June 8, 2020
How Amnesty and Reuters lied about the Iran protests of 2019
Reza Esfandiari (MSc.) and Yousef Bozorgmehr (Ph.D)
“Men lie because they think they can gain by deceiving others.” Darius I, King of Persia


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Amnesty International (AI) has claimed that 304 protesters were unlawfully killed by
security forces in Iran during November 2019 following a 3-fold increase in gasoline prices.
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However, in a report released on May 20th 2020, Amnesty could only name 232 alleged
victims, which is almost the same as a figure given by an Iranian deputy for the death toll.
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The Reuters news agency, citing unnamed sources in the Iranian government, has reported
1,500 were killed, a figure initially released by the cult-like People’s Mojahedeen (PMOI). It
thus appears to be an attempt to lend journalistic credence to the PMOI's own fake claims.
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Contrary to Amnesty's assertion about the protests being mostly peaceful, hundreds of
banks, gas stations and paramilitary bases were attacked by gangs of young thugs, some of
whom were affiliated to known armed opposition groups, such as the PMOI, PJAK and ISIS.
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Amnesty has wilfully distorted the statements of Iranian officials, and has ignored evidence
showing that the police were firing plastic, not metal, bullets in several recorded instances.

Many civilians, including children, were not even protesting when they were fatally shot by
unidentified snipers: this contradicts AI's line that the killings occurred to quell the unrest.
1. Background
Unable to keep subsidizing the cost of refined gasoline, the heads of the three branches of the
Iranian government - the president, speaker of the parliament (Majlis) and judiciary chief – agreed in
November 2019 that the price of gasoline would be increased from 10,000 rials to 15,000 rials for a
rationed monthly amount of 60 litres and 30,000 rials for anything more than this 1. The price
changed suddenly at midnight on November 15th with no advance warning. Information about an
increase in an allowance paid to citizens to cope with higher prices was not simultaneously released.
Friday November 15th was marked by generally peaceful but virulent protests held against the three-
fold increase in the price of gasoline. In late 2017 and early 2018, Iran had been rocked by protests
over the national budget – which also included planned increased in fuel – that resulted in violent
riots and the deaths of about 25 persons 2. Protesters blocked highways and other roads in an act of
civil disobedience and defiance. Iranian police used tear gas and water cannon against demonstrators
causing disruptions 3. Iran, it should be noted, does not have a civilian police service. Rather, the
niroo-ye-entezami (security force) is one of four branches of the regular military, along with the army,
air force and navy. As such, policemen are all armed with firearms as well as non-lethal equipment.
Late on Friday, a mob in the south-eastern city of Sirjan, Kerman province, tried to attack and
detonate fuel storage depots just outside of the city. Police troops guarding them responded by
shooting one man from among the crowd dead 4. The following day, peaceful protests continued in
many cities, such as Shiraz, but quickly escalated into a chaotic disorder. Without doubt, recreational
violence, as conducted by unemployed youths, was a big factor. Confrontations between the riot
police (known as the “Special Guard”), the paramilitary Basij and protesters over the next few days
resulted in a number of violent disturbances in some cities. An estimated 200,000 took to the streets
in over 100 cities in Iran, and up to 7,000 were arrested, the great majority released within a matter
of days 5. This makes these protests/riots the most widespread in the history of the Islamic Republic.
Property was set on fire by arsonists, and department stores were looted in at least four major
provinces. Some 731 banks, 50 police/military bases, 9 mosques/seminaries, 70 gas stations, 140
public places, 34 ambulances, 307 personal cars, 183 police vehicles and 1076 personal motorcycles
were attacked 6. One incident involved the setting fire to the branch of the Central Bank of Iran by
rioters in the southwestern city of Behbahan in Khuzestan province 7 . Downtown Tehran was itself
largely unaffected – unlike in the “Green movement” protests of 2009 when hundreds of thousands
gathered – but the poor working-class western and southern suburbs witnessed considerable unrest.
#
The authorities decided to cut off most access to the Internet late on Saturday to quell the protests
by disrupting communications between protest leaders over cyberspace 8. Protests then continued
until the end of Monday, November 18th, with a few incidents still reported for another couple of
days. BY that time, most peaceful protesters, complaining about the price hike, had long disappeared
from the streets. The Internet was gradually restored within about 10 days. The government blamed
armed opposition groups and outside powers for using gangs of young men to foment the unrest. It
was also reported that Iranian banks were simultaneously hacked by what experts consider to be the
work of a foreign state 9. Iranian authorities have determined that 230 persons were killed in total 10.
