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Sovereign Law Series

International Court of Justice
“Congo v. Belgium” Judgment of
2002


Short-Form Reference:

2002 ICJ “Congo v. Belgium” Judgment

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2002 ICJ “Congo v. Belgium”

Ratification / Registration:

ICJ GL No. 121 (ICJ Rep. 2002 p.3) Hague (14 Feb 2002)


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Official Text of this Law Source as Issued

International Court of Justice
“Congo v. Belgium” Judgment No. 121 (2002)

Facts of the case – Issue by a Belgian investigating magistrate of "an international
arrest warrant in absentia" against the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Congo, alleging grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the
Additional Protocols thereto and crimes against humanity – International circulation of
arrest warrant through Interpol – Person concerned subsequently ceasing to hold
office as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[Summaries of Legal Issues Omitted]

Remedies sought by the Congo – Finding by the Court of international responsibility of
Belgium making good the moral injury complained of by the Congo – Belgium required
by means of its own choosing to cancel the warrant in question and so inform the
authorities to whom it was circulated.

JUDGMENT

[Lists of Judges and Lawyers Omitted]

In the case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,
between
the Democratic Republic of Congo
and
the Kingdom of Belgium,

THE COURT, composed as above, after deliberation, delivers the following Judgment:

1.
On 17 October 2000 the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter referred
to as "the Congo") filed in the Registry of the Court an Application instituting
proceedings against the Kingdom of Belgium (hereinafter referred to as "Belgium") in
respect of a dispute concerning an “international arrest warrant issued on 11 April
2000 by a Belgian investigating judge . . . against the Minister for Foreign Affairs in
office of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi”.

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In that Application the Congo contended that Belgium had violated the
"principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the territory of another State",
the "principle of sovereign equality among all Members of the United Nations, as laid
down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations", as well as "the
diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a sovereign State, as
recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and following from Article 41, paragraph
2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic Relations".

[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

2.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

3.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

4.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

5.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

6.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

7.
Pursuant to Article 53, paragraph 2, of the Rules, the Court, after ascertaining
the views of the Parties, decided that copies of the pleadings and documents annexed
would be made available to the public at the opening of the oral proceedings.

8.
Public hearings were held from 15 to 19 October 2001, at which the Court heard
the oral arguments and replies of: [Lists of Lawyers Omitted]

9.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

10.
In its Application, the Congo formulated the decision requested in the following
terms:

"The Court is requested to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall annul the
international arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 by a Belgian investigating judge,
Mr. Vandermeersch, of the Brussels Tribunal de premiere instance against the
Minister for Foreign Affairs in office of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mr.
Abdu aye Yerodia Ndombasi, seeking his provisional detention pending a request for
extradition to Belgium for alleged crimes constituting 'serious violations of
international humanitarian law', that warrant having been circulated by the judge to
all States, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which received it on 12 July
2000.''

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11.
In the course of the written proceedings, the following submissions were
presented by the Parties:

On behalf of the Government of the Congo, in the Memorial:

"In light of the facts and arguments set out above, the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and declare that:

1.
by issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 11 April
2000 against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium committed a violation in
regard to the DRC of the rule of customary international law concerning the absolute
inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent foreign ministers;

2.
a formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of that act constitutes
an appropriate form of satisfaction, providing reparation for the consequent moral
injury to the DRC;

3.
the violation of international law underlying the issue and international
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 precludes any State, including
Belgium, from executing it;

4.
Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant of 11
April 2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the warrant was circulated
that, following the Court's Judgment, Belgium renounces its request for their
cooperation in executing the unlawful warrant."

On behalf of the Government of Belgium, in the Counter-Memorial:

"For the reasons stated in Part II of this Counter-Memorial, Belgium requests
the Court, as a preliminary matter, to adjudge and declare that the Court lacks
jurisdiction in this case and/or that the application by the Democratic Republic of the
Congo against Belgium is inadmissible. If, contrary to the preceding submission, the
Court concludes that it does have jurisdiction in this case and that the application by
the Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissible, Belgium requests the Court to
reject the submissions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the merits of the
case and to dismiss the application."

12.
[Oral Arguments Repeating Written Arguments Omitted]

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13. On 11 April 2000 an investigating judge of the Brussels Tribunal de premiere
instance issued "an international arrest warrant in absentia" against Mr. Abdulaye
Yerodia Ndombasi, charging him, as perpetrator or co-perpetrator, with offences
constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the Additional
Protocols thereto, and with crimes against humanity.

At the time when the arrest warrant was issued Mr. Yerodia was the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Congo.

14.
The arrest warrant was transmitted to the Congo on 7 June 2000, being received
by the Congolese authorities on 12 July 2000. According to Belgium, the warrant was
at the same time transmitted to the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol), an organization whose function is to enhance and facilitate cross-border
criminal police cooperation worldwide; through the latter, it was circulated
internationally.

15.
In the arrest warrant, Mr. Yerodia is accused of having made various speeches
inciting racial hatred during the month of August 1998. The crimes with which Mr.
Yerodia was charged were punishable in Belgium under the Law of 16 June 1993
"concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the International Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and of Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977 Additional
Thereto", as amended by the Law of 10 February 1 999 "concerning the Punishment of
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter referred to as the
"Belgian Law'').

Article 7 of the Belgian Law provides that "The Belgian courts shall have
jurisdiction in respect of the offences provided for in the present Law, wheresoever
they may have been committed". In the present case, according to Belgium, the
complaints that initiated the proceedings as a result of which the arrest warrant was
issued emanated from 12 individuals all resident in Belgium, five of whom were of
Belgian nationality. It is not contested by Belgium, however, that the alleged acts to
which the arrest warrant relates were committed outside Belgian territory, that Mr.
Yerodia was not a Belgian national at the time of those acts, and that Mr. Yerodia was
not in Belgian territory at the time that the arrest warrant was issued and circulated.
That no Belgian nationals were victims of the violence that was said to have resulted
from Mr. Yerodia's alleged offences was also uncontested.

