0




HONORING COURAGE, IMPROVING SECURITY, AND
FIGHTING THE EXPLOITATION OF A TRAGEDY




Report of the Democratic Members
June 2016

















Select Committee on the Events Surrounding
the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi
Elijah Cummings (MD), Ranking Member
Adam Smith (WA)

Adam Schiff (CA)

Linda Sanchez (CA)
Tammy Duckworth (IL)


June 27, 2016
democrats-benghazi.house.gov

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1
FINDINGS
15
I.
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE CONFIRMS
CORE FINDINGS OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS
17
A. Courage and Heroism of First Responders
18
1. Response of Diplomatic Security Agents
21
2. Response of Annex Personnel
35
3. Response of Tripoli Security Team
41
4. Lifesaving Medical Care
47
B. The Department of Defense
53
1. Military Response Could Not Have Prevented Deaths in Benghazi
55
2. Military Posture Prevented More Rapid Response, and Significant
Improvements Made Years Ago
73
3. Unsubstantiated Claim of Intentional Delay or “Stand Down”
78
C. The Department of State
104
1. Security in Benghazi Was Woefully Inadequate
106
2. Secretary Clinton Never Personally Denied Security Requests
132
3. Secretary Clinton Was Active and Engaged
135
4. Terrorists Caused Attacks in Benghazi, Not U.S. Foreign Policy
143
5. Unsubstantiated Claim That Documents Were “Scrubbed”
149
6. ARB Review Was Independent, Thorough, and Efficient
155
D. The Intelligence Community
165
1. No Advance Warning of the Attacks
167
2. CIA Security Team Temporarily Delayed to Seek Local Support
171
3. Unsubstantiated Claim that CIA Shipped Arms From Libya to Another
Country
181
4. Intelligence Assessments Evolved as More Information Became
Available
184
5. No Evidence Intelligence Assessments or Talking Points Politicized
200
E. No Intentionally Misleading Public Statements
214
1. Secretary Clinton’s Statements
217
2. Ambassador Rice’s Statements
228
II.
SELECT COMMITTEE SQUANDERED MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN A
PARTISAN EFFORT TO ATTACK A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
259
A. Republicans admitted that their purpose in establishing the Select
Committee was to attack Secretary Clinton’s candidacy for President.
262

B. Republicans targeted Secretary Clinton from the beginning.
263
C. Republicans proceeded with no Select Committee rules.
264
D. Republicans proceeded with an unlimited timeline and budget.
265
E. Republicans refused to define the scope of their investigation or identify the
questions the Select Committee was trying to answer.
266
F. Republicans abandoned their own hearing plan to focus on Secretary
Clinton.
267
G. Republicans excluded Democrats from interviews and concealed
exculpatory evidence.
268
H. Republicans selectively released Sidney Blumenthal’s emails after
proclaiming that “serious investigations” do not make selective releases.
271
I. Republicans subpoenaed Sidney Blumenthal to conduct political opposition
research that has nothing to do with the attacks in Benghazi.
273
J. Republicans blocked the release of Sidney Blumenthal’s deposition
transcript showing numerous questions about the Clinton Foundation.
276
K. Republicans leaked inaccurate information about Cheryl Mills’ interview,
forcing Democrats to release her transcript to correct the public record.
281
L. Republicans began withholding interview transcripts in violation of House
rules to retaliate against Democratic efforts to correct the public record.
282
M. Republicans inaccurately accused Secretary Clinton of compromising a
covert CIA source.
285
N. Republicans held an 11-hour hearing with Secretary Clinton that was widely
condemned even by conservative commentators.
286
O. Republicans inaccurately inflated their interview numbers to counter
criticism of their glacial pace.
288
P. Republicans inaccurately claimed the State Department had not provided a
single “scrap” of paper.
288
Q. Republicans inaccurately claimed that no other committee had ever received
Ambassador Stevens’ emails.
289
R. Republicans issued a unilateral subpoena to retaliate against the Department
of Defense for exposing the Select Committee’s abuses.
290
S. Republicans exploited the attacks in Benghazi to raise money for political
campaigns.
292
T. Republicans threatened to withhold $700 million in State Department
funding supposedly to speed up document production.
294
U. Republicans ignored a letter from 33 current and former U.S. ambassadors
explaining how the State Department actually works.
295

V. Republicans abandoned the Select Committee’s final two hearings on
improving security.
297
W. Republicans took a costly and unnecessary congressional delegation to Italy
and Germany.
299
X. Republicans used taxpayer funds to conduct one of the longest and most
partisan congressional investigations in history.
300
Y. Republicans drafted their partisan final report in secret with no input
whatsoever from nearly half of the Select Committee’s members.
301
Z. Republicans forfeited any credibility by delaying their report until the eve of
the presidential conventions.
302
RECOMMENDATIONS
313
CONCLUSION
336

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Democratic Members of the Benghazi Select Committee submit this report in honor
of the memories of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen
Doherty; the other extraordinary heroes in Benghazi and Tripoli who risked life and limb to help
their fellow Americans; and the men and women of the Defense Department, State Department,
and Intelligence Community who serve the United States every day around the world.
We deeply regret that this report is not bipartisan. In May, we asked Chairman Trey
Gowdy to work with us on a joint report with conclusions we could all agree on, followed by
areas on which we may disagree. We also offered to provide him with a draft of our report in
advance. But Chairman Gowdy mocked our request as “mildly amusing.”
We are issuing our own report today because, after spending more than two years and $7
million in taxpayer funds in one of the longest and most partisan congressional investigations in
history, it is long past time for the Select Committee to conclude its work. Despite our repeated
requests over the last several months, Republicans have refused to provide us with a draft of their
report—or even a basic outline—making it impossible for us to provide input and obvious that
we are being shut out of the process until the last possible moment.
Our overarching conclusion is that the evidence obtained by the Select Committee
confirms the core findings already issued by many previous investigations into the attacks in
Benghazi. Although the Select Committee obtained additional details that provide context and
granularity, these details do not fundamentally alter the previous conclusions.
Section I of our report begins by highlighting the bravery of our first responders on the
night of the attacks. U.S. personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli conducted themselves with
extraordinary courage and heroism and at grave personal risk to defend and rescue their fellow
Americans. Our report provides poignant new details about how their actions saved lives.
Our report makes 21 findings based on the evidence we obtained, and it debunks many
conspiracy theories about the attacks. In general, the report finds:
 The Defense Department could not have done anything differently on the night of the
attacks that would have saved the lives of the four brave Americans killed in
Benghazi, and although the military’s global posture prevented it from responding
more quickly that night, improvements were made years ago.
 The State Department’s security measures in Benghazi were woefully inadequate as a
result of decisions made by officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, but
Secretary Clinton never personally denied any requests for additional security in
Benghazi.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