Fig 1: Iranian police use water cannon to disperse crowds blocking roads on Nov 15
2. Competing narratives on what happened
Three basic narratives about the November protests – and the responsibility for the violence - have
emerged. These are the view of the human rights organization, Amnesty International, the Reuters
news agency and the Iranian government. All three of these accounts have been paraphrased below.
a) Amnesty International’s narrative:
“Iranian authorities green-lighted the local security forces to go on a killing spree against peaceful
and unarmed protesters to violently suppress any dissent against the government and its policies.
The authorities have sought to disguise their unlawful killings by disconnecting the Internet for a
period and silence the families of the victims whom they have repeatedly harassed and intimidated.”
b) The Reuters news agency’s narrative:
“Facing the most widespread and forceful protests in its 40 year history, officials of the Islamic
Republic - acting under the direct orders of the supreme Leader – brutally cracked down on largely
peaceful mass protests that were threatening the stability and indeed survival of the ruling regime.”
c) The Iranian government’s narrative:
“Initially peaceful protests to the price hike in gasoline were hijacked by organized gangs of thugs,
acting on the instructions of exiled groups and foreign powers, to create havoc within the country in
which an unprecedented level of arson and destruction of property occurred. Although police did
shoot some violent rioters, the death tally reported by foreign media has been grossly exaggerated.”
The truth about which of the narratives, if any, is correct will be determined in the following sections
3. The Reuters report
On December 23rd, the Reuters news agency published a “special report” claiming that, based on
information provided it to it by government officials, as many as 1,500 had been killed across the
country during the unrest 11. The sources were unnamed as were the authors of the article. The
report claimed the deaths were due to Ayatollah Khamenei, protected within a fortified compound,
telling officials late on Nov 17th that they must “do whatever it takes” to control the situation as the
regime was “in danger” of being overthrown as protests closed in on the capital. However, a week
prior to the release of this report, the People’s Mojahedeen of Iran (known as the PMOI or MEK) had
claimed the exact same amount of people killed across Iran, although they named just 504 victims 12.
The PMOI/MEK is widely acknowledged to be a terrorist cult that, since 1981, has killed thousands of
Iranians and Iraqis and was for a long time allied with Saddam Hussein. Many of its former members
allege being brainwashed and tortured at its facilities in Iraq, and now Albania 13. It is also known for
its shameless lies and exaggerations. One of these concerns the number of its members killed by the
Iranian authorities in 1988. Although most estimates range from 1,000 to 5,000, the PMOI/MEK
claim 30,000 of their members were executed 14. The PMOI/MEK has, more recently, been offering
wildly inflated tallies for the number of people who have died from the Covid-19 outbreak in Iran 15.
Reuters also asserted that 400 of the victims were women, a figure which the PMOI may also have
provided 16, and that Najmeh Bozorgmehr of The Financial Times found to be implausible 17. Nearly
all reports about the protests showed that young men were by far in the majority, certainly in clashes
with the security forces. No further breakdown of the casualties was provided. Iranwire – a news
agency set up by journalist Maziar Bahari – questioned whether Reuters had been fed disinformation
from the authorities 18. Reuters itself does not have any office in Tehran since it was closed in 2012.
No explanation was offered as to why Interior Ministry officials, including sources close to Khamenei,
would actually want to leak such information to the foreign media. The article also falsely claimed
that the main aim of the protesters was in calling for the demise of the Islamic Republic and return of
the Pahlavi dynasty. Moreover, central Tehran – where the seat of power resides - was itself mostly
unaffected by protests that were concentrated in working class suburbs of the capital. The idea that
the entire political system was in danger of collapse is completely absurd: At no point did the security
forces ever lose control of the situation to justify any extraordinary suppression. Also, the unrest had
already peaked - after three days - by Sunday evening when Khamenei allegedly issued his directive.
Fig. 2: The PMOI/MEK confirms that it was the original source of the claim of 1,500 killed
For its part, the Iranian media and government have denounced the report as “fake news”, and that
it proves that the PMOI – which has a network of activists inside Iran – was involved in violence
related to the protests 19. They have denied that any official spoke to Reuters on the subject. It, thus,
seems almost certain that the Reuters article appears to be merely an attempt to corroborate and
elaborate upon the PMOI's original fake report. Brian Hook of the racist Trump administration,
predictably, has endorsed it as unquestionably true 20. The fact that the two figures are identical, and
came within a week of each other, is beyond the possibility of any independent attribution. The only
question that now remains to be answered is why Reuters would collude with a group like the PMOI.