Article 5, paragraph 3, of the Belgian Law further provides that "[i]mmunity
attaching to the official capacity of a person shall not prevent the application of the
present Law".

16.
[Legal Side Issue Omitted]

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17. On 17 October 2000, the Congo filed in the Registry an Application instituting
the present proceedings (see paragraph 1 above), in which the Court was requested
"to declare that the Kingdom of Belgium shall annul the international arrest warrant
issued on 11 April 2000". The Congo relied in its Application on two separate legal
grounds. First, it claimed that "[t]he universal jurisdiction that the Belgian State
attributes to itself under Article 7 of the Law in question" constituted a

"[v]iolation of the principle that a State may not exercise its authority on the
territory of another State and of the principle of sovereign equality among all
Members of the United Nations, as laid down in Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Charter
of the United Nations" .

Secondly, it claimed that "[t]he non-recognition, on the basis of Article 5 . . . of
the Belgian Law, of the immunity of a Minister for Foreign Affairs in office" constituted
a "[v]iolation of the diplomatic immunity of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a
sovereign State, as recognized by the jurisprudence of the Court and following from
Article 41, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention of 18 April 1961 on Diplomatic
Relations".

18.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

19.
From mid-April 2001, with the formation of a new Government in the Congo,
Mr. Yerodia ceased to hold the post of Minister of Education. He no longer holds any
ministerial office today.

20. On 12 September 2001, the Belgian National Central Bureau of Interpol
requested the Interpol General Secretariat to issue a Red Notice in respect of Mr.
Yerodia. Such notices concern individuals whose arrest is requested with a view to
extradition. On 19 October 2001, at the public sittings held to hear the oral arguments
of the Parties in the case, Belgium informed the Court that Interpol had responded on
27 September 2001 with a request for additional information, and that no Red Notice
had yet been circulated.

21. Although the Application of the Congo originally advanced two separate legal
grounds (see paragraph 17 above), the submissions of the Congo in its Memorial and
the final submissions which it presented at the end of the oral proceedings refer only
to a violation "in regard to the . . . Congo of the rule of customary international law
concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent
foreign ministers" (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above).

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22.
In their written pleadings, and in oral argument, the Parties addressed issues of
jurisdiction and admissibility as well as the merits (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). In
this connection, Belgium raised certain objections which the Court will begin by
addressing.

23.
The first objection presented by Belgium reads as follows:

"That, in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no longer either
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a minister occupying any other position
in the . . . Government [of the Congo], there is no longer a 'legal dispute' between the
Parties within the meaning of this term in the Option 11 Clause Declarations of the
Parties and that the Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in this case."

24. Belgium does not deny that such a legal dispute existed between the Parties at
the time when the Congo filed its Application instituting proceedings, and that the
Court was properly seised by that Application. However, it contends that the question
is not whether a legal dispute existed at that time, but whether a legal dispute exists
at the present time.

Belgium refers in this respect inter alia to the Northern Cameroons case, in which the
Court found that it "may pronounce judgment only in connection with concrete cases
where there exists at the time of the adjudication an actual controversy involving a
conflict of legal interests between the parties" (I.CJ. Reports 1963, pp. 33-34), as well
as to the Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France), in which
the Court stated the following : "The Court, as a court of law, is called upon to resolve
existing disputes between States . . . The dispute brought before it must therefore
continue to exist at the time when the Court makes its decision" (I.CJ. Reports 1974,
pp. 270-271, para. 55; p. 476, para. 58).

Belgium argues that the position of Mr. Yerodia as Minister for Foreign Affairs was
central to the Congo's Application instituting proceedings, and emphasizes that there
has now been a change of circumstances at the very heart of the case, in view of the
fact that Mr. Yerodia was relieved of his position as Minister for Foreign Affairs in
November 2000 and that, since 15 April 2001, he has occupied no position in the
Government of the Congo (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above). According to Belgium,
while there may still be a difference of opinion between the Parties on the scope and
content of international law governing the immunities of a Minister for Foreign Affairs,
that difference of opinion has now become a matter of abstract, rather than of
practical, concern.

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The result, in Belgium's view, is that the case has become an attempt by the Congo to
"[seek] an advisory opinion from the Court", and no longer a "concrete case" involving
an "actual controversy" between the Parties, and that the Court accordingly lacks
jurisdiction in the case.

25.
The Congo rejects this objection of Belgium. It contends that there is indeed a
legal dispute between the Parties, in that the Congo claims that the arrest warrant was
issued in violation of the immunity of its Minister for Foreign Affairs, that that warrant
was unlawful ab initio, and that this legal defect persists despite the subsequent
changes in the position occupied by the individual concerned, while Belgium maintains
that the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant were not contrary to international
law. The Congo adds that the termination of Mr. Yerodia's official duties in no way
operated to efface the wrongful act and the injury that flowed from it, for which the
Congo continues to seek redress.

26.
The Court recalls that, according to its settled jurisprudence, its jurisdiction
must be determined at the time that the act instituting proceedings was filed. Thus, if
the Court has jurisdiction on the date the case is referred to it, it continues to do so
regardless of subsequent events. Such events might lead to a finding that an
application has subsequently become moot and to a decision not to proceed to
judgment on the merits, but they cannot deprive the Court of jurisdiction.

(see Nottebohm, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1953, p. 122; Right of
Passage over Indian Territory, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1957, p.
142; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United
Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 23-24, para. 38;
and Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 129, para. 37).

27.
[Procedural Legal Issues Omitted]

Moreover, it is not contested by the Parties that at the material time there was
a legal dispute between them concerning the international lawfulness of the arrest
warrant of 11 April 2000 and the consequences to be drawn if the warrant was
unlawful. Such a dispute was clearly a legal dispute within the meaning of the Court's
jurisprudence, namely "a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal
views or of interests between two persons'' in which "the claim of one party is
positively opposed by the other"

10

(Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising
from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 17, para. 22; and Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 122-123 , para. 21).

28.
The Court accordingly concludes that at the time that it was seised of the case it
had jurisdiction to deal with it, and that it still has such jurisdiction. Belgium's first
objection must therefore be rejected.