2
 The Intelligence Community’s assessments evolved after the attacks as more
information became available, but they were not influenced by political
considerations.
 Administration officials did not make intentionally misleading statements about the
attacks, but instead relied on information they were provided at the time under fast-
moving circumstances.
There are some findings this report does not make. For example, an offensive, anti-
Muslim video sparked protests and anti-American violence in Cairo and throughout the region,
but it remains unclear to this day precisely what motivated all of the individuals in Benghazi on
the night of the attacks. During his interview with the Select Committee just this past March, the
former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), General David Petraeus, told us:
I’m still not absolutely certain what absolutely took place, whether it was a
mix of people that are demonstrating with attackers in there, whether this is an
organized demonstration to launch an attack, whether—because you’ll recall,
there’s a lot of SIGINT [signals intelligence] that we uncovered that very
clearly seemed to indicate that there was a protest and it grew out of the
protest. … And there is a video of what took place. And they are just basically
milling around out there. So if this is an attack, you know, maybe they
rehearsed it to look like a protest, but maybe it was actually a mix. And so,
again, I’m still not completely set in my own mind of what—and to be candid
with you, I am not sure that the amount of scrutiny spent on this has been in
the least bit worth it.
Section II of our report documents the grave abuses that Select Committee Republicans
engaged in during this investigation.
Republicans excluded Democrats from interviews, concealed exculpatory evidence,
withheld interview transcripts, leaked inaccurate information, issued unilateral subpoenas, sent
armed Marshals to the home of a cooperative witness, and even conducted political fundraising
by exploiting the deaths of four Americans.
In one of the most serious abuses, Chairman Gowdy personally and publicly accused
Secretary Clinton of compromising a highly classified intelligence source. Although the
Intelligence Community quickly debunked his claim, Chairman Gowdy has yet to apologize to
Secretary Clinton for his slanderous accusation.
In our opinion, Chairman Gowdy has been conducting this investigation like an
overzealous prosecutor desperately trying to land a front-page conviction rather than a neutral
judge of facts seeking to improve the security of our diplomatic corps.
Decades in the future, historians will look back on this investigation as a case study in
how not to conduct a credible investigation. They will showcase the proliferation of Republican
abuses as a chief example of what happens when politicians are allowed to use unlimited
taxpayer dollars—and the formidable power of Congress—to attack their political foes.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


3
The Republican plan was laid bare when Majority Leader Kevin McCarthy admitted on
national television that House Republicans established the Select Committee to bring down
Secretary Clinton’s poll numbers.
The delay by Republicans in issuing their report is no accident. They have waited until
directly before the presidential conventions for maximum political impact, but the American
people see through this partisan ploy. Republicans have tried to blame everyone else for their
own delays, but their claims are ludicrous. Republicans have forfeited their credibility by
delaying this report repeatedly in order to push it into the presidential election year.
In addition to issuing our report today, we are posting online all of the unclassified
interview transcripts under our control so the American people can judge for themselves the
integrity of this investigation and its findings.
This set of transcripts is not complete. Since February, Chairman Gowdy has withheld
copies of transcripts from Democratic Members in violation of House rules. In order to use
portions of these transcripts in this report, our staff members were often forced to take notes by
hand in Chairman Gowdy’s offices during limited time periods with Republican “minders”
present.
Chairman Gowdy also continues to block the release of the transcript of Sidney
Blumenthal’s deposition, during which the Chairman and other Republicans asked hundreds of
questions unrelated to the attacks in Benghazi in an effort to conduct political opposition
research on Secretary Clinton’s colleagues and supporters. References in our report to this
transcript must remain redacted until Chairman Gowdy reverses his position and allows the
public to see them.
Our report makes 12 recommendations. Because the fundamental goal of the Democratic
Members has always been to improve the security of our diplomatic corps and Americans
serving our country overseas, we make nine recommendations to improve security measures,
security training, risk management processes, and support for survivors and their families. We
also make three recommendations for Congress to consider before establishing any future select
committees.
Set forth below are selected highlights from our report.
COURAGE AND HEROISM OF FIRST RESPONDERS
The evidence obtained by the Select Committee demonstrates that Diplomatic Security
agents, personnel from the nearby CIA Annex, and a security team that flew from Tripoli to
Benghazi all showed remarkable courage throughout the harrowing attacks.
Before the attacks began, several Diplomatic Security agents heard “some kind of
chanting” as a crowd moved closer to the compound, but the agents could not understand what
they were saying because they did not speak Arabic.
Attackers breached the main gate of the compound, and one agent told us that “the doors
were blown open.” He said “about 70 individuals, you know, rushed into the building” where