4. Amnesty International's reports on the protests
From November 19th, Amnesty International released a number of press statements reporting the
number of fatalities in the protests. These started at 106 deaths 21 and increased over subsequent
weeks to 304 22. This included 23 children and 10 women 23. Amnesty's London-based Iran human
rights team consists of 3 persons: Raha Bahreini, a lawyer and lead Iran researcher, Mansoureh Mills,
who claims to be an ex-refugee, and Philip Luther, AI's research director for MENA. They released a
final report on May 20th 2020, including a breakdown of the casualties and analysis by injury type 24.
The final report makes a number of important admissions. First, Amnesty does not have a list of 304
full names, only 232. Second, Amnesty used primary sources – friends/relatives/eyewitnesses to the
death of each individual – in only 127 of the cases, the rest mostly being the claims of unnamed
journalists/activists – most not based in Iran – the provenance of whose information is unknown.
Amnesty stated that it had set up a hotline for those affected to call into. But even in the cases
involving the primary sources, important information like a photo, exact location of death and the
age of the person is not provided. This is unusual if the source was a family relative. Moreover,
Amnesty admitted it had received photos of gravestones of the alleged deceased for only 82 cases
and official confirmation from burial certificates in just 24. As such, the figure of 304 is very tenuous.
There are also many discrepancies between a provisional and the final report. In a press release one
week after the end of the protests, Amnesty International released a breakdown of fatalities spread
across 10 provinces. As can be seen , there is a difference between what Amnesty reported on Nov
25th in Fig. 4, where 143 deaths are claimed 25, and what it has concluded by May 20th in Fig 3. In two
provinces, namely West and East Azerbaijan, 5 deaths were reported that are no longer mentioned.
In another two, namely Kurdistan and Kermanshah, the death tallies have been reduced from 12 to 7
and 34 to 30, respectively. Incredibly, the tally for Tehran province has increased by 550% from 20 to
as many as 130. Although some increase is possible, as more information about cases is gathered
over time, this one is stupendous. Indeed, the figure exceeds the blatantly inflated number reported
by the PMOI/MEK (122), and it is very likely that the PMOI was a source of information used by
Amnesty's Bahreini: she collaborated with the group (in Albania) in the past concerning the alleged
mass execution of its members in 1988 26. Mansoureh Mills, in an interview with Voice of America,
admitted that Amnesty had received information from unusual or unverified sources in compiling its
own figures: “We receive lots of information, sometimes from sources that we’re unfamiliar with.” 27
It should also be noted that Amnesty has, in the past, fallen for hoax stories about alleged deaths.
One notable case is that of Taraneh Mousavi, a young woman who allegedly raped and murdered
during the 2009 post-election protests 28. Amnesty bought into this case even though it later turned
out to be contrived 29. Amnesty also claimed that it made efforts not to duplicate reports of cases,
especially where they couldn't identify the person's name. However, they appear to have done just
that in the case of a protester from Kerman when only one was reported killed by the state media.
Another real possibility to be considered is that some people reported as having been killed by
Amnesty's secondary sources survived their injuries. Without a detailed assessment about Amnesty's
methodology for confirming the death of an individual, it is difficult to investigate this any further.
Fig. 3: Amnesty's final breakdown on 20/5/20 Fig. 4: A provisional breakdown from 25/11/19
5. Was a “green light” given to violently crack down on the protests?
Central to Amnesty’s argument that any violence by the security forces was approved from the top is
a speech given by Ayatollah Khamenei, on November 17th in which he referred to some violent
protesters as “villains”, using the Arabic/Persian word “ashraar” which literally means “evil-doers”. In
a press release, Amnesty's Philip Luther quote-mined Ayatollah Khamenei’s further remarks, calling
on the security forces to “implement their duty”, completely out of context: “During a speech on 17
November, Iran’s Supreme Leader described the protesters as “villains” who were incited to violence
by counter-revolutionaries and foreign enemies of Iran. He ordered security forces to 'implement
their duties' to end the protests, effectively giving the green light for the brutality to continue.” 30
However, this is what Khamenei actually said: “No person interested in his livelihood and country
would help villains. Burning banks is not the work of the people. It is the work of evil-doers. 31-32” In
other words, the Iranian leader was clearly distinguishing between those protesting out of concern
for the effect of the government decision on their livelihood, and those intent on arson and
vandalism. Moreover, calling on the security forces to “implement their duty” could hardly be a call
to massacre, as Amnesty implies. No law enforcement force would simply stand aside as rioters
wantonly destroyed property, endangering lives in the process. They would do their duty and react.