29.
The second objection presented by Belgium is the following:

"That in the light of the fact that Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi is no longer either
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the [Congo] or a minister occupying any other position
in the . . Government [of the Congo], the case is now without object and the Court
should accordingly decline to proceed to judgment on the merits of the case."

30. Belgium also relies in support of this objection on the Northern Cameroons case,
in which the Court considered that it would not be a proper discharge of its duties to
proceed further in a case in which any judgment that the Court might pronounce
would be "without object" (I.C.J. Reports 1963, p. 38), and on the Nuclear Tests cases,
in which the Court saw "no reason to allow the continuance of proceedings which it
knows are bound to be fruitless" (I.C.J. Reports 1974, p. 271 , para. 58; p. 477, para.
61).

Belgium maintains that the declarations requested by the Congo in its first and second
submissions would clearly fall within the principles enunciated by the Court in those
cases, since a judgment of the Court on the merits in this case could only be directed
towards the clarification of the law in this area for the future, or be designed to
reinforce the position of one or other Party. It relies in support of this argument on
the fact that the Congo does not allege any material injury and is not seeking
compensatory damages. It adds that the issue and transmission of the arrest warrant
were not predicated on the ministerial status of the person concerned, that he is no
longer a minister, and that the case is accordingly now devoid of object.

31.
The Congo contests this argument of Belgium, and emphasizes that the aim of
the Congo – to have the disputed arrest warrant annulled and to obtain redress for the
moral injury suffered – remains unachieved at the point in time when the Court is
called upon to decide the dispute. According to the Congo, in order for the case to
have become devoid of object during the proceedings, the cause of the violation of the
right would have had to disappear, and the redress sought would have to have been
obtained.
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32.
The Court has already affirmed on a number of occasions that events occurring
subsequent to the filing of an application may render the application without object
such that the Court is not called upon to give a decision thereon (see Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, p. 26, para. 46; and Questions of
Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.. Reports 1998, p. 131, para. 45).

However, it considers that this is not such a case. The change which has occurred in
the situation of Mr. Yerodia has not in fact put an end to the dispute between the
Parties and has not deprived the Application of its object. The Congo argues that the
arrest warrant issued by the Belgian judicial authorities against Mr. Yerodia was and
remains unlawful. It asks the Court to hold that the warrant is unlawful, thus
providing redress for the moral injury which the warrant allegedly caused to it. The
Congo also continues to seek the cancellation or the warrant. For its part, Belgium
contends that it did not act in violation of international law and it disputes the Congo's
submissions.

In the view of the Court, it follows from the foregoing that the Application of the
Congo is not now without object and that accordingly the case is not moot. Belgium's
second objection must accordingly be rejected.

33.
The third Belgian objection is put as follows:

"That the case as it now stands is materially different to that set out in the
Congo's Application instituting proceedings and that the Court accordingly lacks
jurisdiction in the case and/or that the application is inadmissible."

34. According to Belgium, it would be contrary to legal security and the sound
administration of justice for an applicant State to continue proceedings in
circumstances in which the factual dimension on which the Application was based has
changed fundamentally, since the respondent State would in those circumstances be
uncertain, until the very last moment, of the substance of the claims against it.

12

Belgium argues that the prejudice suffered by the respondent State in this situation is
analogous to the situation in which an applicant State formulates new claims during
the course of the proceedings. It refers to the jurisprudence of the Court holding
inadmissible new claims formulated during the course of the proceedings which, had
they been entertained, would have transformed the subject of the dispute originally
brought before it under the terms of the Application (see Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain
v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 447-448, para.
29). In the circumstances, Belgium contends that, if the Congo wishes to maintain its
claims, it should be required to initiate proceedings afresh or, at the very least, apply
to the Court for permission to amend its initial Application.

35.
In response, the Congo denies that there has been a substantial amendment of
the terms of its Application, and insists that it has presented no new claim, whether of
substance or of form, that would have transformed the subject-matter of the dispute.
The Congo maintains that it has done nothing through the various stages in the
proceedings but "condense and refine" its claims, as do most States that appear
before the Court, and that it is simply making use of the right of parties to amend their
submissions until the end of the oral proceedings.

36.
The Court notes that, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, it "cannot, in
principle, allow a dispute brought before it by application to be transformed by
amendments in the submissions into another dispute which is different in character"
(Societe commerciale de Belgique, Judgment, 1939, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 78, p. 173;
cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 427,
para. 80; see also Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1992, pp. 264-267, in particular paras. 69 and
701).

However, the Court considers that in the present case the facts underlying the
Application have not changed in a way that produced such a transformation in the
dispute brought before it. The question submitted to the Court for decision remains
whether the issue and circulation of the arrest warrant by the Belgian judicial
authorities against a person who was at that time the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Congo were contrary to international law. The Congo's final submissions arise
"directly out of the question which is the subject-matter of that Application" (Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
1974, p. 203, para. 72 ; see also Temple of Preah Vihear, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1962, p. 36).

13

In these circumstances, the Court considers that Belgium cannot validly
maintain that the dispute brought before the Court was transformed in a way that
affected its ability to prepare its defence, or that the requirements of the sound
administration of justice were infringed. Belgium's third objection must accordingly be
rejected.

37.
The fourth Belgian objection reads as follows:

"That, in the light of the new circumstances concerning Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi,
the case has assumed the character of an action of diplomatic protection but one in
which the individual being protected has failed to exhaust local remedies, and that the
Court accordingly lacks jurisdiction in the case and/or that the application is
inadmissible."

38.
In this respect, Belgium accepts that, when the case was first instituted, the
Congo had a direct legal interest in the matter, and was asserting a claim in its own
name in respect of the alleged violation by Belgium of the immunity of the Congo's
Foreign Minister. However, according to Belgium, the case was radically transformed
after the Application was filed, namely on 15 April 2001, when Mr. Yerodia ceased to
be a member of the Congolese Government. Belgium maintains that two of the
requests made of the Court in the Congo's final submissions in practice now concern
the legal effect of an arrest warrant issued against a private citizen of the Congo, and
that these issues fall within the realm of an action of diplomatic protection. It adds
that the individual concerned has not exhausted all available remedies under Belgian
law a necessary condition before the Congo can espouse the cause of one of its
nationals in international proceedings.