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


4
the Ambassador was located. They broke glass and furniture, looted the buildings, and set fire to
the residence, which quickly filled with toxic smoke.
Agents repeatedly risked their lives and rushed back into the burning building to try to
save Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith.
“I had seconds left of life,” one agent told us. He explained: “[T]he smoke and heat
were so intense that, I mean, the smoke was coming in through my eyes, even though they were
closed. It was coming in through my nose. And I stayed in there until I physically couldn’t do it
anymore.” Another agent said it was almost “as if you had your eyes closed.” He added: “You
couldn’t see your hand in front of your face.”
When the security team arrived from the Annex, they also rushed into the burning
building. “It was so hot. You couldn’t see the end of your gun, even with the flashlight on; the
smoke was so thick,” one security team member told us. Another said: “it was the most extreme
heat I’ve ever felt. You could barely take a breath or two in there before you had to come back
out.”
They were able to locate Sean Smith, who had died from the intense smoke, but not
Ambassador Stevens. Concerned that attackers were “massing for a counter assault,” the team
eventually traveled back to the Annex, where both State Department and Annex personnel took
up fighting positions on the rooftops.
During a “lull” in the subsequent fighting, a security team from Tripoli arrived at the
Benghazi airport. After receiving reports that the Ambassador had been taken to a local hospital,
they tried to obtain transportation from Libyan security forces to get to the hospital. When they
learned of the Ambassador’s death, they traveled instead to the Annex and joined in its defense
shortly before dawn.
Several security team members explained how a deadly mortar struck the Annex, killing
Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty and causing life-threatening injuries to American personnel.
One team member described how he treated a survivor: “I started putting a tourniquet on
his arm. He was bleeding from his left arm. He had a hole in his neck, and he had a hole in his
chest. So I put tourniquets on his arm and started patching up with the help of others from the
shrapnel wounds. And it seemed like seconds later when I heard somebody say, [Redacted], I
have another one for you.”
Treating another survivor, the team member said that the survivor’s “right foot was
hanging off” and that he “had a hole in his left arm” and “had several shrapnel holes in his head.”
In response, the team member “readjusted the tourniquet on his right leg, put another one on his
right leg, and ended up putting a tourniquet on his left arm and packing his neck with combat
gauze to help stop the bleeding.”
The team continued to provide lifesaving care during the flight to Tripoli and after they
landed. One team member explained how a survivor on the plane “stopped breathing, so I had to
give him CPR.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


5
Witnesses praised the efforts of two more individuals in Tripoli—a Special Forces-
trained medic and a State Department nurse—who took over medical care when the team landed
there. One team member explained: “As soon as I put them on stretchers, we carried them off
the plane, they started on them; they started helping the ambulance drivers.”
These heroic actions were universally praised by the witnesses we interviewed.
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said “there’s no question in my mind that they took
the initiative” and “saved lives.” Secretary Clinton recounted: “[T]he agent who had been in the
hospital all those months, as I was leaving, he called me over and he said: Secretary, please do
everything you can to make sure I get to go back in the field. And I told him I would.”
“[I]t was one of the bravest and more courageous things I have ever seen,” the CIA Chief
of Base in Benghazi told us. He added: “I think that, in many ways, we owe our lives to them.”
The Deputy Chief of Base agreed: “I have the utmost respect for their capabilities, their heroism,
what they did that night. I’m alive today because of their efforts, and I never forget that for a
minute.”
The Deputy Director of the CIA, Michael Morell, called the first responders in Benghazi
and Tripoli “absolute heroes” who “saved lives.” He added: “And a lot more people would have
died without my guys acting with the bravery that they did. And I don’t want that lost ever, ever,
ever.”
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Evidence obtained by the Select Committee confirmed the findings of Republicans on the
House Committee on Armed Services in 2014 that the U.S. military could not have done
anything differently on the night of the attacks that would have saved the lives of the four brave
Americans killed in Benghazi. Chairman Gowdy admitted this on national television, as did his
chief counsel during closed-door interviews with military officials.
Secretary Panetta explained that he and General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with President Obama at the White House after being notified of the
attacks in Benghazi, and “the President made clear that we ought to use all of the resources at our
disposal to try to make sure we did everything possible to try to save lives there.”
Secretary Panetta returned to the Pentagon at about 6 p.m. and “immediately” convened a
meeting with his chief military advisors, including General Dempsey; General Carter Ham, the
Commander of U.S. Africa Command; General John Kelly, Secretary Panetta’s Senior Military
Assistant; and others.
Secretary Panetta asked his advisors: “[W]hat are the immediate resources we can
deploy in order to try to save these lives and do what we can? And they are the ones that made
the recommendation of the teams that I then ordered to be in place.”
Secretary Panetta ordered the deployment of two Marine Fleet Antiterrorism Security
Team (FAST) platoons stationed in Spain, the Combatant Commander’s In-Extremis Force (CIF)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


6
based in Germany and on assignment in Croatia, and a special operations force based in the
United States.
Secretary Panetta was clear: “I never had a question then and I don’t even have a
question now that we did everything possible to try to see if we could save lives, in line with the
President’s order.”
General Ham told the Select Committee there was “a very, very noticeable and profound
sense of urgency, and I certainly detected no hesitation from any other combatant command,
defense agency, or any other to be responsive to the command’s needs.” He said: “[T]he best
phrase I can use is it was ‘all hands on deck’ to find, continually pursue options to address this
evolving situation.”
Admiral Kurt Tidd, Director for Operations for the Joint Staff, said he felt “an enormous
sense of urgency.”
Witnesses explained again why strike aircraft were not an appropriate option. Secretary
Panetta told us: “Okay, yeah, so F-16s go in there and they drop a lot of bombs, but where is the
Ambassador? Where are our people? What’s happening. You don’t just do that. You’ve got to
have information.”
General Ham explained his decision not to send strike aircraft, warning that “it could’ve
made things worse” by “causing friendly casualties, American or Libyan” or “causing casualties
amongst noncombatants, which would further incite things.” He explained that they lacked the
necessary “detailed information about the situation on the ground, a specific means of targeting
and target designation” as well as “the ability to posture forces for recovery of a downed pilot
should you lose an aircraft.” Others agreed:
 General Philip Breedlove, Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe: “I completely
agree with the judgment not to use kinetic weapons via fighter aircraft in that
environment.”
 Major General Michael Repass, Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command-
Europe: “If you are blindly throwing ordnance at somebody out there, you are going
to inadvertently kill people who ought not be killed.”
 General John Kelly, Senior Military Assistant to Secretary Panetta: “[T]o drop
bombs without knowing what you’re dropping the bombs on might make people feel
good, but it may be counterproductive, particularly when it’s killing or hurting the
wrong people.”
Military witnesses explained—as they had two years earlier to the House Committee on
Armed Services—why the military’s global posture prior to the attacks prevented it from
responding more quickly.
General Dempsey previously testified that “response forces, at some level, will
eventually rely upon basing,” and “we don’t have any basing rights in Africa.” He added that
“the tyranny of distance on the African continent is rather remarkable,” calling the time it takes
to travel “overwhelming.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


7
Although some units did not meet their internal target timelines, General Ham explained
that these units “would not have been in position to affect the outcome as things eventually
played out on the ground.”
Witnesses explained that the military already made significant changes several years ago
to substantially improve the military’s ability to respond to crises at diplomatic facilities
worldwide. General Ham described these changes as “a tremendous improvement over the
situation of just a few years ago” and “a huge benefit and improvement in crisis response.”
Not a single witness substantiated offensive Republican claims that Secretary Clinton or
anyone else ordered Secretary Panetta or the military to “stand down.” Secretary Panetta told us
that “if somebody had said that, I think, you know, it would not have interfered with my orders
to proceed.” When asked again, he replied: “No. Never, never. It would have been against
everything that the military stands for. ... To even imply that somehow the military, or someone
would have said, maybe we shouldn’t go, it’s too risky, it’s crazy. It’s just not the way our
military operates.”
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The evidence obtained by the Select Committee confirms the findings of the
Accountability Review Board (ARB) that security measures in Benghazi were woefully
inadequate as a result of decisions made by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS).