Fig. 5: A cartoon from Khamenei's website differentiates between arsonists and the people
6. Were protesters peaceful and unarmed?
Bahreini's attempts to preserve her original narrative about peaceful protests by unarmed civilians
being brutally suppressed has no longer become tenable in the face of all the evidence. She claims
that there is, “evidence that they (the security forces) shot at unarmed protesters who were posing
no threat whatsoever, killing several people.” However, it is impossible (from video footage alone) to
make such an assertion. The authorities claim to have seized weapons from arrested protesters and
she cannot prove otherwise. As she later admits in the final report, “in some instances documented
by Amnesty International, some protesters engaged in acts of arson or damage to banks, police
stations and seminaries.” This is a massive understatement, but it fits into the general picture of
Amnesty's attempt to minimise, distort, deny and ignore when it suits the group. The reality is that,
whilst most protesters were peaceful, many hundreds were not and it is they who fell foul of the
security forces. Their actions were coordinated and organized, according to reports. An eyewitness in
the Tehransar neighbourhood ,west of Tehran, stated that, “Everything happened in seconds, dozens
of young and organized men smashed the windows of the bank and threw (gasoline bombs) into the
building. 33 ” These were, thus, not just spontaneous outbursts by disgruntled citizens angered over
the sudden increase in gasoline prices. There was almost certainly a pre-planned agenda operating.
Gangs of vandals went on the rampage, burning banks, cars, even attacking police stations and
paramilitary bases, as well as looting shops and stores 34. Iran is used to witnessing protests and riots,
but has never experienced anything on the level of this ferocity and intensity before and in such a
short period. Amnesty refers to an incident in the southwestern city of Mahshahr on the Persian Gulf
coast, that was the scene of an alleged massacre in marshland just outside of the city. Bahreini
acknowledges that there was an exchange of gunfire in which a Revolutionary Guard, identified as
Akbar Moradi and a policeman, named Reza Sayadi, were killed 35. According to Radio Farda – a U.S-
funded media channel on Iran - an eyewitness in the city reported that, “there were a few people
among the protesters who provoked others for harsher demonstrations, by carrying weapons and
riding motorbikes. There were very few of them, and there is a consensus in Mahshahr over the fact
that they were not natives of the county. 36” In Iran's tribal regions, rifles are widely possessed for
prestige, and for hunting, but this suggests that outside agitators were responsible. The Mahshahr
incident involved the local security forces using armoured vehicles and machine guns. A local official,
Mohsen Biranvand, stated that, “when armed separatists came to the area, security forces stood in
front of them with force to teach them a lesson.37 ” This was because the “protesters” had blocked
roads for transporting energy, endangering national security. The disruption of these distribution
lines alone justified a tough response, and not just the shooting of members of the security forces. 38
In
Mahshahr, however, was not the only place where rioters had access to weapons and used them. A
police major in the western city of Kermanshah, Iraj Javaheri, was shot in the back defending his
station from an attack 39. Iranian security forces also fought gun battles with armed assailants in cities
like Javanrood, Marivan and elsewhere. In Sadra city, a working-class town outside of Shiraz, the local
imam reported that rioters set his office and mosque on fire, endangering his safety and residents 40.
The police had to use a helicopter to confront and contain the attackers. Bahreini also accepts that a
Revolutionary Guard officer, Morteza Ebrahimi, as well as 1 or 2 Baseej militiamen, were stabbed to
death in Malard 41. Many “protesters” carried cold weapons, like knives, that they used many times.
Fig 6. A gas station in Eslamshahr that was torched Fig 7. A police vehicle burns in Shiraz
Fig.8: One of many police/paramilitary bases destroyed or damaged by “protesters”
Fig.9: A crowd in the city of Behbahan looks on as the CBI branch building is set on fire
7. How do Reuters' and Amnesty's death toll compare with others?
Amnesty International and the Reuters news agency are not the only organizations to estimate the
death toll in the unrest. Just after the unrest had died down, international media, like the BBC, were
claiming at least 12 had been killed based on confirmed media reports 42. Al-Arabiya claimed around
three dozen had died 43. The OHCHR's spokesman, Rupert Colville, declared that “dozens” had been
killed 44. Farnaz Fassihi of The New York Times offered a broad range of between 180 and 450 (with a
mean of 315), with 40-100 killed in Mahshahr alone 45. Washington-based journalist, Shahed Alavi,
claimed he had been informed by an unnamed Interior Ministry source that 200 persons had been
killed in total and 3,000 injured 46. Reformist politician, and former lawmaker, Mostafa Kavakebian,
has stated the death toll was 170 47. Iranwire has reported, relying on trusted sources inside of Iran, a
total of 160 dead and has mapped out the location of all of the fatalities in detail 48. According to
Kalemeh, which is a website of the defunct “Green movement”, 631 were killed across the country 49.