39.
The Congo, on the other hand, denies that this is an action for diplomatic
protection. It maintains that it is bringing these proceedings in the name of the
Congolese State, on account of the violation of the immunity of its Minister for Foreign
Affairs. The Congo further denies the availability of remedies under Belgian law. It
points out in this regard that it is only when the Crown Prosecutor has become seised
of the case file and makes submissions to the Chambre du conseil that the accused can
defend himself before the Chambre and seek to have the charge dismissed.

14

40.
The Court notes that the Congo has never sought to invoke before it Mr.
Yerodia's personal rights. It considers that, despite the change in professional
situation of Mr. Yerodia, the character of the dispute submitted to the Court by means
of the Application has not changed: the dispute still concerns the lawfulness of the
arrest warrant issued on 11 April 2000 against a person who was at the time Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Congo, and the question whether the rights of the Congo
have or have not been violated by that warrant. As the Congo is not acting in the
context of protection of one of its nationals, Belgium cannot rely upon the rules
relating to the exhaustion of local remedies.

In any event, the Court recalls that an objection based on non-exhaustion of
local remedies relates to the admissibility of the application (see Interhandel.
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 26; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A.
(ELSI), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 42, para. 49).

Under settled jurisprudence, the critical date for determining the admissibility of an
application is the date on which it is filed (see Questions of Interpretation and
Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie ( Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 25-26, paras. 43-44; and Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, l.C.J. Reports 1998, pp. 130-131 , paras. 42-43).

Belgium accepts that, on the date on which the Congo filed the Application instituting
proceedings, the Congo had a direct legal interest in the matter, and was asserting a
claim in its own name. Belgium's fourth objection must accordingly be rejected.

41. As a subsidiary argument, Belgium further contends that "[i]n the event that the
Court decides that it does have jurisdiction in this case and that the application is
admissible, . . . the non ultra petita [“not beyond the request”] rule operates to limit
the jurisdiction of the Court to those issues that are the subject of the [Congo]'s final
submissions".

Belgium points out that, while the Congo initially advanced a twofold argument,
based, on the one hand, on the Belgian judge's lack of jurisdiction, and, on the other,
on the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by its Minister for Foreign Affairs, the
Congo no longer claims in its final submissions that Belgium wrongly conferred upon
itself universal jurisdiction in absentia. According to Belgium, the Congo now confines
itself to arguing that the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 was unlawful because it
violated the immunity from jurisdiction of its Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that the
Court consequently cannot rule on the issue of universal jurisdiction in any decision it
renders on the merits of the case.
15


42.
The Congo, for its part, states that its interest in bringing these proceedings is to
obtain a finding by the Court that it has been the victim of an internationally wrongful
act, the question whether this case involves the "exercise of an excessive universal
jurisdiction” being in this connection only a secondary consideration. The Congo
asserts that any consideration by the Court of the issues of international law raised by
universal jurisdiction would be undertaken not at the request of the Congo but, rather,
by virtue of the defence strategy adopted by Belgium, which appears to maintain that
the exercise of such jurisdiction can "represent a valid counterweight to the
observance of immunities".

43.
The Court would recall the well-established principle that "it is the duty of the
Court not only to reply to the questions as stated in the final submissions of the
parties, but also to abstain from deciding points not included in those submissions"
(Asylum, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 402). While the Court is thus not entitled to
decide upon questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita [“not beyond the request”]
rule nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal points in its
reasoning.

Thus in the present case the Court may not rule, in the operative part of its Judgment,
on the question whether the disputed arrest warrant, issued by the Belgian
investigating judge in exercise of his purported universal jurisdiction, complied in that
regard with the rules and principles of international law governing the jurisdiction of
national courts. This does not mean, however, that the Court may not deal with
certain aspects of that question in the reasoning of its Judgment, should it deem this
necessary or desirable.

44.
The Court concludes from the foregoing that it has jurisdiction to entertain the
Congo's Application, that the Application is not without object and that accordingly
the case is not moot and that the Application is admissible.



16


Thus, the Court now turns to the merits of the case.

45. As indicated above (see paragraphs 41 to 43 above), in its Application instituting
these proceedings, the Congo originally challenged the legality of the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000 on two separate grounds: on the one hand, Belgium's claim to exercise a
universal jurisdiction and, on the other, the alleged violation of the immunities of the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo then in office. However, in its submissions in
its Memorial, and in its final submissions at the close of the oral proceedings, the
Congo invokes only the latter ground.

46. As a matter of logic, the second ground should be addressed only once there
has been a determination in respect of the first, since it is only where a State has
jurisdiction under international law in relation to a particular matter that there can be
any question of immunities in regard to the exercise of that jurisdiction. However, in
the present case, and in view of the final form of the Congo's submissions, the Court
will address first the question whether, assuming that it had jurisdiction under
international law to issue and circulate the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000, Belgium in
so doing violated the immunities of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo.

47.
The Congo maintains that, during his or her term of office, a Minister for Foreign
Affairs of a sovereign State is entitled to inviolability and to immunity from criminal
process being "absolute or complete", that is to say, they are subject to no exception.
Accordingly, the Congo contends that no criminal prosecution may be brought against
a Minister for Foreign Affairs in a foreign court as long as he or she remains in office,
and that any finding of criminal responsibility by a domestic court in a foreign country,
or any act of investigation undertaken with a view to bringing him or her to court,
would contravene the principle of immunity from jurisdiction.

According to the Congo, the basis of such criminal immunity is purely functional, and
immunity is accorded under customary international law simply in order to enable the
foreign State representative enjoying such immunity to perform his or her functions
freely and without let or hindrance. The Congo adds that the immunity thus accorded
to Ministers for Foreign Affairs when in office covers all their acts, including any
committed before they took office, and that it is irrelevant whether the acts done
whilst in office may be characterized or not as "official acts".