In a portion of its report that was not released publicly in 2012, the Board found that the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Programs “did not give sufficient weight to the
judgments put forward by most DS agents on the ground.” The Board was “troubled” by her
responses, “and in some instances lack of formal responses,” to the “repeated requests for
additional security staffing that were made from post.”
The Board concluded that the Deputy Assistant Secretary “showed a lack of proactive
leadership, management oversight and transparency in ensuring adequate security support for one
of the U.S. government’s most vulnerable overseas posts—a vulnerability that was known to
her.”
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Libya through June of 2012 told the Select Committee
that the Deputy Assistant Secretary “was the decisionmaker” and was often “a roadblock and
very unhelpful.”
Contrary to repeated Republican claims, not a single witness we spoke to identified any
evidence that Secretary Clinton personally denied security requests in Benghazi. Five
Republican House Chairmen first made this accusation in 2013, and Rep. Darrell Issa repeated it
on national television. These and similar claims have been debunked repeatedly by the
Washington Post Fact Checker, the Tampa Bay Times PolitiFact, and others.
During our hearing with Secretary Clinton, Rep. Pompeo argued that the Select
Committee had obtained “over 600 requests” for security from Benghazi, but he refused to
provide the evidence for his claim.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


8
Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump took up this allegation himself, claiming:
“Look at Benghazi, our ambassador. He wired her 500 or 600 times asking for help.” The Fact
Checker called his baseless accusation “a whopper.”
None of the witnesses we interviewed—including those on the ground in Benghazi—
recommended withdrawing from Benghazi in 2012. In fact, just weeks before the attacks,
Ambassador Stevens and Deputy Chief of Mission Gregory Hicks were pressing for a permanent
U.S. presence there. In a draft proposal, they wrote that “a permanent platform” would “protect
U.S. national security interests in the region” and “promote a stronger, healthier and more
vibrant bilateral relationship with the new, free, and democratic Libya.”
Secretary Clinton was active and engaged on the night of the attacks and in the days that
followed. In the hours directly after the attacks, she spoke with President Obama, the National
Security Advisor, the CIA Director, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She also
spoke with Libyan General National Congress President Magariaf, and she consulted with a host
of officials within the State Department.
She personally participated in a Secure Video TeleConference (SVTCS) with senior
officials from the Intelligence Community, White House, and Department of Defense. Her
Deputy Chief of Staff, Jacob Sullivan, explained: “[S]he took the really unusual step of a cabinet
Secretary walking into a working level operational SVTCS because she wasn’t going to stand on
ceremony. She wanted to be there to make sure that we were doing everything we could.”
Mr. Sullivan described Secretary Clinton’s “enormous sense of urgency” and said she
“kicked it into high gear, and she got very focused and began the process of trying to execute a
strategy to get our people out of Benghazi safely.” According to Mr. Sullivan, her approach was:
“I am not going to rest until we get Chris Stevens back, and I’m going to do everything in my
power to make that happen.”
Secretary Clinton’s Chief of Staff at the time, Cheryl Mills, described Secretary Clinton
as “very concerned,” “very determined,” and “worried” about U.S. teams on the ground in Libya
and elsewhere, and said Secretary Clinton was “devastated” about the deaths of Americans in
Benghazi.
Ms. Mills said Secretary Clinton “spent time reaching out to our team in Tripoli,
constantly trying to determine if they had what they needed, constantly trying to remind people
that, while we all have jobs, people are fragile and you have to remember the fragility of people
and their humanity and you have to give respect to that.”
Mr. Sullivan explained: “Over the next few days, we had our posts assaulted by
protestors in a number of cities, and every day she’d show up early and go home late, helping
manage the response, calling foreign officials where she needed to get more help, calling
interagency colleagues when she needed to get marines or other security personnel in place.”
Ms. Mills said Secretary Clinton “made herself consistently present to people on her team
because she wanted them to know that, as hard as this was, this was something that required us
all to bear witness, to learn, and to try to be the very best we could in those moments.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


9
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
The evidence obtained by the Select Committee confirms the bipartisan findings of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence that assessments and information provided by the Intelligence Community to
government officials changed repeatedly in the days and weeks following the attacks, in part
based on new information that became available to intelligence analysts.
Not a single witness appearing before the Select Committee identified evidence that
intelligence assessments or CIA talking points provided to Congress and Ambassador Rice were
influenced by political considerations.
 On September 12, 2012, an Executive Update and Situation Report stated that the
“presence of armed assailants from the incident’s outset suggests this was an
intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest.”
 On September 13, 2012, a fully coordinated Intelligence Community assessment
stated that “the attacks began spontaneously following the protests at the U.S.
embassy in Cairo” and that “[e]xtremists with ties to al-Qa’ida were involved in the
attacks.”
 On September 15, 2012, talking points drafted by the CIA stated that “the
demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S.
Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in
Benghazi and subsequently its annex” and referenced “indications that extremists
participated in the violent demonstrations.”
 On September 24, 2012, a revised Intelligence Community assessment—issued after
the review of surveillance video from the State Department compound and the
distribution of reports from FBI interviews of officials on the ground—stated that
analysts’ assessments “gradually evolved from what we first conveyed” and that
“[o]ur most credible information indicates that there was not a protest ongoing at the
time of the attack as first reported.”
CIA Director Petraeus explained that video from the compound “took a while to come
back” and that analysts did not immediately receive the reports of FBI interviews: “The State
Department folks got sequestered in Germany, I think, where they were interviewed, and we
didn’t get that information for quite some time.”
In addition, although an extremist group called Ansar al-Sharia initially claimed
responsibility for the attacks, the group withdrew its claim the following day, stating that the
attacks were “a spontaneous and popular uprising in response to what the West did.”
The Director of the CIA Office of Terrorism Analysis told the Select Committee that
“in any fast-breaking event, like the attacks in Benghazi, analysts attempt to strike a balance of
providing our best understanding of the events, and waiting for additional reporting to come in
to bring the picture into sharper focus.”
She explained why the analysts assessed that there was a protest: “[I]n their mind,