What these estimates show is the utter absurdity of the Reuters/MEK total, which is completely
outside of the average and an obviously gross exaggeration. Amnesty's is more in line with what
others have reported, but is still on the high end and is reliant on many dubious secondary sources.
Amnesty also used data from two human rights groups, Hengaw and the Ahwazi Human Rights
Organization that cover the Kurdish and Arab regions of Iran, respectively. Both organizations are
suspected of having ties to ethnic separatist parties and their information is to be viewed sceptically.
On May 30th, Iran's Interior Minister, Abdolreza Fazili, gave a statement where he implied that around
200 persons had been killed 50. Later, on June 1st, a lawmaker, Mojtaba Zolnour, announced a figure
of 230 dead 51. Excluding the Kalemeh and Reuters tolls, this is almost exactly the average of the
other estimates. He claimed that “a high percentage were killed by bullets that are not used in
Iranian standard-issue weapons” and offered a breakdown of the fatalities by the following five
categories: 7% of the total being rioters killed in open gun battles with security forces, 16% rioters
who were killed whilst attacking military bases, 20% law enforcers and Basij volunteers (including 6
uniformed state officers), 31% protesters/rioters who died near banks and public places, and 26%
civilians killed who weren't even protesting at the time. 22% of those killed had criminal records. The
reason why authorities were slow to disclose a precise breakdown, as Bahreini admits, is because any
innocent person killed as a consequence of the unrest has the right to be declared a martyr, and for
their families to enjoy due compensation, as confirmed by an edict issued by Ayatollah Khamenei. 52
8. Were armed opposition groups and foreign intelligence involved?
The Iranian authorities have alleged that armed opposition groups and foreign intelligence agencies
had a role in fomenting the unrest, including paying young thugs to commit acts of violence 53.
According to Alireza Miryousefi of the Iranian mission to the U.N, "A number of exiled groups [and
media networks] have either taken credit for instigating both ordinary people to protest and riot, or
have encouraged lawlessness and vandalism, or both 54 .” Iran also accused the CIA and Saudi intel of
interference 55. Indeed, the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, has made it known that he
wants to take his fight to Iran within its borders. Elements within Saudi Arabia sponsor radical jihadist
groups throughout the region, including ISIS affiliates. It is impossible to fully verify these claims.
However, what is known is that Iranian banks were, indeed, subjected to a serious state-sponsored
cyberattack, concurrent with the protests, that resulted in the hacking of millions of bank accounts 56.
This suggests that foreign intel agencies were involved to some extent. What is certainly true is that
armed opposition groups exist in Iran and they would have every interest in exploiting any protests.
The PMOI/MEK is the most organized and well-funded of all of them, and has claimed that its
activists were responsible for attacks on police stations and other acts of terrorism in both the 2017
and 2019 protests 57. They are also shameless, and would happily shoot at civilians and try and blame
the authorities for such actions. Other groups include ISIS, which has committed two major
bombings in recent years 58, the APDF - an Arab separatist group based in Khuzestan – and PJAK
which seeks to forcibly establish a “Free Kurdistan”. It was definitely involved in riots held in the
Kurdish city of Mahabad in 2015 59. Another group is Tondar, or “The Kingdom Assembly”, which is a
royalist outfit seeking the return of the Pahlavi dynasty and has been implicated in several bombings.
The Governor of Kermanshah province, Hooshang Bazvand, has stated that, “Vandals and rioters set
fire to many businesses in the city of Kermanshah. They were affiliated with PJAK, ISIS and MEK
groups. 60” Indeed, Arab-majority and the Kurdish regions, where separatist terrorist groups operate,
were affected by some of the most violent clashes. Fig. 10 shows a masked gunman, one of many
who fired upon both civilians and the police. According to IRGC deputy head, Ali Fadavi, “ Rioters, by
using colts, shot at abdomen of the people from a distance of one or one and half meters and killed
them.61 ” Javanrood, where there exists a major base of the IRGC, witnessed a siege of the town's
justice centre that required police commandos to intervene and confront the assailants, as shown in
Fig. 11. The border town of Marivan, where fierce clashes were also reported, Is also a place where
PJAK are very active. Gunmen from the group have repeatedly killed IRGC personnel there, as
recently as a day before Amnesty published its final report on May 20 th, 2020 62. According to
Brigadier General Ali Azadi, a police commander in Kurdistan province, "25 ringleaders and main
culprits behind the riots in the two cities of Marivan and Sanandaj have been detained..and 3
firearms and some cold weapons have been discovered and seized from them.63" If true, this would
undermine Amnesty's spurious argument that only in Mahshahr were protesters armed with guns.