17

48.
The Congo states further that it does not deny the existence of a principle of
international criminal law, deriving from the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo
international military tribunals, that the accused's official capacity at the time of the
acts cannot, before any court, whether domestic or international, constitute a "ground
of exemption from his criminal responsibility or a ground for mitigation of sentence".
The Congo then stresses that the fact that an immunity might bar prosecution before a
specific court or over a specific period does not mean that the same prosecution
cannot be brought, if appropriate, before another court which is not bound by that
immunity, or at another time when the immunity need no longer be taken into
account. It concludes that immunity does not mean impunity.

49. Belgium maintains for its part that, while Ministers for Foreign Affairs in office
generally enjoy an immunity from jurisdiction before the courts of a foreign State,
such immunity applies only to acts carried out in the course of their official functions,
and cannot protect such persons in respect of private acts or when they are acting
otherwise than in the performance of their official functions.

50. Belgium further states that, in the circumstances of the present case, Mr.
Yerodia enjoyed no immunity at the time when he is alleged to have committed the
acts of which he is accused, and that there is no evidence that he was then acting in
any official capacity. It observes that the arrest warrant was issued against Mr.
Yerodia personally.

51.
The Court would observe at the outset that in international law it is firmly
established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-
ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister
for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and
criminal. For the purposes of the present case, it is only the immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that fall
for the Court to consider.

52. A certain number of treaty instruments were cited by the Parties in this regard.
These included, first, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961,
which states in its preamble that the purpose of diplomatic privileges and immunities
is "to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as
representing States". It provides in Article 32 that only the sending State may waive
such immunity. On these points, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to
which both the Congo and Belgium are parties, reflects customary international law.
The same applies to the corresponding provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations of 24 April 1 963, to which the Congo and Belgium are also parties.

18

The Congo and Belgium further cite the New York Convention on Special
Missions of 8 December 1969, to which they are not, however, parties. They recall
that under Article 21, paragraph 2, of that Convention:

"The Head of the Government, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other
persons of high rank, when they take part in a special mission of the sending State,
shall enjoy in the receiving State or in a third State, in addition to what is granted by
the present Convention, the facilities, privileges and immunities accorded by
international law."

These conventions provide useful guidance on certain aspects of the question of
immunities. They do not, however, contain any provision specifically defining the
immunities enjoyed by Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It is consequently on the basis of
customary international law that the Court must decide the questions relating to the
immunities of such Ministers raised in the present case.

53.
In customary international law, the immunities accorded to Ministers for
Foreign Affairs are not granted for their personal benefit, but to ensure the effective
performance of their functions on behalf of their respective States. In order to
determine the extent of these immunities, the Court must therefore first consider the
nature of the functions exercised by a Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He or she is in charge of his or her Government's diplomatic activities and generally
acts as its representative in international negotiations and intergovernmental
meetings. Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents carry out their duties under his
or her authority. His or her acts may bind the State represented, and there is a
presumption that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, simply by virtue of that office, has full
powers to act on behalf of the State (see, for example, Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

In the performance of these functions, he or she is frequently required to travel
internationally, and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need
should arise. He or she must also be in constant communication with the
Government, and with its diplomatic missions around the world, and be capable at any
time of communicating with representatives of other States.

19

The Court further observes that a Minister for Foreign Affairs, responsible for the
conduct of his or her State's relations with all other States, occupies a position such
that, like the Head of State or the Head of Government, he or she is recognized under
international law as representative of the State solely by virtue of his or her office. He
or she does not have to present letters of credence: to the contrary, it is generally the
Minister who determines the authority to be conferred upon diplomatic agents and
countersigns their letters of credence. Finally, it is to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
that charges d'affaires are accredited.

54.
The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign
Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, he or she when
abroad enjoys full immunity [‘absolute immunity’] from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned
against any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the
performance of his or her duties.

55.
In this respect, no distinction can be drawn between acts performed by a
Minister for Foreign Affairs in an "official" capacity, and those claimed to have been
performed in a "private capacity", or, for that matter, between acts performed before
the person concerned assumed office as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acts
committed during the period of office.

Thus, if a Minister for Foreign Affairs is arrested in another State on a criminal charge,
he or she is clearly thereby prevented from exercising the functions of his or her office.
The consequences of such impediment to the exercise of those official functions are
equally serious, regardless of whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs was, at the time
of arrest, present in the territory of the arresting State on an "official" visit or a
"private" visit, regardless of whether the arrest relates to acts allegedly performed
before the person became the Minister for Foreign Affairs or to acts performed while
in office, and regardless of whether the arrest relates to alleged acts performed in an
"official" capacity or a "private" capacity.

Furthermore, even the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting another State a
Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal proceedings
could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the
purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.

56.
The Court will now address Belgium's argument that immunities accorded to
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs can in no case protect them where they are
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. In support of
this position, Belgium refers in its Counter-Memorial to various legal instruments
creating international criminal tribunals, to examples from national legislation, and to
the jurisprudence of national and international courts.
20


Belgium begins by pointing out that certain provisions of the instruments
creating international criminal tribunals state expressly that the official capacity of a
person shall not be a bar to the exercise by such tribunals of their jurisdiction.

Belgium also places emphasis on certain decisions of national courts, and in
particular on the judgments rendered on 24 March 1999 by the House of Lords in the
United Kingdom and on 13 March 2001 by the Court of Cassation in France in the
Pinochet and Qaddafi cases respectively, in which it contends that an exception to the
immunity rule was accepted in the case of serious crimes under international law.

Thus, according to Belgium, the Pinochet decision recognizes an exception to the
immunity rule when Lord Millett stated that "[i]nternational law cannot be supposed
to have established a crime having the character of a jus cogens and at the same time
to have provided an immunity which is coextensive with the obligation it seeks to
impose", or when Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers said that "no established rule of
international law requires state immunity ratione materiae to be accorded in respect
of prosecution for an international crime".

As to the French Court of Cassation, Belgium contends that, in holding that, "under
international law as it currently stands, the crime alleged [acts of terrorism],
irrespective of its gravity, does not come within the exceptions to the principle of
immunity from jurisdiction for incumbent foreign Heads of State", the Court explicitly
recognized the existence of such exceptions.