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


10
they believe there had been a protest. They believed that that protest turned into an assault on
the compound. Whether that was that the protest took place as a cover for an assault, whether
the protest was something that individuals were opportunistically taking advantage of in the
past, they just didn’t know.”
CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell told the Select Committee: “I know analysts
better than I think I know my own kids. And if the analysts had believed that what they had
written was somehow being turned for political reasons, or if the analysts had believed that I
was somehow editing the talking points for political reasons, they would have gone crazy.”
He explained that there were “a dozen or so sources that suggested to them, told them
there was a protest, and there were zero, zero sources saying there wasn’t a protest, when they
made that judgment on the 12th and published it on the 13th.”
Deputy Director Morrell also explained the process for developing the CIA talking
points: “The talking points were exactly what the analysts thought. Politics was not in
anybody’s mind.” He added: “[N]obody who was doing the work in the intelligence
community recognized that there were any politics here at all to begin with. It was only later
that it became political.”
CIA Director Petraeus, who reviewed the talking points before they were provided to
Congress, confirmed that changes in the final drafts were “understandable” and that Deputy
Director Morell played a “forthright role.” He told the Select Committee: “I think the folks
that were engaged in that were faithfully trying to carry out their respective duties.”
Considerable attention has been focused on public allegations that the CIA Chief of
Base in Benghazi told the security team at the Annex to “stand down” before responding to
the attack on the State Department Special Mission Compound.
The Select Committee interviewed all surviving members of the security team. One
reported that the Chief of Base in Benghazi directed him to “stand down.” In his previous
appearance before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 2013, this security
team member did not mention that the Chief of Base directed him to “stand down.”
A second security team member told the Select Committee that he did not hear the
words “stand down” directly, but was told about them by the other security team member on the
night of the attacks. He did not share this information with the Intelligence Committee.
The Chief of Base in Benghazi told the Select Committee that he did not use the term
“stand down,” but he confirmed that he told the security team to wait while he tried to obtain
additional help from local security forces.
Although there is a disagreement about whether the words “stand down” were uttered,
witnesses agreed that the team was told to wait while CIA officials in Libya requested security
assistance from local Libyan forces, and they generally agreed that it was appropriate to try to
obtain this additional security assistance.
None of the witnesses appearing before the Select Committee identified any evidence
that CIA officials were motivated by political or improper motives or that their decisions were

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


11
directed by any officials outside Libya.
CIA Director Petraeus, a former military commander, said the decision to seek local
support to help prevent an ambush was “a very reasonable precaution to take.” The CIA Chief
of Station in Tripoli, the most senior U.S. intelligence official in Libya, said the direction by
the Chief of Base in Benghazi was “absolutely” reasonable and that if he had not made it, “it
would have been negligent.”
One individual on the ground told the Select Committee that the Chief of Base was
“the most experienced operator on that base when it came to judging operational decision-
making.”
Some security team members criticized the length of time that passed before the team
departed, asserting that they might have been able to save Ambassador Stevens and Sean
Smith if they had left earlier. One acknowledged that this likely would have cost more lives:
“Now, would we have probably died? Yes, probably. So, it’s okay. It’s our job.”
Another said he felt the wait became too long, but he “respected the fact that he wanted
us to wait and see if he can gather additional fire power to help.”
Like its predecessors, the Select Committee identified no evidence of an advance
warning of the attacks to the Intelligence Community and no evidence to substantiate Republican
claims that the CIA was collecting or shipping arms from Libya to Syria or elsewhere.
NO INTENTIONALLY MISLEADING PUBLIC STATEMENTS
For more than three years, Republicans have accused Administration officials of
intentionally misleading the American people about the attacks in Benghazi. In 2013—well
before House Speaker John Boehner chose him to lead the Select Committee—Chairman Gowdy
proclaimed: “[W]e know we were lied to.”
The evidence obtained by the Select Committee demonstrates that these claims are
baseless. Republicans simply disregard the fact that the intelligence reports changed repeatedly,
and the Administration’s statements changed with them.
Not one person interviewed by the Select Committee provided any evidence of an
intentional effort to misrepresent the facts. Instead, they described how they were devastated by
the loss of their friends and colleagues in Benghazi and how they focused urgently on the safety
of U.S. personnel as demonstrations and violence continued throughout the week across the
Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere.
Secretary Clinton’s statements on September 11 and 12, 2012, tracked early reporting
from the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli that Ansar al-Sharia “claimed responsibility and called for an
attack on Embassy Tripoli on Facebook and Twitter.” They also tracked an early intelligence
report that “the presence of armed assailants from the incident’s outset suggests this was an
intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest.”
On the night of the attacks, Secretary Clinton called the President of the Libyan General
National Congress to ask for help and referenced Ansar al-Sharia’s claim of responsibility. She