Fig. 10 A masked gunman takes aim Fig.11: Police defend the justice centre in Javanrood
9. Bystanders and onlookers, who were not protesting, were shot and killed
Bahreini states in her report that, “officials have repeatedly made false statements and produced
numerous propaganda videos on state TV saying most of the victims were killed by armed “rioters”
or “suspicious agents” working for “enemies” of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” She also dismisses the
claim made by President Rouhani that bullets used against civilians, “did not belong to the police,
Revolutionary Guards or the Basij” and that of Admiral Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Iran's supreme
national security council, that 85% of those killed during the unrest in Tehran province were not shot
by anyone from the security forces 64. Certainly, it is true that security forces did fire bullets at rioters,
however, they were not the only ones to do so. Amnesty's “Digital verification corps”, led by Sam
Dubberley, is not acquainted with ballistics analysis and did not have access to the physical evidence
to positively determine that only bullets used by the Iranian armed forces were fired, or what type of
bullet was used. As such, Bahreini is not in any position to declare that these are “false” statements .
Crucially, Amnesty has accepted that “bystanders”, who were not actually protesting at the time they
were shot, are among the death toll. This raises the question as to whether the armed forces were
firing so indiscriminately that they hit random bystanders – the video evidence does not suggest this
- or whether there were other persons firing at them. Of course, as seen in the George Floyd protests
in the United States, bystanders can be accidentally injured and so it is perfectly possible that some
civilians were shot by officers who did not intentionally target them. But there is good evidence that
agents provocateurs were at work in fomenting nasty incidents such as in the southern city of Shiraz.
According to a report by The Guardian, protests held in the city on Saturday Nov 16th were initially
peaceful and good-natured between the police and protesters before violence erupted after an hour
65. Police started using tear gas and batons to clear protesters who were blocking access to key roads.
Then, out of nowhere, live rounds started being fired with Mehdi Nekouyee being one of the first to
fall. In Amnesty's own analysis, Nekouyee was shot from behind in the back even though he was not
running away from police at the time. A 15 year old boy on his way home from school in Sadra city,
Mohammad Dastkhankhah was also shot, this time in the heart, even though he wasn't participating
in the protests or posed a threat. Iranian police have denied targeting him, and had no reason to do.
A report by the Centre for Human Rights in Iran (CHRI) published a few days after Amnesty's final
analysis, lists 20 individuals that they have confirmed as having died in the unrest 66
. It is striking that
most of these are reported as having not participated in the protests at the time of their death. It is
mentioned that they were simply commuting or had gone out to do shopping. They include Golnar
Samsami who was shot and killed on her way home from work in the city of Shahriar, west of Tehran,
where some of the most violent clashes took place. In another case, a man named Farzad Ansarifar,
who was not involved in the firing of a bank in Behbahan, was shot and killed. His father has stated
that ,“He was way in the back, behind where all the trouble was taking place.” Amnesty also reported
the death of a “Mina Sheikhi” who was watching a small protest from the roof of the apartment in
Tehran when she was shot three times in the heart by someone from the street below 67. It is hard to
imagine how she could have been killed by stray bullets fired from a police rifle. A 14 year old-girl,
Nikta Esfandani, was also reported as having been killed, but Amnesty accepts the story is not
confirmed 68. Therefore, the large number of non-violent bystanders/onlookers who died means that
whoever was responsible was more interested in killing individuals than in suppressing the protests.
10. Was there a “shoot-to-kill” policy by the security forces?
Amnesty alleges that Iranian security forces went on a “killing spree” against protesters. Researchers
like Bahreini have examined social media videos that show police firing on them in many cases. The
authorities in Iran have, indeed, acknowledged that this happened when police confronted rioters.
The governor of the Qods township, west of Tehran city, Layla Vaseqi, has stated that she gave
permission to guards protecting her offices to fire on rioters if they tried to breach the premises. The
assailants, in this case, did enter the administrative state building with the intention to ransack it 69.
However, phone videos do not capture the full context of the events that they portray, only what the
person making the video wants to be seen. Moreover, these videos don't show what types of
projectile were actually being fired. A report by the Observation Team of France24, named “Hidden
Slaughter”, has examined some 750 social media videos captured on smart phones. The Team
claimed that they showed that Iranian police were firing on protesters in order to kill them 70.