57.
The Congo, for its part, states that, under international law as it currently
stands, there is no basis for asserting that there is any exception to the principle of
absolute immunity from criminal process of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs
where he or she is accused of having committed crimes under international law. In
support of this contention, the Congo refers to State practice, giving particular
consideration in this regard to the Pinochet and Qaddafi cases, and concluding that
such practice does not correspond to that which Belgium claims but, on the contrary,
confirms the absolute nature of the immunity from criminal process of Heads of State
and Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

Thus, in the Pinochet case, the Congo cites Lord Browne Wilkinson's statement that
"[t]his immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power and an ambassador in post is a
complete immunity [‘absolute immunity’] attached to the person of the head of state
or ambassador and rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions . . . ".

21

According to the Congo, the French Court of Cassation adopted the same position in
its Qaddafi judgment, in affirming that "international custom bars the prosecution of
incumbent Heads of State, in the absence of any contrary international provision
binding on the parties concerned, before the criminal courts of a foreign State".

As regards the instruments creating international criminal tribunals and the
latter's jurisprudence, these, in the Congo's view, concern only those tribunals, and no
inference can be drawn from them in regard to criminal proceedings before national
courts against persons enjoying immunity under international law.

58.
The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national legislation
and those few decisions of national higher courts, such as the House of Lords or the
French Court of Cassation. It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there
exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule according
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for
Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes
against humanity.

The Court has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or criminal
responsibility of persons having an official capacity contained in the legal instruments
creating international criminal tribunals, and which are specifically applicable to the
latter (see Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, Art. 7; Charter
of the International Military Tribunal of Tokyo, Art. 6; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Art. 7, para. 2; Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, para. 2; Statute of the International Criminal
Court, Art. 27). It finds that these rules likewise do not enable it to conclude that any
such an exception exists in customary international law in regard to national courts.

Finally, none of the decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military
tribunals, or of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, cited by
Belgium deal with the question of the immunities of incumbent Ministers for Foreign
Affairs before national courts where they are accused of having committed war crimes
or crimes against humanity. The Court accordingly notes that those decisions are in no
way at variance with the findings it has reached above.

In view of the foregoing, the Court accordingly cannot accept Belgium's
argument in this regard.



22


59.
It should further be noted that the rules governing the jurisdiction of national
courts must be carefully distinguished from those governing jurisdictional immunities:
Jurisdiction does not imply absence of immunity, while absence of immunity does not
imply jurisdiction.

Thus, although various international conventions or the prevention and punishment of
certain serious crimes impose on States obligations of prosecution or extradition,
thereby requiring them to extend their criminal jurisdiction, such extension of
jurisdiction in no way affects immunities under customary international law, including
those of Ministers for Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of a
foreign State, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these
conventions.

60.
The Court emphasizes, however, that the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in
respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite
separate concepts. While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal
responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar
prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person
to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.

61. Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an incumbent
or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a bar to criminal prosecution in
certain circumstances.

First, such persons enjoy no criminal immunity under international law in their
own countries, and may thus be tried by those countries' courts in accordance with
the relevant rules of domestic law.

Secondly, they will cease to enjoy immunity from foreign jurisdiction if the State
which they represent or have represented decides to waive that immunity.

Thirdly, after a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs,
he or she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in
other States. Provided that it has jurisdiction under international law, a court of one
State may try a former Minister for Foreign Affairs of another State in respect of acts
committed prior or subsequent to his or her period of office, as well as in respect of
acts committed during that period of office in a private capacity.

23

Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be subject to
criminal proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have
jurisdiction. Examples include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant
to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and
the future International Criminal Court created by the 1998 Rome Convention. The
latter's Statute expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that "[i]mmunities or
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its
jurisdiction over such a person".

62. Given the conclusions it has reached above concerning the nature and scope of
the rules governing the immunity from criminal jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent
Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Court must now consider whether in the present case
the issue of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and its international circulation
violated those rules. The Court recalls in this regard that the Congo requests it, in its
first final submission, to adjudge and declare that:

"[B]y issuing and internationally circulating the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000
against Mr. Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, Belgium committed a violation in regard to
the Democratic Republic of the Congo of the rule of customary international law
concerning the absolute inviolability and immunity from criminal process of incumbent
foreign ministers; in so doing, it violated the principle of sovereign equality among
States."

63.
In support of this submission, the Congo maintains that the arrest warrant of 11
April 2000 as such represents a "coercive legal act" which violates the Congo's
immunity and sovereign rights, inasmuch as it seeks to "subject to an organ of
domestic criminal jurisdiction a member of a foreign government who is in principle
beyond its reach" and is fully enforceable without special formality in Belgium.

The Congo considers that the mere issuance of the warrant thus constituted a
coercive measure taken against the person of Mr. Yerodia, even if it was not executed.

24

64. As regards the international circulation of the said arrest warrant, this, in the
Congo's view, not only involved further violations of the rules referred to above, but
also aggravated the moral injury which it suffered as a result of the opprobrium "thus
cast upon one of the most prominent members of its Government". The Congo
further argues that such circulation was a fundamental infringement of its sovereign
rights in that it significantly restricted the full and free exercise, by its Minister for
Foreign Affairs, of the international negotiation and representation functions
entrusted to him by the Congo's former President. In the Congo's view, Belgium
"[thus] manifests an intention to have the individual concerned arrested at the place
where he is to be found, with a view to procuring his extradition".

The Congo emphasizes moreover that it is necessary to avoid any confusion between
the arguments concerning the legal effect of the arrest warrant abroad and the
question of any responsibility of the foreign authorities giving effect to it. It points out
in this regard that no State has acted on the arrest warrant, and that accordingly "no
further consideration need be given to the specific responsibility which a State
executing it might incur, or to the way in which that responsibility should be related"
to that of the Belgian State. The Congo observes that, in such circumstances, "there
[would be] a direct causal relationship between the arrest warrant issued in Belgium
and any act of enforcement carried out elsewhere".