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


12
added: “I also need you to help us in Tripoli. We have seen serious threats on social media sites,
like Facebook, and it is important that your government take all possible measures, in an urgent
manner, to secure our facilities.”
Later that night, Secretary Clinton emailed her daughter and again referenced that two
officers had been killed by an al-Qaida-like group, which tracked the reporting at the time.
The next day, she told the Egyptian Prime Minister it was “a planned attack—not a
protest,” and that it “had nothing to do with the film.” She again referenced Ansar al-Sharia’s
claim of responsibility and again asked for help to “lower the temperature on everything that is
going on and to make sure this does not happen again today, tomorrow, or after Friday prayer.”
In her public statements, Secretary Clinton said: “Some have sought to justify this
vicious behavior as a response to inflammatory material posted on the Internet.” This statement
was accurate.
Victoria Nuland, the State Department’s spokesperson and a former advisor to Vice
President Dick Cheney, told Congress in 2013 that she helped write this statement because
groups across the region “were applauding the attack,” and there was “considerable cheerleading
on social media throughout the region for violence against U.S. missions, facilities, personnel.”
She said the attacks were “linked in social media to a response to the movie” and “pent up
anger.” She said the purpose of the statement was to address “a larger community in the broader
Middle East and North Africa,” to “calm things,” and to “help our embassies and both
governments secure security.”
The Select Committee chose not to re-interview Ms. Nuland.
The Select Committee did re-interview Jacob Sullivan, the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Policy, who drafted the statement with Ms. Nuland, and he corroborated Ms. Nuland’s testimony
from 2013. He explained: “my first concern in getting this out was to do everything we could to
try to help prevent further violence from happening.” He said they chose the words “carefully”
because they “didn’t know the motives of the actual attackers of Benghazi.”
On September 13, the Intelligence Community issued another product, which was the
first “fully coordinated” intelligence assessment. The title of this assessment was “Extremists
Capitalized on Benghazi Protests.” It stated that “the attacks began spontaneously following the
protests at the U.S. embassy in Cairo.” This assessment became the basis for talking points
drafted later that week by the CIA, cleared by the Intelligence Community, and provided to
Congress and Ambassador Rice.
Mr. Sullivan explained that “this was a fast-moving situation with a lot of information
coming in,” and they “went back and forth on what exactly had happened in Benghazi.” He
explained that “to this day, people haven’t been able to figure out exactly who the attackers were,
exactly what motivated them, so certainly in that first week, we weren’t going to. All we could
do was the best with the information we had at the time was, and that’s what we did.”
Secretary Clinton testified to the Select Committee that the “intelligence community,
which took the lead on trying to sort this out, as they should have, went through a series of
interpretations and analysis. And we were all guided by that.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


13
Ambassador Rice also explained during her interview with the Select Committee how she
relied on the CIA’s talking points when she spoke about the Benghazi attacks on five Sunday
news shows on September 16, 2012.
She said she relied on the “intelligence community’s current best assessment,” which
“mirrored very closely the finished intelligence products that I had received.”
She added: “[F]or me to go out and try to second guess the intelligence community or
glean individual pieces of information and make my own judgments would have been to
substitute my personal judgment for the best assessment of the intelligence community. ... And it
would have been highly inappropriate.”
Ben Rhodes, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategic Communications,
confirmed Ambassador Rice’s account, stating: “given that we had a process underway to
compile the best assessment of the intelligence community for public use at that time, it stood to
reason that she should use those points in her appearances.”
He created a separate document to prepare Ambassador Rice for a wide range of issues
she could be asked about, but on the “specific question of what happened in Benghazi, our
expressed intent was to provide her with the HPSCI [House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence] talking points to inform her as to the position of the intelligence community.”
Ambassador Rice’s spokesperson at the United Nations, who staffed her before and
during the Sunday shows, corroborated this account and dismissed as “frustrating” allegations
that Ambassador Rice intentionally misled the public. She explained: “I think those of us who
give our lives to public service expect more. And I also think it does a disservice to our
colleagues whose lives were lost to perpetuate conspiracy theories.”
The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, responded to Republican criticism
of Ambassador Rice in 2013, testifying that it was “unfair because the hit she took, I didn’t think
that was appropriate.” He added: “She was going on what we had given her, and that was our
collective best judgment at the time as to what should have been said.”
The Under Secretary of State for Management, Patrick Kennedy, testified in 2012: “If
any administration official, including any career official, were on television on Sunday,
September 16th, they would have said what Ambassador Rice said. The information she had at
that point from the Intelligence Community is the same that I had at that point.”
The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Matt Olsen, told the Select
Committee that he “certainly” would have used the talking points: “[I]f I knew they came from
Michael Morell and I knew that others had looked at them, that would give me more
confidence—that would give me confidence if I were a policymaker, whether in the Executive
Branch or Congress, relying on these as a basis for a public statement, yes.”
He made clear to the Select Committee that “what she said was accurate.” Although he
felt that her “demeanor” and “the way in which she phrased her comments” were in some ways
“more unequivocal,” these were “small differences,” according to Mr. Olsen. He concluded: “in
terms of the facts that she conveyed, my sense was that they were fully consistent with what we
were assessing at the time.”

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


14
It was not until September 24, 2012, that the Intelligence Community disseminated a
revised assessment after surveillance video from the State Department compound were reviewed
and the FBI disseminated reports of their interviews with officials on the ground.
REPUBLICAN ABUSES—FROM A TO Z
The Select Committee has broken its promise to the American people—to address the
attacks in Benghazi in a fair, credible, and bipartisan manner.
On May 11, 2014, directly after the Select Committee was established, Chairman Gowdy
stated on national television: “I have said from day one I want this to transcend politics and I
want it to inspire trust in you and our fellow citizens.”
He also predicted that “if we overplay our hand or if we engage in a process that is not
fair according to the American people, we will be punished as we should be for that.”
The abuse of millions of dollars in taxpayer funds for partisan purposes—to influence a
presidential election—discredits the House of Representatives.
It is a disservice to the American public, the men and women who serve our nation
abroad, and the families of those who were killed during the attacks.
To create a historical record for Congress to consult before establishing any future select
committees, Section II of this report sets forth the abusive conduct of Republicans on the
Benghazi Select Committee in subsections A through Z.


FINDINGS


15
FINDINGS
OVERALL CONCLUSION
 The evidence obtained by the Select Committee confirms the core findings already
issued by many previous investigations into the attacks in Benghazi. Although the
Select Committee obtained additional details that provide context and granularity,
these details do not fundamentally alter the previous conclusions.
COURAGE AND HEROISM OF FIRST RESPONDERS
 U.S. personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli conducted themselves with extraordinary
courage and heroism and at grave personal risk to defend and rescue their fellow
Americans on the night of the attacks.
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
 The United States military could not have done anything differently on the night of
the attacks that would have saved the lives of the four brave Americans killed in
Benghazi.
 The military’s global posture prior to the attacks prevented it from responding more
quickly, and significant changes were made several years ago to substantially
improve the military’s ability to respond to crises at diplomatic facilities worldwide.
 Repeated Republican claims that Secretary Clinton or anyone else intentionally
delayed the military response or ordered a “stand down” are unsubstantiated,
meritless, and offensive to our men and women in uniform.
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Security measures in Benghazi were woefully inadequate as a result of decisions
made by officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
 Contrary to repeated claims by Republican leaders, Secretary Clinton never
personally denied any requests for additional security in Benghazi.
 Secretary Clinton was active and engaged in responding to the attacks in Benghazi.
 The attacks in Benghazi were caused by terrorists rather than by U.S. foreign policy.
 The claim that documents were “scrubbed” by State Department officials is
unsubstantiated.