However, in many of the videos, the muzzle flash – the discharge that comes out of the gun – is quite
large. This would tend to indicate that blanks 71, not live rounds, were being used as warning shots as
seen in Fig. 12. In many other instances, police are shown aiming and firing at the legs with the
person targeted going down but not showing any signs of a blood wound, as seen in Fig. 13 where an
officer is seen aiming at the lower part of the body of a young man who was pursuing him. This
would indicate that plastic bullets were being used, which the Iranian police possess for riot control.
Although they can be lethal shot at close range, if aimed at the legs they serve to incapacitate rather
than to injure or kill. Indeed, in the post-election unrest of 2009 a PressTV reporter, Faranak Amidi,
who quit her job and joined the protesters, was shot in the knee by a plastic bullet during a
demonstration but did not suffer any serious injury 72. As such, the videos show that Iranian police
were seeking to control the violence without necessarily resorting to killing any protesting civilians.
Although the security forces may well have been heavy-handed, and were not reluctant to use their
firearms, they were also acting with a professional constraint in most engagements with protesters.
Fig. 12 An officer fires warning shots at rioting youths Fig. 13 An officer fires a plastic round at a pursuer
11. Were Iranian security personnel justified in the use of (lethal) force?
Every year in the United States, about 1,000 civilians are shot dead by the police, many of them
unarmed 73. (In 1992, 63 persons were killed in the Los Angeles riots in 1992 74, a good many shot by
the police, and 80-90 were brutally killed in the Waco siege a year later 75). Amnesty International
rarely ever criticises this violence. It has only offered relatively mild criticism of the response to the
George Floyd Protests and has not called for an inquiry into protester deaths and use of excessive
and unnecessary force. However, all law enforcement organizations around the world consider it
necessary to protect property, as well as the lives of civilians, and indeed their own lives, with the
use of the appropriate amount of force. Faced with the worst rioting in the history of Iran, the
security forces had to forcefully respond to restore order. Amnesty considers any kind of shooting at
civilians in Iran - but not necessarily in other countries – as being unlawful in all circumstances. This
is irrespective of whether those civilians were themselves armed with cold weapons and/or firearms.
But Iranian law does empower the security forces to be armed and to use their weapons provided
that there is sufficient reason and cause. Under the Islamic Shariah code, violent rioters could be
seen as “mohareboon”, namely waging war upon God, which would justify maximum force to be
used against them. Thus, Amnesty cannot make a sweeping claim that the shooting of rioters was
unlawful under both Iranian and international law. They also acknowledge that some deaths were
accidental, caused by suffocation from inhaling tear gas which is commonly used for crowd dispersal.
The legality of these incidents can only be determined on a case by case basis. Certainly, the attacks
by rioters on police and paramilitary facilities - where weapons were stored and could be seized from
– justified the use of lethal force in defending them. Had the security forces not acted decisively and
forcefully, they would have had an armed insurrection to deal with that would have led to the loss of
more lives. As reported by Maziar Bahari, in June 2009, during protests against the re-election of
then president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a group of MEK members laid siege to a Basij compound in
Tehran 76. One of the guards fired on these rioters, killing at least 7 of them. The facility was later
burned to the ground by the mob. These killings were entirely legal as they were a form of self-
defense and would, thus, be in total accordance with the UN's Basic Principles on the use of Force
and Firearms. The same applies for similar incidents that occurred during the November 2019 riots.
12. Was the Internet shut down to conceal a massacre?
Another plank of Amnesty's argument about a massacre having been conducted is that the
authorities shut down most connectivity to the Internet for several days. Philip Luther alleges that it
did so to prevent the world from seeing the massacre they were about to perpetrate in order to quell
the unrest 77. The authorities defend their decision as necessary to disrupt communications between
highly coordinated groups of armed thugs intent on acts of violence and destruction. The latter
argument is the only one that makes sense and there is evidence that the action did serve to
disorientate some of the violent protesters. According to The Financial Times, a protester named
Ahmad said that, “The Internet was shut down and we felt it was a lonely war as we didn’t have
enough information about what was happening in the rest of the country. 78” The shutting down of
the Internet for a few days did not prevent videos being taken of any street clashes and they were all
posted once it was restored. Therefore, the world was always going to see what happened regardless
of when it became known; there was media coverage before the advent of the Internet. It seems
likely that without such a draconian measure, the unrest would have continued for many more days.