65. Belgium rejects the Congo's argument on the ground that "the character of the
arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 is such that it has neither infringed the sovereignty of,
nor created any obligation for, the [Congo]".

With regard to the legal effects under Belgian law of the arrest warrant of 11
April 2000, Belgium contends that the clear purpose of the warrant was to procure
that, if found in Belgium, Mr. Yerodia would be detained by the relevant Belgian
authorities with a view to his prosecution for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
According to Belgium, the Belgian investigating judge did, however, draw an explicit
distinction in the warrant between, on the one hand, immunity from jurisdiction and,
on the other hand, immunity from enforcement as regards representatives of foreign
States who visit Belgium on the basis of an official invitation, making it clear that such
persons would be immune from enforcement of an arrest warrant in Belgium.
Belgium further contends that, in its effect, the disputed arrest warrant is national in
character, since it requires the arrest of Mr. Yerodia if he is found in Belgium but it
does not have this effect outside Belgium.

25

66.
In respect of the legal effects of the arrest warrant outside Belgium, Belgium
maintains that the warrant does not create any obligation for the authorities of any
other State to arrest Mr. Yeodia in the absence of some further step by Belgium
completing or validating the arrest warrant (such as a request for the provisional
detention of Mr. Yerodia), or the issuing of an arrest warrant by the appropriate
authorities in the State concerned following a request to do so, or the issuing of an
Interpol Red Notice. Accordingly, outside Belgium, while the purpose of the warrant
was admittedly "to establish a legal basis for the arrest of Mr. Yerodia . . . and his
subsequent extradition to Belgium", the warrant had no legal effect unless it was
validated or completed by some prior act "requiring the arrest of Mr. Yerodia by the
relevant authorities in a third State". Belgium further argues that "[i]f a State had
executed the arrest warrant, it might infringe Mr. [Yerodia's] criminal immunity", but
that "the Party directly responsible for that infringement would have been that State
and not Belgium''.

67.
The Court will first recall that the "international arrest warrant in absentia",
issued on 11 April 2000 by an investigating judge of the Brussels Tribunal de premiere
instance, is directed against Mr. Yerodia, stating that he is "currently Minister for
Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, having his business address at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kinshasa". The warrant states that Mr. Yerodia is
charged with being "the perpetrator or co-perpetrator" of:

-- Crimes under international law constituting grave breaches causing harm by
act or omission to persons and property protected by the Conventions signed at
Geneva on 12 August 1949 and by Additional Protocols I and II to those Conventions
(Article I, paragraph 3, of the Law of 16 June 1993, as amended by the Law of 10
February 1999 concerning the punishment of serious violations of international
humanitarian law)

-- Crimes against humanity (Article I, paragraph 2, of the Law of 16 June 1993, as
amended by the Law of 10 February 1999 concerning the punishment of serious
violations of international humanitarian law)."

The warrant refers to "various speeches inciting racial hatred" and to
"particularly virulent remarks" allegedly made by Mr. Yerodia during "public addresses
reported by the media" on 4 August and 27 August 1998. It adds:

"These speeches allegedly had the effect of inciting the population to attack
Tutsi residents of Kinshasa: there were dragnet searches, manhunts (the Tutsi enemy)
and lynchings.

26

The speeches inciting racial hatred thus are said to have resulted in several
hundred deaths, the internment of Tutsis, summary executions, arbitrary arrests and
unfair trials."

68.
The warrant further states that "the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs
currently held by the accused does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and
enforcement". The investigating judge does, however, observe in the warrant that
"the rule concerning the absence of immunity under humanitarian law would appear .
. . to require some qualification in respect of immunity from enforcement" and
explains as follows:

"Pursuant to the general principle of fairness in judicial proceedings, immunity
from enforcement must, in our view, be accorded to all State representatives
welcomed as such on to the territory of Belgium (on 'official visits'). Welcoming such
foreign dignitaries as official representatives of sovereign States involves not only
relations between individuals but also relations between States. This implies that such
welcome includes an undertaking by the host State and its various components to
refrain from taking any coercive measures against its guest and the invitation cannot
become a pretext for ensnaring the individual concerned in what would then have to
be labelled a trap. In the contrary case, failure to respect this undertaking could give
rise to the host State's international responsibility."

69.
The arrest warrant concludes with the following order:

"We instruct and order all bailiffs and agents of public authority who may be so
required to execute this arrest warrant and to conduct the accused to the detention
centre in Forest;

We order the warden of the prison to receive the accused and to keep him (her)
in custody in the detention centre pursuant to this arrest warrant;

We require all those exercising public authority to whom this warrant shall be
shown to lend all assistance in executing it."

27

70.
The Court notes that the issuance, as such, of the disputed arrest warrant
represents an act by the Belgian judicial authorities intended to enable the arrest on
Belgian territory of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs on charges of war crimes
and crimes against humanity. The fact that the warrant is enforceable is clearly
apparent from the order given to "all bailiffs and agents of public authority . . . to
execute this arrest warrant" (see paragraph 69 above) and from the assertion in the
warrant that "the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs currently held by the accused
does not entail immunity from jurisdiction and enforcement". The Court notes that
the warrant did admittedly make an exception for the case of an official visit by Mr.
Yerodih to Belgium, and that Mr. Yerodia never suffered arrest in Belgium.

The Court is bound, however, to find that, given the nature and purpose of the
warrant, its mere issue violated the immunity which Mr. Yerodia enjoyed as the
Congo's incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly concludes that
the issue of the warrant constituted a violation of an obligation of Belgium towards
the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity of that Minister and, more
particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then
enjoyed by him under international law.

71.
The Court also notes that Belgium admits that the purpose of the international
circulation of the disputed arrest warrant was "to establish a legal basis for the arrest
of Mr. Yerodia . . . abroad and his subsequent extradition to Belgium". The
Respondent maintains, however, that the enforcement of the warrant in third States
was "dependent on some further preliminary steps having been taken" and that, given
the "inchoate" quality of the warrant as regards third States, there was no
"infringe[ment of] the sovereignty of the [Congo]". It further points out that no
Interpol Red Notice was requested until 12 September 2001, when Mr. Yerodia no
longer held ministerial office.