FINDINGS


16
 The review conducted by the Accountability Review Board was independent,
thorough, and efficient.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 The Intelligence Community did not receive advance warning of the attacks in
Benghazi.
 The CIA security team’s response in Benghazi was delayed temporarily while
leadership on the ground sought local support.
 Republican claims that the CIA was collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria
or elsewhere are unsubstantiated.
 Intelligence assessments evolved after the attacks in Benghazi as more information
became available.
 Political considerations did not influence the intelligence assessments or the CIA’s
talking points provided to Congress and Ambassador Rice.
NO INTENTIONALLY MISLEADING PUBLIC STATEMENTS
 The Select Committee has obtained no credible evidence that any Administration
official made intentionally misleading statements about the attacks in Benghazi.
 Statements made by Secretary Clinton in the week following the attacks were
consistent with the information she had at the time and were intended to prevent
further violence throughout the region.
 Statements made by Ambassador Rice on the Sunday shows about the Benghazi
attacks were based on talking points prepared by the Intelligence Community.
 Republicans simply disregard the established fact that the Intelligence Community’s
assessments changed repeatedly, and the Administration’s public statements changed
with them.
REPUBLICAN ABUSES—A TO Z
 The Select Committee squandered millions of taxpayer dollars in a partisan effort to
attack a presidential candidate.





17


I. EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY THE SELECT
COMMITTEE CONFIRMS CORE FINDINGS OF
PREVIOUS INVESTIGATIONS



FINDINGS


18
A. COURAGE AND HEROISM
OF FIRST RESPONDERS



FINDINGS


19
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A.
COURAGE AND HEROISM OF FIRST RESPONDERS
18
1.
Response of Diplomatic Security Agents
21
Agent 1’s Account
22
Agent 2’s Account
25
Agent 3’s Account
29
Agent 4’s Account
32
2.
Response of Annex Personnel
35
Chief of Base and Deputy Chief of Base
36
Team Member 1’s Account
37
Team Member 2’s Account
39
Team Member 3’s Account
39
Annex Employee’s Account
41
3.
Response of Tripoli Security Team
41
DOD Servicemember’s Account
42
Tripoli Security Team Member’s Account
45
4.
Lifesaving Medical Care
47




FINDINGS


20
Courage and Heroism of First Responders
Based on the evidence obtained by the Select Committee, including documents, briefings,
surveillance video footage, and interviews, the Democratic Members make the following
finding:
 U.S. personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli conducted themselves with extraordinary
courage and heroism and at grave personal risk to defend and rescue their fellow
Americans on the night of the attacks.
Although this conclusion is similar to those in numerous previous investigations,
Democratic Select Committee Members believe it should be noted—first and foremost—that the
brave actions of American personnel saved lives on the night of the attacks. Both Democratic
and Republican Select Committee Members share these views.
For example, during the Select Committee’s interview with one Diplomatic Security (DS)
agent, Ranking Member Elijah E. Cummings stated: “The bravery that you’ve shown and so
many others, we can never thank you enough.”1
During the same interview, Republican Select Committee Member Lynn Westmoreland
stated: “My hat is off to you. I admire what you did. I think you did a great job.”2 He also
stated to one of the Annex security team members: “First of all, thank you for your service. … I
appreciate everything you did.” 3
Similarly, in the Select Committee’s interview with a member of the Annex security
team, Democratic Select Committee Member Tammy Duckworth stated:
Well, I wanted to be sure to come and express to you how much the members
of this committee, my colleagues, admire the heroism that you guys displayed
that night. As someone who wasn’t left behind on a battlefield, I think I’m
especially sensitive to the fact that you did everything you possibly could to
rescue both friends and people that you didn’t know that well. And that I just
want to express how much we recognize just how much you put yourselves in
danger, and that you didn’t even think about it, and that you would do it all
over again in order to preserve American lives and not leave any Americans
behind. And I want to express that.4
During the same interview, Democratic Select Committee Member Adam Schiff stated:
First of all, I just want to thank you for your service to the country, your long
military service. I want to thank you for what you did that night. It took a lot
of guts. And I’m very grateful for what you did. It must have been hell.5
These statements match the conclusions of the independent Accountability Review Board
(ARB), which issued its unanimous report in 2012, finding:

FINDINGS


21
DS and Annex personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed with courage
and an overriding desire to protect and rescue their colleagues, in a near
impossible situation. The multiple trips that the DS agents and Annex security
team members made into a burning, smoke-filled building in attempts to rescue
Sean Smith and Ambassador Stevens showed readiness to risk life and limb to
save others. … The Board members believe every possible effort was made to
protect, rescue, and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith, and that the
bravery of the DS agents present in Benghazi helped prevent a further loss of
life, particularly given their assistance in defending the Annex.6
Similarly, in January 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued its
bipartisan report, concluding:
The Committee honors the lives and sacrifices of the four American heroes
who died in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. We also recognize those who
came to their aid or mobilized assistance in their defense.7
On April 2, 2014, Rep. Mike Rogers, the Republican Chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, stated during a public hearing:
Many of the brave officers who came to the rescue testified in closed session
before the committee. These men took extraordinary measures to save their
fellow Americans. Without their courage, their skill, the terrorists would have
killed other Americans in Benghazi that night for sure. Most of these silent
warriors preferred to stay unnamed and many still defend America, in some of
the most dangerous locations around the world.8
In November 2014, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence reached the
same conclusion in its bipartisan report, finding:
CIA security personnel on the ground in Benghazi, Libya, during the attacks
that began on September 11, 2012, exhibited bravery and tactical expertise,
saving the lives of fellow Americans from the State Department under difficult
conditions.9
1. RESPONSE OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AGENTS
The Select Committee conducted transcribed interviews with four Diplomatic Security
agents who were on the ground in Benghazi on the night of the attacks. These agents showed
remarkable courage and fortitude during incredibly challenging circumstances. They worked
swiftly to protect the Ambassador and defend the compound. Despite suffering from smoke
inhalation, many of these agents continued to provide security at the CIA Annex.
All of these agents previously shared their accounts with the ARB. Their accounts
supported the ARB’s description of events, and they corroborated the account of the fifth DS
agent on the ground that night, who testified previously in a closed deposition before the House