13. Were families of those killed harassed and intimidated?
Bahreini's final report also focuses on the alleged, “ruthless campaign to intimidate families and
prevent them from speaking out.”. In a prior press release, Amnesty stated that, “there are also
shocking reports that, when the authorities have returned victims’ bodies to their families, they have
demanded payment citing several reasons, including the cost of the bullet that killed their loved one,
or compensation for property destroyed during the protests.” The claim about families being charged
for the bodies or the bullets used to kill their relatives is on oft-recycled assertion that Amnesty has
provided no evidence to support whatsoever. Indeed, it is omitted in the final report. Bahreini claims
that families had to bury their dead under tight security, but also appears to admit that all bodies
were returned to the families who held private burials. Only two cases are given of where a person
was “disappeared” and has not been ever seen again. She also claims that independent autopsies
were denied, but admits that the death certificates that she had obtained list the injuries that caused
death and that they name projectiles, such as bullets, in many cases. She charges that the families of
the deceased have been intimidated into not talking to independent media. But that would
contradict the fact that, according to her own report, they did speak to Amnesty and other human
rights groups in many cases. She mentions the family of a “Majid Sheikhi” as having spoken with Iran
International which is a Saudi-funded Persian-language propaganda channel. Another point raised
concerns the non-return of the effects of the deceased, but standard practice allows the police to
retain evidence for any criminal investigation. It is true, however, that the family of Pouya Bakhtiari –
a protester killed near Karaj under suspicious circumstances according to Iranian media 79 – were
prevented from holding his 40th day memorial and some of them were arrested for attempting this.
14. Conclusion
14.
It is clear that the figures and narratives of Amnesty and Reuters just don't hold up under scrutiny.
They also don't comport. The latter claims 40 times as many women died than does the former.
Predictably, whilst calling for the the prosecution of “state agents” with “criminal responsibility”,
Amnesty has pointedly declined to call for the prosecution of rioters who destroyed property and
injured/killed policemen. This indicates that Amnesty is not concerned about human rights abuses
across the board. In other words, the violence of rioters towards private/public property and the
lives of the security forces is not as unacceptable as that of any state violence. Likewise, Amnesty
demands a process to ensure non-repetition of the shooting of protesters, but no effort to prevent
the repeat of any major rioting. Iran's judiciary spokesman, Gholamhussein Esmaili, has stated that
Amnesty, “named people who have died in other incidents that are different from the recent riots
and many of those people claimed to be killed are alive 80.” Certainly, many people have been
identified who were shot and killed whilst not participating in any protest at the time of their death.
However, it is also true that the Iranian authorities must do as Amnesty recommends and investigate
each and every death now that the official toll is known. At around 230 deaths, this would still make
it by far the bloodiest unrest in the history of the Islamic Republic, easily surpassing the death toll of
50-100 killed in the Green Movement protests of 2009. If the armed forces used excessive or
unnecessary force, then the appropriate action against those officers responsible must be taken and
families must be compensated. But any investigation has to also look into the possibility that many
deaths were caused by armed rioters and situations where civilians may have been accidentally
caught in the crossfire between themselves and the security forces. Amnesty rejects this out of hand.
Instead of offering a nuanced account that reflected the reality of events on the ground – as difficult
as they may have been to observe and gather information about – Amnesty's Raha Bahreini has
pursued a narrow black and white narrative. This suits her own political purposes, and this is used by
her employer to help raise funds to investigate “abuses” and “violations” that did not likely did not
happen under the circumstances. All of this is for the sake of sensationalism to make money:
Amnesty is currently facing a budget crisis due to a fall in donations and thus needs to grab attention.
Ultimately, the Iranian government, and especially President Rouhani, are responsible for the fallout
of the 2019 unrest. His decision to end gasoline rationing in 2015, when it had successfully been
implemented in 2007, was unnecessary. The sudden announcement of the increase in gasoline prices
was completely mishandled, and the ensuing chaos allowed violent elements to exploit popular
resentment. The authorities should have been expecting trouble and planned for this accordingly.
Methodology: All material in English and Persian on the subject of the November reports, including
articles written by Amnesty and Reuters staff, were analysed as the source material for this article. In
addition, journalists, community activists and ordinary people living in Iran were interviewed to
corroborate information obtained about the events. Reuters staff who were unhappy about the
publication of the Dec 23rd article also volunteered their criticisms but asked to remain anonymous.
Authorship: The authors of this article are two Iranian scientists resident in the United
Kingdom and are not employees of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
They occasionally write on matters relating to Iranophobia in the western media. This rejoinder
was not sponsored by any organisation and it solely reflects the analysis and opinion of both authors.
Their contact details are provided below for any comments or further information about the article:
Yousef Bozorgmehr: bozorgmehr@mail.com Reza Esfandiari: esfandiarireza@ymail.com
Distribution: This article is not copyright and may be freely distributed and shared on any platform.