The Court cannot subscribe to this view. As in the case of the warrant's issue, its
international circulation from June 2000 by the Belgian authorities, given its nature
and purpose, effectively infringed Mr. Yerodia's immunity as the Congo's incumbent
Minister for Foreign Affairs and was furthermore liable to affect the Congo's conduct
of its international relations. Since Mr. Yerodia was called upon in that capacity to
undertake travel in the performance of his duties, the mere international circulation of
the warrant, even in the absence of "further steps" by Belgium, could have resulted, in
particular, in his arrest while abroad.

28

The Court observes in this respect that Belgium itself cites information to the effect
that Mr. Yerodia, "on applying for a visa to go to two countries, [apparently] learned
that he ran the risk of being arrested as a result of the arrest warrant issued against
him by Belgium", adding that "[t]his, moreover, is what the [Congo] . . . hints when it
writes that the arrest warrant 'sometimes forced Minister Yerodia to travel by
roundabout routes'”.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the circulation of the warrant, whether or not it
significantly interfered with Mr. Yerodia's diplomatic activity, constituted a violation of
an obligation of Belgium towards the Congo, in that it failed to respect the immunity
of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and, more particularly,
infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability then enjoyed by
him under international law.

72.
The Court will now address the issue of the remedies sought by the Congo on
account of Belgium's violation of the above-mentioned rules of international law. In
its second, third and fourth submissions, the Congo requests the Court to adjudge and
declare that:

"A formal finding by the Court of the unlawfulness of [the issue and
international circulation of the arrest warrant] constitutes an appropriate form of
satisfaction, providing reparation for the consequent moral injury to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo;

The violations of international law underlying the issue and international
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 preclude any State, including
Belgium, from executing it;

Belgium shall be required to recall and cancel the arrest warrant of 11 April
2000 and to inform the foreign authorities to whom the warrant was circulated that
Belgium renounces its request for their cooperation in executing the unlawful
warrant."

73.
In support of those submissions, the Congo asserts that the termination of the
official duties of Mr. Yerodia in no way operated to efface the wrongful act and the
injury flowing from it, which continue to exist. It argues that the warrant is unlawful
ab initio, that "[i]t is fundamentally flawed" and that it cannot therefore have any legal
effect today. It points out that the purpose of its request is reparation for the injury
caused, requiring the restoration of the situation which would in all probability have
existed if the said act had not been committed. It states that, inasmuch as the
wrongful act consisted in an internal legal instrument, only the "withdrawal" and
"cancellation" of the latter can provide appropriate reparation.

29

The Congo further emphasizes that in no way is it asking the Court itself to
withdraw or cancel the warrant, nor to determine the means whereby Belgium is to
comply with its decision. It explains that the withdrawal and cancellation of the
warrant, by the means that Belgium deems most suitable, "are not means of
enforcement of the judgment of the Court but the requested measure of legal
reparation/restitution itself'. The Congo maintains that the Court is consequently only
being requested to declare that Belgium, by way of reparation for the injury to the
rights of the Congo, be required to withdraw and caned this warrant by the means of
its choice.

74. Belgium for its part maintains that a finding by the Court that the immunity
enjoyed by Mr. Yerodia as Minister for Foreign Affairs had been violated would in no
way entail an obligation to cancel the arrest warrant. It points out that the arrest
warrant is still operative and that "there is no suggestion that it presently infringes the
immunity of the Congo's Minister for Foreign Affairs". Belgium considers that what
the Congo is in reality asking of the Court in its third and fourth final submissions is
that the Court should direct Belgium as to the method by which it should give effect to
a judgment of the Court finding that the warrant had infringed the immunity of the
Congo's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

75.
The Court has already concluded (see paragraphs 70 and 71) that the issue and
circulation of the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 by the Belgian authorities failed to
respect the immunity of the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo and,
more particularly, infringed the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the
inviolability then enjoyed by Mr. Yerodia under international law. Those acts engaged
Belgium's international responsibility. The Court considers that the findings so
reached by it constitute a form of satisfaction which will make good the moral injury
complained of by the Congo.

76. However, as the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in its Judgment
of 13 September 1928 in the case concerning the Factory at Chorzow:

"[t]he essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act – a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by
the decisions of arbitral tribunals – is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out
all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed'' (P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17,
p. 47).

30

In the present case, “the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if
[the illegal act] had not been committed'' cannot be re-established merely by a finding
by the Court that the arrest warrant was unlawful under international law. The
warrant is still extant, and remains unlawful, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Yendia
has ceased to be Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Court accordingly considers that
Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the warrant in question and so
inform the authorities to whom it was circulated.

77.
The Court sees no need for any further remedy: In particular, the Court cannot,
in a judgment ruling on a dispute between the Congo and Belgium, indicate what that
judgment's implications might be for third States, and the Court cannot therefore
accept the Congo's submissions on this point.

78.
For these reasons,

THE COURT,

(1)
(A)
By fifteen votes to one,

Rejects the objections of the Kingdom of Belgium relating to jurisdiction, mootness
and admissibility;

(B)
By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the Application filed by the Democratic
Republic of the Congo on 17 October 2000;

(C)
By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not without
object and that accordingly the case is not moot;

(D) By fifteen votes to one,

Finds that the Application of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is admissible;



31


(2)
By thirteen votes to three,

Finds that the issue against Mr. Abdulaye Yerndia Ndombasi of the arrest warrant of
11 April 2000, and its international circulation, constituted violations of a legal
obligation of the Kingdom of Belgium towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
in that they failed to respect the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the
inviolability which the incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo enjoyed under international law;

(3)
By ten votes to six,

Finds that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of its own choosing, cancel the
arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant
was circulated.

Done in French and in English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace,
The Hague, this fourteenth day of February, two thousand and two, in three copies,
one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others transmitted to
the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Government of the
Kingdom of Belgium, respectively.

(Signed)
Gilbert GUILLAUME,
President.

(Signed)
Philippe COUVREUR,
Registrar.