FINDINGS


22
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and who was not re-interviewed by the Select
Committee.
AGENT 1’S ACCOUNT
Agent 1, a U.S. Navy veteran, described the beginning of the attack from his perspective
in Villa C of the State Department’s Special Mission Compound (SMC) with the Ambassador
and Sean Smith:
Okay, so the evening started with [Agent 2, Agent 3,] and I sitting at a table
near the pool at the end of the night. Ambassador Stevens had come by and
said, I’m going to bed. Sean Smith said the same thing and went, you know,
went inside the villa, and we were just sitting out kind of relaxing at the end of
the night.
While we were talking, I started hearing some kind of chanting, I thought it
was. So I told the others, you know, I told the other two, hang on. Just listen
for a minute. And what we heard was chanting. And it was my impression
that it was coming closer. You know, so immediately when I realized, you
know, that this is a potential security incident, or a potential something, I said,
you know, go get your gear, right now. I ran into Villa C where the
Ambassador and Sean Smith were and the other two ran in a different
direction.
I remember hearing the chants. I mean, they were fairly close already. I mean,
yelling distance, which is pretty close especially in a city setting. So my
impression is that I don’t have much time. So I ran right to my room, you
know, put my helmet on, put my vest on, grabbed my weapons, my additional
weapons, and I turned to lock the gate, and basically, it was a jail cell door
with three locks on it. I locked all three locks.
And at about that time Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith were coming out
of their rooms. Sean Smith was already, you know, donning his helmet and
vest. I guided them both into the safe haven, and set myself up in the safe
haven with—I was holding my M4. I had a pistol, a radio, a shotgun, and
when we were, you know, when we were in there, I radioed to the other guy,
hey, we are all in the safe haven.
I could hear outside explosions, yelling, chanting, screaming, gunfire, and I
reported all of this on the radio just saying, this is what my senses are telling
me. Then people started banging on the doors on the building, so I reported
that. Hey, there is banging on the doors. They are trying to come in, you
know, we need immediate assistance. And there wasn’t any response on the
radio.
Shortly after that, to my recollection, the doors were blown open. And about
70 individuals, you know, rushed into the building, all of them carrying AK-

FINDINGS


23
47s, grenades, RPGs, you know, a mixture throughout everyone. Different—
there were a couple of different assault rifles.
And with the number of individuals that came into the building versus me, I
chose just to stay in the shadow that I was in. So I was partially in the safe
haven, partially outside of the safe haven. The area was, you know, there was
a big shadow where I was sitting, and my view through the jail cell door was
into the common area. So I could see where everybody was going, and they
began breaking everything. I could just hear glass breaking. I could hear stuff
being thrown around. I could hear furniture being moved.
If I may just back up a little bit. When we made it into the safe haven, I
handed my cell phone to the Ambassador. I said, call everybody on my cell
phone. Call everybody that you know that can help us. …
And then slowly, people started to kind of trickle out. And then the lights
started to kind of dim. My initial response, or my initial thought was, well,
they just knocked out the generators. You know, we have regular city power,
but we also have backup generators. So flickering would be a likely, you
know, cause of this. But in reality, it was smoke. And it took me about, you
know, 2 or 3 seconds after that to determine that it was smoke.
As soon as I realized it was smoke, I turned to the Ambassador and Sean Smith
and I said, we are moving to the bathroom. And at that time, grabbed the
Ambassador, Sean Smith was right behind him and we started crawling
towards the bathroom. It’s about a 3- to 4-meter crawl. And it only took
seconds for us to reach—to reach the hallway that the bathroom was in. But
by that time—seconds later, the smoke had already filled the entire room and I
began basically army crawling like on my belly, and breathing through my
hands like this, the last, you know, centimeter of air that was left.
And as soon as it became that thick, no light was visible from the lights that
were fully on. The sounds were, you know, crackling and breaking of things
from the heat. And so to lead them to the bathroom, I was saying, come on
guys, follow me. And I was slapping my hands on the floor, or you know,
hitting stuff with my hands if I felt anything.10
The agent explained that he made it to the bathroom, but the Ambassador and Sean Smith
did not. As he started to lose consciousness, he proceeded to a bedroom where he could open the
window to exit the building:
And as soon as I passed the threshold to my bedroom, you know, I had seconds
left of life, essentially. And so I quickly went over to my window and I started
to crank open these metal shutters, but I was cranking the wrong way. So I had
to turn back and crank it the other way. Then I had to open up a glass window,
and then I had to pull a pin and push out this big metal gate. And as soon as I
did that, I collapsed on to my little patio area.

FINDINGS


24
And around the patio area was, you know, maybe a 2-1/2-foot tall cinderblock
wall. And as soon as I went out there, I just started taking fire immediately. I
remember hearing explosions, which I equate to grenades. I remember feeling
the cement exploding and hitting me in the face. And I remember the sounds.
So after catching my breath, I jumped back into the building, and I searched
for the Ambassador and Sean Smith. I went as far as my threshold, and
reached out into the—into the area we had just come from to see if I could feel
anybody. But the smoke and heat were so intense that, I mean, the smoke was
coming in through my eyes, even though they were closed. It was coming in
through my nose. And I stayed in there until I physically couldn’t do it
anymore.
When I was in the Navy, they engrain in you, 110 percent. And most people
don’t think you can do 110 percent, but it’s part of my character. I do 110
percent and I stayed in there until—until I physically could not and mentally
could not stay in there any longer.11
The agent described going back into the building repeatedly:
The last time I went out, you know, I decided that if I went back into the
building that I wasn’t going to come back out. The smoke and heat were way
too powerful, and way too strong, and it was extremely confusing feeling my
way in a smoke-filled building. And I didn’t want to get lost, and so I decided
to climb up the ladder up to the roof.
I climbed up the ladder, and pulled up the ladder