
Sub‑regional (district/
unitary local authorities,
Great Britain only)
Bolsover
(-24.2%)
City of London
(+38.8%)
Figure 1.8 Distribution of the proportion of the population aged 16-64 with level 3+, local
authorities by UK countries and regions, 2021
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Ea
st
Ea
st
Midla
nds
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
Ea
st
No
rth
W
es
t
Sout
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
an
d
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
Distribution of the proportion f the population aged 16-64 with level 3+,
local authorities by UK counties and regions, 2021
Source: ONS. Annual Population Survey: All people aged 16-64 with Level 3+ skills, by local authority. NOMIS. 2021.
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
12
Health
At the national level, male and female healthy life expectancy between 2017 and 2019 was highest in
England (63.2 and 63.5) and lowest in Scotland (61.7, 61.9). At a local level, people in the top decile (least-
deprived) areas of the UK can expect to live around a decade longer than people in the bottom decile
(most-deprived) areas.
Figure 1.9 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), UK local authorities, 2017-2019
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
13
Table 1.4 Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Male) in years and percent, UK
countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19
Lowest performing
Difference compared to
UK average in years and (%)
Highest performing
Difference compared to UK
average in years and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East
-3.5 years (-5.61%)
South East
+2.4 years (+3.85%)
Sub‑regional (county/
unitary local authorities)
Blackpool
-9.2 years (-14.59%)
Rutland
+8.6 years (+13.64%)
Figure 1.10 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Males), local authorities by UK
countries and regions, 2017–2019
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Ea
st
Ea
st
Midla
nds
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
Ea
st
No
rth
W
es
t
So
ut
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
an
d
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
North
er
n I
re
lan
d
Distribution of healthy life expctancy t birh (Male), local authorities by UK
countries and regions, 2017 - 2019
Source: ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
14
Figure 1.11 Healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), UK local authorities, 2017-2019
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
15
Table 1.5 Size of the gap: Differences in healthy life expectancy (Female) in years and percent,
UK countries and regions/local authorities, 2017–19
Lowest performing
Difference compared to
UK average in years and (%
Highest performing
Difference compared to UK
average in years and (%)
Regional (ITL1)
North East
-4.2 years (6.70%)
South East
+2.6 years (4.06%)
Sub‑regional (county/
unitary local authorities)
Blackpool
-8.0% years (12.61%)
Orkney Islands
+11.7 years (18.6%)
Figure 1.12 Distribution of healthy life expectancy at birth (Females), local authorities by UK
countries and regions, 2017-2019
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
Ea
st
Ea
st
Midla
nds
Lo
nd
on
No
rth
Ea
st
No
rth
W
es
t
Sout
h E
as
t
Sout
h Wes
t
Wes
t M
idl
an
ds
York
sh
ire
an
d
Th
e Hum
be
r
Sc
ot
lan
dWale
s
North
er
n I
re
lan
dDistribution of healthy life expctancy at birh (Female), local authorities by UK
countries and regions, 217 - 2019
Levelling Up the United Kingdom White Paper
16
1.2 Geographical Disparities across the UK
These global economic growth dynamics have been mirrored in the UK over
recent decades, with long waves of expansion and contraction. But these
dynamics appear to have been both more powerful and persistent in the UK
than in some other countries. They also appear to have left deep and long-
lasting economic and social scars. The result has been larger spatial differences
across the UK than elsewhere, which have persisted and widened over time.
This section outlines the nature and evolution of these spatial differences.
This section shows that the UK displays large spatial disparities compared to
most other OECD countries (1.2.1), with a large gap between London and most
other regions – in both absolute and relative terms (1.2.2) – contributing to
substantial differences in living standards (1.2.3). These differences are long-lived
and mean that the UK is not taking full advantage of the economic
potential that all parts of the country have to offer. This in turn holds back
aggregate productivity and growth and imposes costs on both poorly and
well-performing places alike. These differences are also typically hyper-local
and differences within UK regions or cities are often larger than differences
between regions on most performance metrics (1.2.4). It is also clear that while
the UK has a large number of clusters of innovative economic activity (1.2.8), its
second tier cities underperform international counterparts (1.2.6). All of these
differences in place performance matter since they have a lasting impact on
the life outcomes of the people who grow up there (1.2.7), not just in economic
terms but across a wide range of social indicators.
1.2.1 The scale of geographical disparities across the UK
Across a broad range of economic and social metrics, geographic differences in
the UK are large in absolute terms and have widened over recent decades.
Figures 1.3 to 1.12 plot four different areas of performance of the UK at the local
authority level: productivity, pay, educational attainment and health. For each of
these areas, there is a relatively high degree of geographic similarity, with the
most productive places generally having higher earnings, longer life expectancy
and higher levels of skills. . As the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities
emphasised, geography is a key factor affecting equality of opportunity and
social mobility.21
The differences between the best and worst performing areas are large. For
productivity at the regional level, the gap between the highest (London) and
lowest (Northern Ireland) is around 60%. In general, productivity tends to be
higher in larger city-regions due to economies of scale and scope. Nonetheless,
even this pattern is not entirely uniform.
Even in high productivity cities, such as London, there are areas with low
productivity. Haringey and Lewisham have productivity levels of 91% and 82%
of the UK average respectively.22 In some of the UK’s other large cities, such as
Birmingham and Sheffield, productivity also lies below the national average.23
Cities are not always highly productive.
21 The independent report of the Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities. 2021.
22 ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: July 2021. 2021.
23 ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: July 2021. 2021.
Across a broad
range of
economic and
social metrics,
geographic
differences in
the UK are large
Chapter 1 Explaining Economic Geographies
17
Nor are towns and rural areas always underperforming. Some towns and rural
areas are thriving in productivity terms. For example, Darlington has the same
level of productivity as central Manchester.24
These differences in productivity are mirrored, broadly, in measures of pay and
skills. Pay in the top region for earnings (London at £823 per week) is 1.5 times
greater than the lowest region (the North East at £550 per week).25 The difference
in the proportion of the adult population with a level 3 qualification or
equivalent between these two regions is almost 16 percentage points.26
These differences are larger still at a more local level. Nearly half of adults aged
16-64 have a qualification at level 4 or above in York compared to a quarter
in Doncaster.27
Some of the most striking spatial disparities are in health. The difference in
healthy life expectancy at birth for females between England and Scotland is
only 1.6 years.28 But at a local level, these differences are much larger. Females
born in Wokingham can expect to live twelve years longer in good health than
those born in Southampton.29 This is mirrored in other health-based metrics,
such as the incidence of obesity and smoking.30
Figure 1.13 combines these four performance measures. There are clear
typologies of places that have poor socioeconomic outcomes. These include
coastal communities previously associated with tourism, parts of the North
and Midlands with industrial legacies, and rural parts of Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland. The UK’s cities tend to perform better in general, but often
harbour both some of the best and the worst-performing areas.
24 ONS. Subregional productivity in the UK: July 2021. 2021.
25 ONS. Apr-June 2021 gross weekly earnings data – not seasonally adjusted. Gross weekly earnings of full-time employees
by region. 2021.
26 ONS. Annual Population Survey, 2004-2021. Data from: Jan-Dec, 2020. UK Data Service. 2021.
27 ONS. Annual Population Survey, 2004-2021. Data from: Jan-Dec, 2020. UK Data Service. 2021.
28 ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019.
29 ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019.
30 ONS. Health state life expectancy at birth and at age 65 years by local areas, UK. 2019.
Even in high
productivity
cities, such as
London, there
are areas
with low
productivity